Why did the Democrats Lose the South?
Bringing New Data to an Old Debate

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Abstract

Between 1958 and 1980, Southern whites’ identification with the Democratic party fell 17 percentage points relative to other whites. To what extent was this decline driven by the party’s association with 1960s Civil Rights legislation versus Southern economic development and other secular changes that made the party less attractive to the region? Answering this central question in American political economy has been hampered by lack of data on racial attitudes from both before and after the Civil Rights era. Our contribution is to uncover and employ such measures, drawn from Gallup surveys dating back to 1958. From 1958 to 1961, conservative racial views strongly predict Democratic identification among Southern whites, a correlation that disappears after President Kennedy introduces sweeping Civil Rights legislation in 1963. Gallup’s monthly presidential approval surveys allow us to more finely link regional variation in white support for Kennedy to episodes where newspapers linked his name to Civil Rights initiatives (and allows us to eliminate other policy initiatives and current events as potential causes). We conclude that the entire 17 percentage-point decline in relative white Southern Democratic identification between 1958 and 1980, and 75% of the 20 percentage-point decline from 1958 to 2000, is explained by racial attitudes, with little if any role for income growth or other observable secular changes.

Keywords: Party identification; Civil Rights movement

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1 Introduction

After nearly a century of loyalty and despite the general stability of Americans’ party identification in adulthood, Southern whites left the Democratic party *en masse* in the second half of the twentieth century.\(^1\) As illustrated in Figure 1, at mid-century white Southerners (defined throughout as residents of the eleven states of the former Confederacy) were 25 percentage points more likely to identify as Democrats than were other whites, a gap that disappeared by the mid 1980s and has since flipped in sign.\(^2\) Despite the massive, concurrent enfranchisement of Southern blacks, who overwhelmingly favored the Democrats from 1964 onward, the resulting shifts in aggregate Southern political outcomes were stark: to take but one example, in 1960, all U.S. senators from the South were Democrats, whereas today all but three (of 22) are Republican.

This paper explores why this political shift occurred and in particular quantifies the role of Civil Rights and Southern racial attitudes in explaining the change. This central question of American political economy remains unresolved. On one side of the argument are researchers who rely on more qualitative sources (interviews, party platforms, correspondence and other historical sources) and conclude that Civil Rights was the prime cause. While the Democratic party had been unequivocally associated with Jim Crow policies from the end of Reconstruction until the middle of the twentieth century, as early as the 1940s the Northern wing of the party began to support some Civil Rights positions. These scholars argue that Democratic presidents’ introducing and signing of the Civil Rights (1964) and Voting Rights (1965) Acts—outlawing, respectively, discrimination in public accommodations and voting restrictions that in practice occurred only in the South—triggers the permanent exodus of many white Southerners from the party.

On the other side are scholars whose more quantitative methods (correlations using repeated cross-sectional data, most typically the cumulative file of the ANES, the American National Election Surveys) point to factors other than Civil Rights and race. They most often argue that economic development in the South made the redistributive policies of the Democrats increasingly unattractive. Indeed, the *a priori* case for factors besides Civil Rights is weak: the eleven states of the former Confederacy are Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia.

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\(^1\)Political scientists have found partisanship, like religion or ethnicity, to be a stable part of an adult’s identity. The canonical reference is Campbell *et al.* (1966), with a more quantitative treatment by Green *et al.* (2004).

\(^2\)Authors’ calculation using Gallup micro data (more information on this data source is provided in Section 3). The eleven states of the former Confederacy are Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia.
Rights is compelling. Southern dealignment, though much accelerated during the 1960s, was (and perhaps still is) a slow moving trend.\(^3\) As we detail in Section 4, voters viewed Civil Rights as the most important issue facing the country for a fleeting two to three year period, undermining the case that it could be the underlying cause of a fifty-year trend. Moreover, Southern dealignment coincides with massive economic catch-up in the region—from 1940 to 1980, per capita income in the South rose from 60 to 89 percent of the U.S. average—which would predict a movement away from the more redistributive party.\(^4\) Beyond economic catch-up, demographic change (driven by both Northern Republican migrants and younger voters coming into the age of majority post-Jim Crow) and the liberalization of the Democratic party on other issues such as abortion and welfare may have pushed whites in the region out of the party.\(^5\)

That such disagreement could remain on such a central question may seem surprising, but data limitations have severely hampered research on this question. Until recently, consistently worded survey questions on racial attitudes from before and after the major Civil Rights victories of the 1960s have not been widely available. For example, as we review in the next section, those authors using the cumulative ANES to address the role of racial views on party alignment typically begin their analysis in the 1970s, well after the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts.

In this paper, we uncover and employ the missing measure of racial attitudes from both before and after the Civil Rights movement, by turning to micro-data from Gallup surveys. Beginning in 1958, Gallup asks respondents “Between now and ..[election]... there will be much discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates. If your party nominated a well-qualified man for president, would you vote for him if he happened to be a Negro?” Fortunately for our purposes, the wording has remained consistent and the question has been asked repeatedly since that date.\(^6\) We refer to those who do not answer in the affirmative to this question as having conservative racial views (“conservative” as in “believing in the value of established and traditional practices in politics and society,” Merriam-Webster). To our knowledge, these data represent the longest running time series on Americans’ attitudes toward racial equality.

\(^3\)We use the term “dealignment” instead of “realignment” in this paper as we focus on Southerners leaving the Democratic party—whether to join the Republicans, adopt independent status, or support third-party candidates such as Strom Thurmond or George Wallace.

\(^4\)Authors’ calculation, *Statistical Abstracts*, various years.

\(^5\)We detail each of these arguments in the next Section.

\(^6\)Changes are very minor and are discussed in detail in Section 3.
Having identified our measure of racial attitudes, we then define the pre- and post-periods by determining the moment at which the Democratic Party is first seen as actively pursuing a more liberal Civil Rights agenda than Republicans. Conventional wisdom of the race-as-cause view states that President Johnson famously “lost the South” with his signing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. However, marshaling contemporaneous media sources, survey questions on respondents’ views on issue importance and parties’ positions on racial equality, we identify instead the Spring of 1963—when John F. Kennedy first proposed legislation barring discrimination in public accommodations—as the critical moment when Civil Rights is, for the first time, an issue of great importance to the majority of Americans and an issue clearly associated with the Democratic Party.

The first part of our exploration on the role of racial views in explaining white Southern dealignment focuses on a triple-difference analysis: how much of the post-period decrease in Democratic party identification among Southern versus other whites is explained by the differential decline among those Southerners with conservative racial attitudes? We find that racial attitudes have little if any explanatory power for non-Southern whites’ party identification in either period. In the South, conservative racial views strongly predict Democratic identification in the pre-period, but this correlation is wiped out between August 1961 and August 1963 (the last poll of the pre- and the first poll of the post-period, respectively). Most important to the question at hand, the entire 17 percentage-point decline in Democratic party identification between 1958 and 1980 is explained by the 19 percentage point decline among Southern whites with conservative racial views. Extending the post-period through 2000, 77% of the 20 percentage-point drop is explained by the differential drop among Southern whites with conservative racial views. This pattern of results is robust to controlling flexibly for socioeconomic status measures included in the Gallup data and is highly evident in event-time graphical analysis as well.

