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Session 4: Dynamic Games, Contracts and Markets

August 7-9, 2019 | Patterson Building | 663 Serra St, Rm P102, Stanford

The idea of this session is to bring together microeconomic theorists working on dynamic games, mechanisms, and contracts with more applied theorists working in macro, finance, organizational economics, and other fields. First, this is a venue to discuss the latest questions and techniques facing researchers working in microeconomic dynamics. Second, we wish to foster interdisciplinary discussion between scholars working on parallel topics in different disciplines, in particular, helping raise awareness among theorists of the open questions in other fields.

Organizers: Simon Board (University of California, Los Angeles), Daniel Garrett (Toulouse School of Economics), Yingni Guo (Northwestern University), Andrzej Skrzypacz (Stanford Graduate School of Business), Takuo Sugaya (Stanford Graduate School of Business) and Felipe Varas (Duke) 

In this Session

Aug 7 | 8:30 am to 9:00 am

Check-in | Breakfast

Aug 7 | 9:00 am to 9:45 am

A Dynamic Theory of Learning and Relationship Lending

Presented by: Felipe Varas (Duke University)
Co-Author(s): Yunzhi Hu (UNC Chapel Hill)
Aug 7 | 9:45 am to 10:15 am

Break

Aug 7 | 10:15 am to 11:00 am

Delegating Learning

Presented by: Qiaoxi Zhang (University of Chile)
Co-Author(s): Juan F. Escobar (University of Chile)
Aug 7 | 11:00 am to 11:30 am

Break

Aug 7 | 11:30 am to 12:15 pm

Contracting with Non-Exponential Discounting: Moral Hazard and Dynamic Inconsistency

Presented by: Can Urgun (Princeton University)
Co-Author(s): Doruk Cetemen (Collegio Carlo Alberto) and Felix Feng (University of Notre Dame)
Aug 7 | 12:15 pm to 2:00 pm

Lunch

Aug 7 | 2:00 pm to 2:45 pm

Robust Opinion Aggregation and its Dynamics

Presented by: Giacomo Lanzani (MIT)
Aug 7 | 2:45 pm to 3:15 pm

Break

Aug 7 | 3:15 pm to 4:00 pm

Endogenous Learning from Incremental Actions

Presented by: Julia Salmi (University College London)
Co-Author(s): Tuomas Laiho (University of Oslo) and Pauli Murto (Aalto University School of Business)
Aug 7 | 4:00 pm to 4:30 pm

Break

Aug 7 | 4:30 pm to 5:15 pm

Macroeconomics with Learning and Misspecification: A General Theory and Applications

Presented by: Pooya Molavi (MIT)
Aug 7 | 6:00 pm

Dinner (Off Site)

Aug 8 | 8:30 am to 9:00 am

Breakfast

Aug 8 | 9:00 am to 9:45 am

The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Anonymous Random Matching

Presented by: Joyee Deb (Yale University)
Co-Author(s): Takuo Sugaya (Stanford University) and Alexander Wolitzky (MIT)
Aug 8 | 9:45 am to 10:15 am

Break

Aug 8 | 10:15 am to 11:00 am

Steady-State Equilibria in Anonymous Repeated Games

Presented by: Alexander Wolitzky (MIT)
Co-Author(s): Drew Fudenberg (MIT) and Daniel Clark (MIT)
Aug 8 | 11:00 am to 11:30 am

Break

Aug 8 | 11:30 am to 12:15 pm

The Use and Misuse of Coordinated Punishments

Presented by: Yingni Guo (Northwestern University)
Co-Author(s): Daniel Barron (Northwestern University)
Aug 8 | 12:15 pm to 2:00 pm

Lunch

Aug 8 | 2:00 pm to 2:45 pm

Our Distrust is Very Expensive

Presented by: Mallesh Pai (Rice University)
Co-Author(s): Rahul Deb (University of Toronto) and Matthew Mitchell (University of Toronto)
Aug 8 | 2:45 pm to 3:15 pm

Break

Aug 8 | 3:15 pm to 4:00 pm

Family Knows Best: Fund Advisors as Talent Rating Agencies

Presented by: Dmitry Orlov (University of Rochester)
Co-Author(s): Ron Kaniel (University of Rochester)
Aug 8 | 4:00 pm to 4:30 pm

Break

Aug 8 | 4:30 pm to 5:15 pm

Ratings Design and Barriers to Entry

Presented by: Nikhil Vellodi (Princeton)
Aug 9 | 8:30 am to 9:00 am

Breakfast

Aug 9 | 9:00 am to 9:45 am

Information Acquisition and Strategic Investment Timing

Presented by: Erik Madsen (New York University)
Co-Author(s): Rishabh Kirpalani (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
Aug 9 | 9:45 am to 10:15 am

Break

Aug 9 | 10:15 am to 11:00 am

Signaling with Private Monitoring

Presented by: Gonzalo Cisternas (Massachussetts Institute of Technology)
Co-Author(s): Aaron Kolb (Indiana University)
Aug 9 | 11:00 am to 11:30 am

Break

Aug 9 | 11:30 am to 12:15 pm

Startups and Upstarts

Presented by: Yu Awaya (University of Rochester)
Co-Author(s): Vijay Krishna (Penn State University)
Aug 9 | 12:15 pm to 2:00 pm

Lunch

Aug 9 | 2:00 pm to 2:45 pm

Optimal Mechanism for the Sale of a Durable Good

Presented by: Laura Doval (California Institute of Technology)
Co-Author(s): Vasiliki Skreta (University of Texas at Austin, University College London, and CEPR)
Aug 9 | 2:45 pm to 3:15 pm

Break

Aug 9 | 3:15 pm to 4:00 pm

Repeated Games with Observable Actions in Continuous Time: Costly Transfers in Repeated Cooperation

Presented by: Mikhail Panov (NYU)
Aug 9 | 4:00 pm to 4:30 pm

Break

Aug 9 | 4:30 pm to 5:15 pm

Bargaining Over Heterogeneous Good With Structural Uncertainty

Presented by: Marcin Peski (University of Toronto)