- Simon Board, University of California, Los Angeles
- Gabriel Carroll, Stanford University
- Yuliy Sannikov, Princeton University
- Andrzej Skrzypacz, Stanford University
- Takuo Sugaya, Stanford University
- Alexander Wolitzky, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
To attend, pre-registration is required. Check the homepage for details.
This session will be held at the Knight Management Center, room C105.
This session aims to bring together microeconomic theorists working on dynamic games and contracts with more applied theorists working in macro, finance, organizational economics, and other fields. First, this is a venue to discuss the latest questions and techniques facing researchers working in dynamic games and contracts. Second, we wish to foster interdisciplinary discussion between scholars working on parallel topics in different disciplines, in particular, helping raise awareness among theorists of the open questions in other fields.
Presentation theme groupings:
- Delegation - Monday a.m.
- Bargaining - Monday 1-3 p.m.
- Auctions - Monday 3-5 p.m.
- Cooperation - Tuesday a.m.
- Learning and Incentives - Tuesday p.m.
- Employment Contracts - Wednesday a.m.
- Learning in Markets - Wednesday p.m.
[see times below]