The second part of our exploration exploits higher-frequency variation provided again in the Gallup micro data. Whereas Gallup only asks the black president question every one to two years, it asks its signature “presidential approval” question roughly once a month during our sample period. We can thus perform a high-frequency analysis surrounding our key moment of Spring of 1963 by correlating presidential approval (for John F. Kennedy) in the South versus the non-South, with the daily count of newspaper articles that include the President’s name along with terms related to Civil Rights. The most striking result is the 35 percentage point drop in his support among whites in the South (compared to no
change in the North and a rise among blacks) between the April 6th and June 23rd 1963 Gallup polls (which corresponded to a surge of articles related to his support of protesters during Martin Luther King’s Birmingham campaign in May and the president’s televised announcement of the Civil Rights Bill on June 11th). This drop in support for Kennedy is reflected in both survey data on his approval and on preferences in a hypothetical matchup between Kennedy and Goldwater in anticipation of the following year’s presidential election. Smaller Civil Rights moments (e.g., the integration of Ole Miss in September 1962) also match up to significant dips in Kennedy’s relative approval among Southern whites.

In regression analysis, we find that relative white Southern approval of Kennedy is inversely related to the frequency with which the media mentions his name alongside Civil Rights. Moreover, when we allow Southern whites to have differential reaction to other news items of the period (e.g., Cuba, tax policy) the strong, negative relationship between Kennedy’s relative approval in the South and his Civil Rights mentions if anything grows, suggesting that our main results our unlikely driven by similarly timed alternative policies or events. Moreover, a simple regression of white approval on state fixed effects and Civil Rights article counts explain over half the decline in relative white Southern approval of Kennedy during his administration, whereas no other issue or event explains more than 20%. During this key period, Civil Rights swamps all other issues in explaining regional variation in white approval of the Democratic president.

Our work speaks to the large literature on whether political and policy preferences in the US are motivated by class versus racial or ethnic identification. We find that, consistent with work that argues that racial fractionalization helps explain “American exceptionalism” in terms of limited redistribution (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004, Lee and Roemer, 2006, Luttmer, 2001), that during these key years racial attitudes explain the entire white Southern shift away from the Democrats.

Our findings further shed light on redistributive patterns within the US. First, race-based dealignment offers an explanation for why the poorest part of the country now serves as the base for the anti-redistributive political party.\footnote{A recent policy manifestation of this pattern is the refusal of almost all Southern states to expand Medicaid coverage to poor adults under the Affordable Care Act, despite the fact that the South remains the poorest region of the country, even when considering only whites (authors’ calculation using 2013 ACS).} Second, our findings provide a potential explanation for why—in stark contrast to the median voter model’s prediction (Meltzer and Richard, 1981)— redistribution in the US has receded since the 1970s, even as income
inequality has risen. We show that a large voting bloc left the more redistributive political party over largely non-economic issues, reducing political support for redistributive policies just when theory would predict that they should begin to become more popular.

The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review the debate between the more qualitative “Civil-Rights-as-cause” and more quantitative “other-trends-as-cause” sides of the literature. In Section 3, we introduce the Gallup micro data, and in particular our key question on racial attitudes. In Section 4, we justify our use of the Spring of 1963 as the key moment that separates the “pre-” and “post-periods.” In Section 5, we present results both from the triple-differences analysis as well as the high-frequency analysis on Kennedy’s approval. In Section 6, we more directly address the remaining arguments of the research arguing for causes besides Civil Rights. In Section 7 we offer some concluding thoughts and ideas for future work.

2 Debate Over the Role of Race in Southern Dealignment

The literature on the role of race in Southern politics is vast, and our attempts to summarize it here cannot do it proper justice. Almost all reviews start with V.O Key’s *Southern Politics in State and Nation*. Key memorably wrote, “[w]hatever phase of the southern political process one seeks to understand, sooner or later the trail of inquiry leads to the Negro” (Key Jr, 1949). Drawing on hundreds of interviews with Southern politicians and journalists, the book provides a state-by-state analysis of how race influenced Southern politics, but given its 1949 publication cannot directly speak to the coming dealignment. Carmines and Stimson (1989) is a modern update on this seminal work, using historical material (e.g., interviews, party platforms, and speech transcripts) as well as some tabulations from the ANES to argue that race was the motivating factor in the dealignment, as “racially conservative white southerners felt betrayed” when President Lyndon Johnson, a Texan, navigated the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (CRA).8

Those who argue against Civil Rights as the main cause of dealignment emphasize the lack

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8While this literature is primarily ethnographic, at times aggregate data are employed in a descriptive manner. For example, Carmines and Stimson point to the fact all five Deep South states voted majority Republican in 1964 (when Barry Goldwater, a staunch opponent of Civil Rights legislation, was the candidate), four of which had not done so in 92 years. Authors exploring the “racial threat” hypothesis—the idea that whites fled the Democratic Party because of the threat posed by the inclusion of new black voters—support their argument with county-level negative correlations between the black population or black voter registration and white Democratic Party registration (see, for example, Kohfeld, 1989).
of quantitative backing for the race claim. Shafer and Johnston (2009) are quite emphatic in this regard: “Yet if these propositions [our quantitative approach] appear almost elementary as an analytic strategy, they bump up against an established literature of Southern politics—charming and richly contextualized, but also unsystematic and deeply inbred.” But even on the more quantitative side of the debate, few if any authors perform formal econometric decompositions of the share of dealignment that can be explained by racial attitudes versus other factors. The authors more typically employ the cumulative file of the ANES (and to a somewhat lesser extent the General Social Survey) to offer indirect evidence (often cross tabulations) relating to the question.

While some papers in the quantitative literature argue for the primacy of racial attitudes in explaining dealignment, the majority argue that the role of Civil Rights and race has been vastly overstated.\footnote{Quantitative papers that conclude that racial views are key to dealignment include Valentino and Sears (2005), who use the GSS and cumulative ANES to show that, in the South relative to elsewhere, whites report more racially conservative views and that racial views have greater predictive power for whites’ party identification. McVeigh et al. (2014) use county-level data to show that the presence of a Ku Klux Klan (KKK) chapter in 1960 predicts higher vote shares for Goldwater (in 1964), George Wallace (in 1968), and more generally for Republicans in the elections since.}

We group their arguments into four main categories.

