Session 2: Labor and Finance
- Jonathan Berk (Stanford Graduate School of Business)
- Luigi Pistaferri (Stanford University)
- Philip Bond (University of Washington)
- Claudio Michelacci (Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance)
- Marco Pagano (University of Naples Federico II, Center for Studies in Economics and Finance and EIEF)
The location for this session will be Landau Economics Bldg, Lucas Conference Room A, 579 Serra Mall.
The Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics (SITE), in cooperation with the Center for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), and the Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), invites paper submissions on the relationships between labor and finance. Possible issues include:
- role of employees in the governance and financing of companies,
- response of wages and employment to financial shocks,
- risk sharing arrangements between firms and workers,
- financial development, job reallocation and employment growth,
- effects of regulation of financial markets on industrial relations,
- human capital, portfolio choice and asset pricing.
The conference aims to bring together researchers from labor and financial economics to discuss issues from the point of view of both disciplines.
In this Session
Jul 31 | 1:30 pm to 2:30 pm
The Dark Side of Hedge Fund Activism: Evidence from Employee Pension Plans
Presented by: Anup Agrawal, University of Alabama
This study examines whether shareholder wealth gains from hedge fund activism are partly wealth transfers from employees and taxpayers. We find that defined benefit employee pension plans of target firms experience underfunding after activism events. Our identification strategy is to use firm fixed effects, tests of the underlying mechanism and tests of alternative hypotheses. We find that employee pension plans suffer from underfunding due to reduced employer contributions to the plans.
Jul 31 | 3:00 pm to 4:00 pm
The Employee Clientele of Corporate Leverage: Evidence from Personal Labor Income Diversification
Presented by: Jie (Jack) He, University of Georgia
Using employee job-level data, we empirically test the equilibrium matching between a firm’s debt usage and its employee job risk aversion (“clientele effect”), as predicted by the existing theories. We measure job risk aversion for a firm’s employees using their labor income concentration in the firm, calculated as the fraction of the employees’ total personal labor income or total household labor income that is accounted for by their income from this particular firm. Using a sample of about 1,400 U.S.
Jul 31 | 4:00 pm to 5:00 pm
Credit and Punishment: Career Incentives in Corporate Banking
Presented by: Kristoph Kleiner, Indiana University
This study examines the role of incentives in disciplining bankers' risk-taking and influencing loan performance in the market for corporate loans. In particular, we study the relationship between negative credit events (i.e., defaults, bankruptcies, and rating downgrades) and career turnover for loan officers underwriting syndicated loans. We construct a comprehensive dataset containing the identities and employment histories of nearly 1,500 loan officers employed by major corporate banking departments from the period spanning 1994 to 2014.
Aug 1 | 9:00 am to 10:00 am
Bankruptcy, Team-specific Human Capital, and Innovation: Evidence from U.S. Inventors
Presented by: Rui Silva, London Business School
Abstract: This paper studies the impact of bankruptcies on the career and productivity of inventors in the U.S. We find that when inventor teams are dissolved because of bankruptcy, inventors subsequently become less productive. When, instead, inventor teams remain intact and jointly move to a new firm, their post-bankruptcy productivity increases. Consistent with the labor market recognizing the value of team stability, we find that the probability of joint inventor reallocation post-bankruptcy is positively associated with past collaboration.
Aug 1 | 10:00 am to 11:00 am
Technological Innovation and the Distribution of Labor Income Growth Rates
Presented by: Lawrence Schmidt, University of Chicago
Aug 1 | 11:30 am to 12:30 pm
Asset Pricing with Endogenously Uninsurable Tail Risks
Presented by: Anmol Bhandari, University of Minnesota
This paper studies asset pricing in a setting where idiosyncratic risks in labor productivities are uninsurable due to limited commitment. Firms provide insurance to workers using long-term contracts but neither side can commit to these relationships. Under the optimal contract, sufficiently adverse shocks to worker productivity are uninsured. as firms cannot commit to negative net present value projects. In general equilibrium, exposure to down-side tail risks results in higher risk premia, more volatile returns and variation of returns across firms.
Aug 1 | 1:30 pm to 2:30 pm
Earnings Dynamics, Mobility Costs and Transmission of Firm and Market Level Shocks
Presented by: Thibaut Lamadon, University of Chicago
The goals of this paper are threefold. First, we quantify the extent to which firm and market level productivity shocks are transmitted to wages. Second, we recover the frictions or costs to worker mobility across firms and markets from the transmission of productivity shocks. And third, we examine the extent to which taxes and transfers, the family, and long-term contracts attenuate firm and market level shocks, and thereby, influence the incentives to and costs of worker reallocation across firms and markets.
Aug 1 | 3:00 pm to 4:00 pm
The Effect of Superstar Firms on College Major Choice
Presented by: Darwin Choi, Chinese University of Hong Kong
We study the effect of superstar firms on an important human capital decision -- college students’ choice of major. Past salient, extreme events in an industry, as proxied by cross-sectional skewness in stock returns (or in favorable news coverage),are associated with a disproportionately larger number of college students choosing to major in related fields, even after controlling for the average industry return. This tendency to follow the superstars, however, results in a temporary over-supply of human capital.
Aug 1 | 4:00 pm to 5:00 pm
Debt and Human Capital: Evidence from Student Loans
Presented by: Constantine Yannelis, New York University
This paper investigates the dynamic relation between debt and investments in human capital. We document a negative causal effect of the level of undergraduate student debt on the probability of enrolling in a graduate degree for a random sample of the universe of federal student loan borrowers in the US. We exploit exogenous variation in student debt induced by tuition increases that affect differentially students within the same school across cohorts.
Aug 2 | 9:00 am to 10:00 am
Locked in by Leverage: Job Search during the Housing Crisis
Presented by: David Matsa, Northwestern University
This paper examines how housing market distress affects job search. Using data from a leading online job search platform during the Great Recession, we find that job seekers in areas with depressed housing markets apply for fewer jobs that require relocation. With their search constrained geographically, job seekers broaden their search to lower-level positions nearby. These effects are stronger for job seekers with recourse mortgages, which we confirm using spatial regression discontinuity analysis.
Aug 2 | 10:00 am to 11:00 am
Angels, Entrepreneurship, and Employment Dynamics: Evidence from Investor Accreditation Rules
Presented by: Luke Stein, Arizona State University
This paper examines the effects of a shock to angel finance on entrepreneurial activity and employment. Using public micro data from the U.S. Census, we construct a state-level estimate of the fraction of accredited investors likely affected by Dodd-Frank’s elimination of housing wealth in the determination of accreditation status. We demonstrate that a larger reduction in the pool of potential angels negatively affects firm entry and reduces employment levels at small entrants.
Aug 2 | 11:30 am to 12:30 pm
The Equilibrium Value of Employee Ethics
Presented by: Brendan Daley, Duke University
We propose a model in which employees differ in both skills and ethics. Employees receive a private, non-verifiable signal about the quality of their project, and decide whether or not to undertake it. Skilled employees lead more projects to success than unskilled ones. Ethical employees internalize the overall costs and benefits of a project whereas strategic employees make their decision based solely on personal rewards (i.e., future wages).