**Economic growth in the South.** Shafer and Johnston (2009) argue that income growth in the South was the key driver of dealignment (and in fact contend that Civil Rights, by introducing a strongly Democratic black voting bloc to the South, on net slowed the natural process of dealignment). They show via cross tabulations that, relative to the 1950s, in more recent decades it is *economically conservative* Southern whites who identify as Republican (they generally do not compare this trend to that among non-Southern whites).\footnote{In a wide-ranging critique of Shafer and Johnston, Kousser (2010) argues that growing social desirability of progressive racial views may mean that in more recent years racially conservative whites merely adapt the language of economic conservatism.}

Also using the ANES cumulative file, Brewer and Stonecash (2001) run a regression “horserace” between racial issues and income in predicting party identification and presidential and House support, again focusing on Southern whites in isolation. They find a larger coefficient on income, though given limited ANES questions on race, their regression analysis starts in the 1970s.\footnote{Note that they are not decomposing what share of the change is explained by income versus racial views, but instead estimating which factor has greater explanatory power, separately by decade.}

Interestingly, economists who have studied the role of economic development in explaining
Southern dealignment have reached the opposite conclusion. Wright (2013) argues in fact for a reverse causal chain. Using BEA annual data, he shows that while the South grew rapidly during World War II, its growth stalled from 1945 until the late 1960s. He credits the Civil Rights Act with the late-1960s economic surge in the South, meaning major exodus of Southern whites from the Democratic party preceded the South’s real catch-up growth.\textsuperscript{12} Using IPUMS data, we find that the relative Southern catch-up is limited to 1960-1980, consistent with this story (Appendix Figure A.1). Alston and Ferrie (1993) argue that the sharp rise of mechanization in the cotton industry during the 1960s actually made Southern elites more open to social insurance programs (and thus should have pushed them toward the Democrats).\textsuperscript{13} Neither of these arguments would seem to imply that Southern economic growth could have caused the 1960s nosedive in Democratic identification.\textsuperscript{14}

**Changing selection into the South.** The South experienced net in-migration after 1960. Given the large Democratic advantage in the South during much of the 20th century, in-migrants from the non-South would tend to be more Republican (Gimpel and Schuknecht, 2001 and Trende, 2012). However, Stanley (1988) uses ANES data to show that the vast majority of the overall decline is accounted for by native Southern whites, as the migrant population is simply too small to drive the effect. Age has also been considered as a dimension of dealignment that weakens the race case: Wattenberg (1991) argues that Southern whites who came of age since Jim Crow have in fact driven the dealignment, though Osborne \textit{et al.} (2011) finds that the shift has taken place among all cohorts.

**Issues other than Civil Rights.** Did Southern whites leave the Democratic Party, or did the Democratic Party leave Southern whites, by taking more liberal positions on redistribution, free speech, abortion and issues other than Civil Rights? Abramowitz and Saunders (1998) lend support for the latter view using the ANES to demonstrate that in the post-Civil Rights period ideology (how liberal or conservative the respondent is), as well as views on social welfare and security, are better predictors than racial views of Southern

\textsuperscript{12}He argues that, before Civil Rights, Southern firms were in a bad equilibrium: they would have preferred to sell to (hire) both black and white clients (workers), but any one firm moving away from the pre-Civil-Rights equilibrium might legitimately fear that its white clients (workers) could abandon it for another firm.

\textsuperscript{13}They argue that pre-mechanization, planter elites required a large, unskilled labor force, which they secured in part by providing informal social insurance (including physical protection from other, more violent whites). They would lose the ability to uniquely provide this employment benefit were the government to universally guarantee it.

\textsuperscript{14}Less quantitative work on the role of Southern economic development include Rorabaugh (2005) and Lassiter (2013).
white partisanship.

The timing of dealignment. As we show in Section 4, Civil Rights was a dominant issue for at most a few years in the mid-1960s. Trende (2012) argues that the slow-moving nature of Southern dealignment undermines the argument that Civil Rights was the prime trigger. He concludes that “the gradual realignment of the South had been going for nearly forty years by 1964 and continued at a glacial pace after that.” He points to the 1960 election as a key piece of evidence for secular causes: “That [Republican Richard] Nixon could do so well in the South while part of an administration that had finished desegregating Washington, argued that segregation was unconstitutional before the Supreme Court ... implemented [desegregation] with a show of force in Little Rock, and pushed through the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960 seems astonishing, until you realize that economics, rather than race, was primarily driving the development of Southern politics at the time.” We discuss the timing of dealignment with respect to Civil Rights events in detail in Section 6.3.

Although both large and contentious, the literature on the cause of dealignment has a clear gap: Due to the limitations of standard data sets, existing quantitative work is unable to examine racial attitudes before Civil Rights was a key political issue (and often several years after that). Even Shafer and Johnston, the authors perhaps most associated with the argument that economic development triggered dealignment, write: “Introducing racial attitudes into the story of legal desegregation and a politics of race will prove more difficult....because there is less substantive consistency in the opinion items asked by the [A]NES in the realm of race policy for the full postwar period.” Due to this limitation, a standard econometric decomposition of the share of dealignment accounted for by those with conservative racial views has not been possible.

As we describe in the following section, we have identified a consistent measure of racial attitudes dating back to 1958 by turning to a data source little used by social scientists.

3 Data

An ideal research design would employ panel data on white voters to compare the extent to which holding conservative racial views in the pre-period (before the Democratic party is associated with Civil Rights) predicts leaving the Party in the post-period, in the South versus the rest of the country. To the best of our knowledge, such panel data do not exist. We instead use repeated cross-sectional surveys from Gallup (and later the restricted-access version of the GSS) that each have the following key variables: a consistently worded measure
of racial attitudes, party identification, state of residence and race.

3.1 Gallup Surveys

Gallup, Harris and other commercial, academic and media surveys have been recently cataloged and in many cases made available for download on the website of the non-profit Roper Center at the University of Connecticut.\(^{15}\) The 20,000 surveys deposited at Roper date as far back as 1935 and cover topics such as foreign relations, health, economics, politics, and—most relevant for our purposes—social issues including racial attitudes. It is our hope that one contribution of this work will be to increase awareness and usage of Roper’s resources.

As noted in the introduction, beginning in 1958 Gallup repeatedly asks respondents whether they would vote for a qualified man (“person,” in more recent years) who happened to be Negro (“black”). Appendix Table B.1 documents the exact wording of this item separately by survey date, as well as the wording of the question preceding it (often asking about willingness to vote for members of other demographic groups). While there are some small variations year to year, they are relatively minor, especially compared to other surveys during this time (we detail the deficiencies of the ANES in this regard in Appendix C). For ease of exposition, we refer to this survey item as the “black president question.”

In addition to consistency, a second advantage of the survey item is that Gallup fielded it quite frequently during our key sample period. The question is asked in nine separate surveys between 1958 and 1972. While the question is asked less frequently after 1972, we are fortunate that beginning in 1974 we can use the GSS (see Appendix Table B.2 for exact wording and preceding question in the GSS) to help fill gaps. As such, between 1958 and 1980 (2000), the black president item (as well as the other variables we need for the analysis) was collected by either Gallup or GSS on 14 (29) separate occasions.\(^{16}\)

A final strength of the black president item is its specificity: it refers to a single, hypothetical (at least during our key sample period) concept. For example, the GSS has, since 1972, asked whether the government should “help” blacks, which is not only vague but also might be interpreted differently in 1972 than in 2000. Similarly, Gallup also queries white

\(^{15}\)See http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/. Access is free to affiliates of institutional subscribers.

\(^{16}\)The GSS fields this question in 1972 as well, but only in 1974 are state identifiers available (and even then only in the restricted-use version of the data). In addition to the 1983 black president survey that we employ, the Roper catalog lists two additional surveys from 1983 that include the question. In one case the survey is not available for download. In the second case the codebook shows that the question is not actually included in the survey.
respondents—much less frequently—about whether they would move if blacks came to reside next door or in their neighborhoods in great numbers. But responses to these questions will vary not only by feelings about racial equality but also by the actual integration of one’s present neighborhood, not to mention housing density (“next door” is a different concept in an apartment building versus a farm). The black president question suffers from no such contextual bias: it should be interpreted similarly for Southerners and non-Southerners, rich and poor, urban and rural. Nonetheless, as we demonstrate in Appendix Table A.1, black president is highly correlated with other GSS measures of racial attitudes, including questions on interracial socializing, school integration, government aid to blacks, and blacks “pushing” themselves into places they are not wanted.

While we believe the Gallup data have allowed us to make an important step forward in answering the question at hand, they are not without their limitations. The most important given our context is limited control variables for income and place of birth (given the arguments that Southern income growth and Northern migrants played key roles in dealignment). Only six of ten of our Gallup surveys from 1958-1980 have income information; none records state of birth. To rule out income and migration as alternative hypotheses we turn to alternative data sources, most frequently the ANES. Begun in 1948, ANES is a nationally representative repeated cross-sectional survey of the political and social opinions of voting age Americans conducted in the fall of both midterm and presidential election years.

As the Gallup data are not familiar to most researchers, Appendix Table A.2 compares its summary statistics to the IPUMS, splitting the sample by region and decade. Comfortingly, demographics for each of these subsamples are quite similar across surveys.

### 3.2 Summary statistics

Table 1 provides summary statistics for our basic Gallup analysis sample (whites age 21 and above who live in the continental US and have non-missing state data) from 1958 to 1980 (our standard sample period, though we demonstrate robustness to various endpoints), by pre-and post-period. We once again see the large decline in southern Democratic Party

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17Gallup also poses, again less frequently than the black president question, questions on school integration, but unfortunately only directs these questions to parents of school-aged children, which greatly reduces sample sizes.

18The survey was fielded in presidential election years only from 1948-1952. State identifiers are missing in 1948, so 1952 is the first year we can include in regression analysis.

19Both Gallup and GSS claim to be nationally representative surveys of adult Americans. We use the provided survey weights—the GSS for all years and Gallup for 1968 forward—to adjust
affiliation across the two time periods. Not surprisingly, we also see a concurrent increase in education and urbanicity in both regions. The ANES columns of the table demonstrate similar demographic shifts in our analysis sample drawn from that dataset.

In Appendix Figure A.3 we graph the responses to the black president over time in the combined GSS and Gallup samples, denoting the data set from which each point is drawn. Note that this figure includes non-whites, whereas unless noted all of the analysis that follows does not. In years where we have both GSS and Gallup data, the shares willing to vote for a black president are nearly identical, suggesting that both surveys are collecting data from very similar (presumably representative) universes. The series as a whole depicts a marked increase in stated views on racial equality, at least as measured by this question. In 1958 fewer than forty percent say they would be willing to vote for an equally qualified black candidate, where by 1975 that share is just over eighty percent, a rate of change more rapid than the more recent evolution on same-sex marriage.20

While Appendix Figure A.3 is interesting in demonstrating the rapid change that occurred in attitudes toward race relations nationally, Figure 2 introduces the views of our analysis sample, separately for the South and non-South.21 While only about ten percent of white Southerners are willing to vote for a black person at the series’ beginning (versus just under forty percent elsewhere), whites in both regions increase at the same (rapid) rate through about 1970, after which point there is more rapid (though never complete) Southern catch-up.22

For completeness, in Appendix Figure A.4 and A.5 we graph for all available years the other two Gallup survey questions on racial attitudes: the questions that ask whether the respondent would move if a black person moved next door or if blacks moved into the

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20Over the seventeen-year period between 1996 and 2013, support for gay marriage in Gallup polls rose from 27 to 54 percent, a slightly slower pace in both absolute and proportional terms. See http://www.gallup.com/poll/1651/gay-lesbian-rights.aspx.

21In this focal sample we have roughly 2,000 observations per survey in the Gallup data and 1,200 observations per survey in the GSS data.

22The small percentage of respondents who answer don’t know are grouped with those unwilling to vote for a black president throughout the paper. Results are robust to grouping them with those willing to vote yes or dropping them entirely.
neighborhood in great numbers. The same pattern of substantial (but incomplete) Southern convergence holds.

4 Methodological Approach

4.1 Defining pre- and post-periods

Before 1958, we do not have any consistent measure of racial attitudes, and thus our main analysis is restricted to 1958 and beyond (we return to the pre-1958 period in Section 6). To define pre- and post-periods during our sample years, we need to identify a moment during our period when voters’ views of the parties’ Civil Rights positions undergoes its most meaningful change.

Evidence from the ANES: The shift occurs between 1960 and 1964. To pin down the point during our sample period when views on the parties’ positions most significantly shift, we would ideally employ a consistent repeated survey question that asks respondents which party they believe will do more to promote equality between whites and blacks. Unfortunately we were unable to find such a question. We come close, however. Using the individual-year files of the ANES, we can compare a 1960 item asking “which party is more likely to stay out of the question of whether white and colored children go to the same schools” with 1964 and 1968 items asking which party is more likely to “see to it that white and Negro children go to the same schools.” Figure 3 shows that in 1960, only 13% of Southern whites see the Democrats as the party pushing for school integration, 22% say Republicans, and the rest see no difference. Non-Southern whites see essentially no difference between the parties on this issue in 1960.

A dramatic shift occurs sometime between 1960 and 1964. By 1964, 45% of Southern whites now see the Democrats as more aggressive on this issue, whereas the share seeing Republicans as more aggressive has fallen to 16%. Non-Southerners’ assessment shifts similarly. The large gap in voters’ perception of the parties on school integration that emerges in 1964 holds steady in 1968.23 In Appendix Figure A.6 we show that the same shift occurs on the question of which party most supports “fair” treatment for Negroes in obtaining jobs (and, in 1964, “jobs and housing”). The addition of “housing” in 1964 as well as the worry

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23This result of a sharp mid-1960s change in the view of the Democratic Party’s position on Civil Rights lends support to the Kousser (2010) criticism that by grouping data by decade Shafer and Johnston (2009) create a false image of continuity over a period in which there was actual a trend break.
that “fair” is interpreted differently in the South and elsewhere make us prefer the school integration question, but the result is robust to using this survey item.\textsuperscript{24}

**Evidence from newspapers: The shift occurs in Spring of 1963.** The ANES cannot tell us at what point between 1960 and 1964 the Democrats are first viewed by voters as the party of Civil Rights. To further pinpoint that moment, we use higher-frequency data, but these data admittedly provide less direct evidence.

The leader of the Democratic party during most of the 1960 to 1964 period was President John F. Kennedy. Kennedy was not a consistent supporter of Civil Rights throughout his presidency. Just as his Republican predecessor Eisenhower sent federal troops to forcibly integrate Little Rock High School, Kennedy intervened to end both the violence against the freedom riders in 1961 and attempts to bar James Meredith from integrating the University of Mississippi in 1962. But Kennedy also disappointed movement leaders with his inaction, including a January 1962 press conference pledging not to move ahead of public opinion on Civil Rights and his appointment of segregationist federal judges in the South. Thus it is not clear that voters could have predicted his June 1963 proposal of sweeping Civil Rights legislation, even a few months before that date.\textsuperscript{25}

While we unfortunately do not have polling data that directly speaks to the evolution of voters’ perception of Kennedy’s commitment to the issue, we turn to the *New York Times* to track any evolution he exhibited on the issue. In Figure 4 we tally daily counts of articles in which (1) “President” and “Kennedy” and “civil rights” appear or (2) “President” and “Kennedy” and any of the following terms: “civil rights,” “integrat*,” “segregat*,” where the asterisk is a “wildcard.”\textsuperscript{26} While the former search hones in on the focal issue, it may miss articles related to the civil rights that fail to use the stylized term. The expansiveness of the second search is both its advantage and disadvantage, because of the increasing likelihood of false positives. The two series tell similar stories. Outside of two short-lived spikes—when the administration intervenes on behalf of the freedom riders (Spring 1961) and James Meredith (fall 1962)—the first two years of Kennedy’s administration see few mentions of his name alongside civil rights terms.

However, the number of articles begins a steep incline in May 1963 when the nation’s at-

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\textsuperscript{24}While there is an ANES fielded in 1962, it does not ask either of these questions.

\textsuperscript{25}Space constraints prevent us from detailing the relationship of President Kennedy (as well as that of his brother Robert, the attorney general) to the Civil Rights movement. We direct readers to Branch (2007) and Perlstein (2009).

\textsuperscript{26}We searched for words “President” and “Kennedy” to exclude articles that only mention Robert Kennedy, though in practice there is little difference.
tention turned to Birmingham. Local black activists had organized a shopping boycott of the city’s segregated stores in the weeks leading up to Easter. By early April, Martin Luther King arrived in Birmingham and the movement grew into a series of marches and sit-ins aimed at filling the local jails to force the city into negotiations to end segregation in employment and public accommodations. By early May, the Birmingham police responded with beatings, water hoses and attack dogs. These attacks were captured live for a television audience, did not spare even young children, and drew Robert Kennedy and other administration officials to Birmingham to intervene on behalf of the protestors.27

The number of articles reaches its pinnacle the following month when President Kennedy enters the Civil Rights conversation with a televised proposal of legislation to end segregation (“The events in Birmingham and elsewhere have so increased the cries for equality that no city or State or legislative body can prudently choose to ignore them”). And while the number of articles drops slightly from that mid-June high it remains elevated above pre-May 1963 levels throughout the remainder of his presidency. Thus the NYT evidence points to spring 1963 as the moment when Kennedy became linked with Civil Rights. The dramatic change in voters’ views of his party’s position on Civil Rights in the ANES data suggests that voters saw Kennedy’s evolution as reflecting that of the Democratic party more broadly.

Further corroborating evidence. The NYT data may reflect the views of a narrow, elite group of East Coast editors and may not reach, much less reflect, average voters. In Appendix Figures A.7 we tally the number of articles with the term “civil rights” for the two Southern papers for which we can do textual analysis, the Dallas Morning News and the New Orleans Times-Picayune. Again, we see Spring (in particular June) of 1963 as the moment when articles including “civil rights” and “President Kennedy” skyrocket.28

A related concern is that newspapers, regardless of their regional focus, reflect the decisions of editors, not the sentiment of the general public. We thus complement our newspaper analysis with polling data. In the years 1950-1980, Gallup asks over 100 times “What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?” Unfortunately, as we detail in the figure notes (Appendix Figure A.8), there are a number of complications with these data (e.g., the question is open-ended, and Gallup aggregates responses in an inconsistent manner across surveys), so we are cautious in interpreting these data points. For most of the

28We performed this search in the summer of 2014 using Library of Congress state newspapers as well as Yale University subscriptions to ProQuest Historical Newspapers and 20th Century American Newspapers.
1950-1980 period, Americans do not consider Civil Rights the nation’s most pressing issue, with at most minor blips of around 20 or 30 percent around the time of the integration of Little Rock High school. The key exception is 1963-1965, when for a sustained two to three years a majority of Americans named civil rights the most issue on the nation’s agenda.

In summary, the ANES data show that views on the parties’ racial policies shift dramatically between 1960 and 1964. Such a shift is unlikely to occur without important events that generate media and public interest. Indeed, we show that in the Spring of 1963, the media begins to link the Democratic president with Civil Rights in a heightened and sustained manner unequaled before in his presidency. Moreover, media coverage of the issue as well as public interest in Civil Rights explodes in 1963, suggesting that the shift in the positions of the parties on this issue would be hard for voters to miss.

4.2 Estimating equations

Having defined a pre- and post-period for our 1958 to 1980 sample period, the empirical strategy for our main set of results is straightforward. We first estimate the total amount of white Democratic dealignment specific to the South in the following regression:

\[ D_{ist} = \beta_1 South_s \times Aft_t + \gamma X_{ist} + \lambda_s + \mu_t + \epsilon_{ist}, \]

where \( D_{ist} \) is an indicator for person \( i \) identifying as a Democrat, \( South_s \) is an indicator for residency in a Southern state, \( Aft_t \) is an indicator for being observed after April 1963, \( X_{ist} \) includes controls (which we will vary in robustness checks), and \( \lambda_s \) and \( \mu_t \) are state and year fixed effects, respectively.\(^{29}\)

We then estimate a companion regression:

\[ D_{ist} = \tilde{\beta}_1 South_s \times Aft_t + \tilde{\beta}_2 South_s \times Aft_t \times NoBlackPrez_i + \tilde{\gamma} \tilde{X}_{ist} + \lambda_s + \mu_t + \epsilon_{ist}. \]

In equation (2), the \( South_s \times Aft_t \) interaction is now interacted with \( NoBlackPrez_i \), an indicator variable for being unwilling to vote for a black president.\(^{30}\) The vector \( \tilde{X} \) now includes all lower-order terms of this triple interaction and the remaining notation follows that in (1). The estimate of \( \tilde{\beta}_2 \) reflects the dealignment coming from those with conservative

\(^{29}\)As we are interested in dealignment from the Democratic Party, we code Democrats as 1 and Republicans, independents and other responses to party identification as 0.

\(^{30}\)In practice we code both “no” and “don’t know” as 1 for this measure. In no year do more than ten percent of respondents answer “don’t know.”
racial views, and comparing the estimate of $\beta_1$ in (1) with that of $\tilde{\beta}_1$ in (2) allows us to measure the share of Southern dealignment accounted for by those with conservative racial views.

5 Results

We first present the main results from estimating equations (1) and (2) and then provide corroborating higher-frequency analysis using Gallup’s Presidential approval data.

5.1 Results using the “black president” question

Regression results. Table 2 presents the main results of the paper. For completeness and to provide a baseline, col. (1) replaces state fixed effects with a South dummy and uses only Gallup (as opposed to adding GSS) data from 1958 to 1980. Whereas Democrats enjoy 23-percentage-point pre-period advantage among whites in the South relative to the rest of the country, that advantage fell by 65% in the post-period. In col. (2), we show that the $South \times Aft$ coefficient falls by 99% once the triple interaction term is added, which is itself highly significant and negative, indicating that essentially all the decline in Democratic identification among white Southerners comes from those with conservative racial views leaving just as the national Democratic Party’s policies seek to end de jure segregation in the region.

The lower-order terms are of interest in their own right. The significant, positive coefficient on $South \times NoBlackPrez$ highlights the strongly conservative racial views that characterized the Southern Democratic party in the pre-period. While not significant, whites outside the South who hold conservative racial views move slightly away from the Democrat party, though neither in the pre- nor post-period are racial views highly predictive of white partisanship outside the South. The insignificant shift among non-Southerners with conservative racial views is consistent with 1963 not being a particularly salient year for non-Southerners, as the policies proposed by Kennedy that year were binding only in the South.

In the remainder of Table 2 we explore the robustness of this result. During our sample period, Gallup does not consistently sample all states in all years, thus in cols. (3) and (4) as well as all remaining columns we add state fixed effects to adjust for this variation. The comparison of $South \times After$ across specifications is even more striking: in col (3) the coefficient is larger in magnitude than in col (1), but the inclusion in col. (4) of $NoBlackPrez$ and its interactions actually makes the $South \times After$ coefficient flip signs (though its magnitude is
tiny). The resulting point estimates suggest that the 18.6 point decline among Southerners with conservative racial views (very) slightly overpredicts the full 16.7 point relative decline among white Southerners. In Cols. (5) and (6) we add basic controls (age, city-size fixed effects, and educational attainment fixed effects) to this specification, which barely moves the coefficients of interest.

Col. (7) adds interactions of South × Aft with age, a high school completion dummy, and a city size (categorical) variable (as well as all lower-order terms of these triple interactions). This specification tests whether the strong, negative coefficient on South × Aft × NoBlackPrez is merely picking up differential trends in the South along these other dimensions. For example, we might worry that, say, rural Southerners differentially turn against the Democrats in the post-period for reasons independent of Civil Rights. If rural Southerns happen to have more conservative racial views, we would estimate a negative coefficient on South × NoBlackPrez × Aft even absent any true reaction to Civil Rights. In fact, even after allowing age, education and urbanicity to have different effects in the South, different effects in the post-period, and different effects in the South in the post-period, the coefficient on South × Aft × NoBlackPrez barely moves (note that adding the additional triple interactions means that the coefficient on South × Aft no longer has any natural interpretation).

In the remaining columns, we add the GSS data (as control variables are not consistent across the two datasets, we do not include them). Comparing cols. (8) and (9) to cols. (3) and (4) shows that the results are nearly identical in this larger, pooled dataset. The final two columns we keep the GSS data and extend the series to 2000. The point estimates suggest that the decline in Democratic identification among those with conservative racial views explains three-fourths of the 19.5 point relative decline in the South over this longer period.\textsuperscript{31}

**Graphical results.** Figure 5 shows the variation underlying our regression results in an event-time figure. Specifically, for each survey date, we present the coefficient from regressing Democratic party ID on NoBlackPrez, separately for Southern and non-Southern whites. As expected, the figure echoes the regression results (conservative racial views strongly predict Democratic party identification in the South in the pre-period, an association that is wiped out in the post-period) but unlike those results can show the shift is better described as a one-time decline—occurring sometime between the 1961 and 1963 survey dates—and not a

\textsuperscript{31} We conclude our analysis period in 2000. After Illinois State Senator Barack Obama’s 2004 Democratic convention speech, heightened talk of his Presidential bid may have transformed the black president item from a hypothetical question to a referendum on a particular individual.
secular trend. Throughout the sample period, racial views have limited predictive power over party identification among whites outside the South.

**Robustness checks.** Perhaps the key concern about our approach so far is that while the black president question is worded consistently over time, the true attitudes of those who respond “yes” may change because of the increasing social desirability of progressive racial views over the sample period.\(^{32}\) If social desirability bias is increasing similarly in both the South and non-South, then state and year fixed effects likely address this concern. But to the extent that our measure of conservative racial views is increasingly poor in one region over the other, our results will be biased in an indeterminate direction.

We address this concern in two ways in Table 3. First, Figure 2 shows that from 1958 to about 1970, the South-versus-non-South gap on this question remains relatively stable, suggesting that social desirability bias may work similarly by region during these earlier years (and it seems fair to assume this bias was simply smaller during earlier years and thus less concerning). Cols. (1) and (2) demonstrate that our main result barely changes when we restrict observations to this shorter period, not surprising given the patterns presented in Figure 5.

Second, we use pre-1963 data to predict conservative racial views and then substitute this predicted black president response for the actual response. Put differently, we ask, is Southern dealignment driven by the type of person who would have given racially conservative answers in the pre-period, regardless of how that person answers the black president question in later, more politically correct years. To guard against over-fitting and data mining, we use machine learning techniques to perform this prediction. We document our methodology as well as show robustness to more more familiar (but subjective) prediction techniques in Appendix D [not yet complete].

We begin with the 1958-1969 sample used in cols. (1) and (2). The predicted conservative racial views analysis of Cols (3) and (4) indicates a slightly larger role for racial views in explaining dealignment, suggesting, perhaps, that social desirability adds noise to the actual black president question and thus attenuates the results of the first two columns. Note that using the predicted instead of actual answer to the black president question means we can

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\(^{32}\)This concern is not merely hypothetical. For example, Kuklinski *et al.* (1997) use a clever between-subject approach whereby the racial views of any one individual cannot be detected but the racial views of large groups can be. They show that these “unobtrusive” measures of racial attitudes show white Southerners to have significantly more conservative racial views than other whites (at least in the mid-1990s), whereas standard survey questions (subject to social desirability bias) show much smaller differences.
expand the sample to the (many more) surveys that have the regressors used in the prediction equation but do not have the black president question itself. The similarity of the results in the expanded (cols. 5 and 6) and original (cols. 3 and 4) samples suggest that the ML predictions were not over-fit to the original sample. For completeness, the final four columns repeats the cols. (3) through (6) analysis on the 1958-1980 sample.

Beyond composition bias, we document a few more robustness checks for the main Table 2 results. In Appendix Table A.4 we demonstrate robustness to using a probit specification, breaking the non-South control group into separate Census regions, and substituting “Republican ID” for the outcome variable. In Appendix Table A.5 we show that results are qualitatively similar across age (under and over 40) and gender.

5.2 Higher-frequency results from Gallup

The results of Figure 5 point to a sharp decline in the association of conservative racial attitudes and white Southern identification with the Democratic Party between the summers of 1961 and 1963, the last pre-period and first post-period surveys that include the black president question, respectively. Gallup does not ask the black president question at a sufficiently high frequency that we can pin the key shift to the Spring of 1963, the moment when, we earlier argued, voters first firmly connect the Democrats to Civil Rights. We now turn to alternative Gallup questions and a modified empirical strategy to more finely pinpoint the transition moment of white Southern Democratic allegiance. We lose the ability to stratify the analysis by racial attitudes, but we gain higher-frequency measures of Americans’ responses to political news.

Presidential approval. During the 1960s, Gallup asked the following question roughly every month: “Do you approve or disapprove of the way President ______ is handling his job as President?”\(^{33}\) We find 25 usable surveys that ask Kennedy approval, a question we use to examine how Southern white approval (relative to non-Southern white approval) responds to presidential Civil Rights news.\(^{34}\)

Figure 6 tracks Kennedy’s approval among whites, separately for the South and non-

\(^{33}\)In most surveys the possible valid responses are only approve or disapprove.

\(^{34}\)According to the Roper catalog, Gallup asks about Kennedy (Eisenhower) approval 39 (119) times, all of which are downloadable. However only 25 (52) were originally entered in ASCII format. We eliminate files that were originally entered in binary format as Roper’s binary to ASCII conversion resulted in several strange characters in variable fields such that we cannot match our frequencies to that in the codebook.
South. The most striking element of the figure is the more than 35 percentage point drop in Southern approval around our critical period, the Spring of 1963, a period during which non-Southern white approval is flat and black approval (Appendix Figure A.9) is increasing. More than half of this decrease occurs between the two polls (May 25 and June 23) that surround Kennedy’s televised June 11 Civil Rights address. Thus this high frequency data provides evidence to pinpoint spring 1963 as a critical moment for dealignment.

In addition to allowing us to focus in on particular moments, these high frequency data, along with our NYT searches on the mentions of Kennedy and Civil Rights allow us to expand our focus beyond Spring 1963 and ask how presidential approval correlates more generally with Civil Rights media coverage. In Figure 7 we plot the difference in presidential approval by region (South minus non-South) against the frequency of articles mentioning President Kennedy and Civil Rights terms. We see of course that the large spike in articles in the spring of 1963 is accompanied by a large decline in relative approval. However it is notable that even smaller events in the Civil Rights timeline lead to wobbles in Kennedy’s popularity among whites in the South relative to elsewhere.

We formalize the analysis of Figure 7 in the regression analysis of Table 4. We regress approval among Gallup respondents on the average number of articles per day linking the president and Civil Rights during the week of the survey, allowing the effect to differ by residence in the South. We begin with the more narrow, “Civil Rights” classification. The negative coefficient on articles mentioning “Civil Rights” in col. (1) indicates that Kennedy’s approval falls in both regions the more his name is mentioned alongside the issue. However, the interaction term indicates that the decrease is nearly four times larger for Southerners. The point estimates suggest that, if a week were to average an additional article per day that mentions JFK and civil rights than some baseline period, we should expect non-Southern white approval to fall by 1.53 percentage points and white Southern approval to fall by 7.13 percentage points relative to their baseline levels.

In col. (2) we add survey date fixed effects and an interaction between South and article counts of Kennedy alongside several “placebo” issues (the main effects of these placebo

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35 This drop occurs between the April 5 and June 23 polls.
36 The figure shows the hits for the “expanded” definition of Civil Rights (including segregation, integration and their variants). Results, available upon request, are similar for the more narrow search.
37 The modal survey is in the field for six days. However, we do not know on which day each respondent is interviewed. We match the midpoint of the survey date to the number of hits during the period four days before through two days after the midpoint.

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issues article counts as well as the Civil Rights article count are absorbed by the survey-date fixed effects). Consistent with divergent regional interests, Southerners not only differentially react to Civil Rights but also mentions of the USSR and agricultural policy (reflecting, perhaps, the region’s large share of rural residents and its reputation for hawkish foreign policy views). However, adding these controls only increases the magnitude of the coefficient on the interaction between South and Civil Rights articles. In col. (3) we repeat the col. (2) analysis using the more expanded “Civil Rights terms” search. The interaction term remains negative and significant, though is about one-fourth smaller.

False positives, especially for the expanded “Civil Rights terms” search, could attenuate results. We thus had two RAs ascertain whether each article actually suggests that Kennedy was on the side of Civil Rights. In fact, they classify roughly two-thirds of the “expanded” search as false hits.\textsuperscript{38}

Col. (4) suggests that, relative to baseline, an additional article per day placing Kennedy on the side of Civil Rights reduces his relative support among white Southerners by over eleven percentage points, consistent with substantial attenuation bias in col. (3). Finally, in another attempt to address false positives but without relying on labor-intensive and potentially subjective hand-coding, in col. (5) we show that our col. (3) specification is robust to using the search term “Negro” instead of Civil Rights terms. In Appendix Tables A.6 and A.7 we show that our results are robust to normalizing the number of hits by total number of articles and to including a South linear time trend.\textsuperscript{39}

We provide a final piece of evidence against alternative issues as drivers of Southern dealignment by quantifying the share of the variation over JFK’s administration in the South-vs-non-South difference in presidential approval that can be explained by Civil Rights relative to placebo issues. Separately for each issue (each of the placebos as well as civil rights) we use our micro data to regress whites’ approval of JFK on state fixed effects, the number of hits for the expanded “Civil Rights” Kennedy search (from col. 3, without RA coding), and the interaction of this variable with South. We then predict approval and

\textsuperscript{38}In practice, we sum by day each article either RA denotes as pro Civil Rights, and then divide by two to keep coefficients comparable. See Appendix E for further details, including the instructions we gave to the RAs. Neither knew that we hypothesized Spring of 1963 as the turning point.

\textsuperscript{39}We have also explored robustness of these results to varying the search window. When we increase the window to allow articles to impact approval with a lag of as much as 30 days, the coefficient on South \times Articlecount and its significance increase to a lag of about two weeks before precision starts to fall. When we include additional lags of search terms, the association of hits and approval is smaller in magnitude in lagged weeks.
collapse both the predicted and actual approval to South × survey date cells. Figure 8 shows
the actual South-non-South approval differences (already depicted in Figures 6 and 7) as well
as our predicted differences, generated from the parsimonious regression described above. The
series line up quite well and in fact our predicted series explains 51% of the total variation
in the actual South-non-South difference over time.\textsuperscript{40} The best performing placebo category
(social security and safety net issues) explains only twenty percent (see Appendix Figure
A.10) and completely misses the huge decline in relative approval in the Spring of 1963. In
fact seven of nine placebo issues explain under five percent of the South-nonSouth variation
over time. Consistent with the results in Table 4, when we use the RA-coded version of the
broad search in the same prediction exercise, the relationship appears even tighter (the third
series of Figure 8) and now explains 56 percent of the variation. The overwhelming predictive
power of Civil Rights in explaining regional differences in approval for JFK undercuts the
argument that other issues were triggering dealignment during this key period.

**Hypothetical presidential match-ups.** Another familiar Gallup question asks voters
whom they would prefer in hypothetical election match-ups. We examine how Kennedy fairs
in these match-ups against Barry Goldwater, the Republican candidate most identified with
Civil Rights opposition. Gallup asks this question roughly monthly beginning in February
1963, with the final poll less than two weeks before Kennedy’s assassination.

Figure 9 shows Goldwater’s support among white Southerners at around 30% through the
first week of March. Goldwater then enjoys a steady increase in support through the Spring
of 1963, reaching a plateau of around 60% in July. During our key period of the Spring of
1963, JFK goes from having a healthy, thirty percentage point lead over Goldwater to being
thirty points behind him. White non-Southerners remain rather aloof toward Goldwater.
Over the same February to July period when JFK’s support plummets in the South, in the
non-South it falls modestly from 65 to 60%, while support for Goldwater shows a similarly
small gain from 28 to 33%.

The result from the presidential match-ups suggests that JFK’s decline in approval docu-
mented in the previous subsection did not reflect mere short term annoyance. Within months
of Kennedy’s association with Civil Rights, half of his Southern white supporters shifted their
backing to a candidate who was from a party they had shunned for a century but who was
not believed to support Civil Rights. As noted in the introduction, those arguing for Civil

\textsuperscript{40}When we instead use the more narrow “Civil Rights” search in our prediction exercise, it also
explains 51%. The “Negro” search explains 54%.
Rights as the trigger for dealignment typically point to Johnson as the catalyst—our results suggest that JFK has been given too little credit (or blame?) for losing the South for his party.

6 Addressing alternative hypotheses

We think of the previous section as our “positive case” for Civil Rights as the prime mover of Southern whites out of the Democratic Party. In this section, we more directly address the most commonly raised alternative hypotheses.

6.1 Rising party polarization

Over the past fifty years, the Democratic and Republican parties have moved further apart on most issues, in particular redistribution and social insurance (McCarty et al., 2006). As just one example, roughly half of Republican legislators voted to establish Medicare and Medicaid in 1965, whereas their opposition to the 2010 Affordable Care Act was literally unanimous. If Southern whites have always been more conservative—especially economically—than other whites, then rising polarization could lead to differential exodus of Southern whites from the increasingly more liberal party. Moreover, if our “black president” question is merely acting as a proxy for general conservatism, then our results could be an artifact of polarization that we mistakenly attribute to reaction to Civil Rights. We investigate both of these claims.

Have white Southerners always been more conservative? We focus on the 1956 ANES, which asks more than a dozen policy questions (some are repeated in 1960 and in those cases we pool the two surveys) scored on a scale from 1 to 5 (strongly agree to strongly disagree). The first panel of Appendix Table A.8 focuses on economic policy preferences, providing both means and the fraction agreeing or strongly agreeing for each of seven questions. In matters of economic policy, there was remarkable consensus among whites in the South versus elsewhere. We find no significant differences by region on job guarantees, tax cuts, the appropriate influence of big business and (somewhat surprising to us, given Southern legislators’ support for the Taft-Hartley Act) labor unions, and the regulation of housing and utilities. Southern whites actually supported government provision of affordable medical care at significantly higher rates. Southerners were significantly less likely to support federal financing of local school construction, though the latter issue was connected to desegregation...
and thus likely tainted as a measure of economic policy preferences.\textsuperscript{41} In comparison, there are similarly few—in fact only one—significant regional difference on foreign policy preferences during this era (second panel), but large and significant differences, as expected, on Civil Rights (third panel).

This analysis paints a picture of broad pre-period consensus on policy issues outside of civil rights. We emphasize that the above analysis is not to deny that Southern whites became more conservative (especially economically) in the post-period, but as scholars have pointed out (see, e.g., Kousser, 2010 and Lee and Roemer, 2006) this trend can be potentially explained by Civil Rights: blacks are now full citizens with access to the federal social safety net even in Southern states, which would presumably reduce support for these programs among some racially conservative whites.\textsuperscript{42}

**Is “no black president” merely proxying for conservatism?** Until now we have been interpreting our black president question as a measure of racial views, and indeed we showed earlier it is highly correlated with standard questions on racial equality. There are at least two complications to address. First, as until 1960 all U.S. presidents had been white, Protestant males, being against electing a black president may simply be proxying for social or cultural conservatism—a desire to adhere to past norms—not opposition to racial equality per se. Second, recall that the question specifies that “your party” nominales a black man—a white Southerner would surely have assumed that had the Democrats nominated a black man, he would be from the Northern, liberal wing of the party. As such, he could fear this man would be dismissive of regional issues beyond segregation (e.g., agricultural policy).

In most surveys in which Gallup asks the black president question, it also asks whether respondents would refuse to vote for a female, Catholic or Jewish nominee from their party. In the 1960s, a president from any of these groups would have been a large break from tradition and thus refusal should correlate with social conservatism (perhaps especially for a female candidate). Moreover, had the Democratic party nominated a Jewish or Catholic president during this period, Southern whites could be very sure he would come from the Northern,

\textsuperscript{41}Specifically, in 1956, HR 7535 proposed $1.6 billion in federal aid for local school construction. An amendment added by Adam Clayton Powell (D-NY) stipulated funds could not be used for segregated schools. The bill failed due to Southern opposition (e.g., Henderson Lanham, D-GA, called the bill “an effort....to bribe my state and the South with school construction money to accept the mixing of the races in our schools”).

\textsuperscript{42}For historical treatment of this question, see Katznelson (2013), who argues that Southern politicians were among the most ardent supporters of redistribution during the New Deal, as New Deal legislation tended to exclude traditionally black occupations and moreover ceded all administrative authority to local agencies and thus did not affect Southern racial norms.
liberal wing of the party. If our black president is merely proxying for social conservatism or regionalism, then our coefficient of interest should be quite sensitive to simultaneously controlling for views toward these three groups.

For each of these groups, Table 5 shows the results from four regression specifications (ignore the final two columns of the table for the moment). To provide a baseline, we begin by estimating our standard equations (1) on the subsample of observations that include the “black president question” as well as the “president” question for the group in question. In the second column, we then estimate a version of equation (2) where we instead measure the share of total dealignment accounted for by Southerners opposed to a candidate from the group in question. The third specification is our usual “black president” triple-interaction equation on the subsample that includes the president question for the given group. The final specification performs a “horserace” to see if the decline is better explained by those Southerners against voting for blacks or those against voting for the other group.

The results of these exercises are very similar regardless of whether women, Jews or Catholics are the group of interest. Comparing the first and second regressions for each group shows that almost none of the total Southern dealignment is explained by differential movement among Southerners unwilling to vote for members of these groups. Moreover, comparing the third and fourth regressions, when we simultaneously control for views toward blacks and views toward the other group (our “horserace” specification), the coefficients on our racial conservatism variables retain their statistical significance and in fact barely move. As such, Southern dealignment during the post-period is driven by those with conservative views on racial equality, even after we control for views toward women and religious minorities.

### 6.2 Can economic development or changing demographics explain dealignment?

Even conditional on self-reported ideology, income is a negative predictor of Democratic identification. During our study period, the South and non-South exhibited differential economic growth rates. While we showed in Table 2 that our main results were robust to flexibly controlling for education, age and urbanicity, it is possible that they are confounded by insufficient controls for income. Therefore we explore the alternative hypothesis of income as the cause of dealignment in this section.

As noted, only six of the ten Gallup surveys from 1958 through 1980 include an income control, and in fact only one of the six is from the pre-period. Given the limitations of income
measures in Gallup, our main approach to addressing this concern is to return to the ANES, the dataset authors tend to use in support of the income argument.\textsuperscript{43} From 1952 onward, the ANES has the needed state identifiers as well as a consistent income measure: grouping households by where they fall in the U.S. income distribution (bottom 16 percent, between the 17 and 33 percentiles, the middle third, between the 67th and 95th percentiles, or the top five percent).

As noted in Section 2, most of the work that finds evidence of income as a driver actually uses cross tabulations and does not, in a regression sense, partial out what share of the total dealignment is explained by the South’s economically catching up with the rest of the country. We perform this exercise in Table 6, again defining the post-period as years after 1963 (1964 being the first post-period year in the ANES) and otherwise following the specification in equation (1).

To establish a baseline, col. (1) shows the results with no controls except year and state fixed effects, and we find a 14 percentage-point relative decline in Southern Democratic identification (similar, as we would expect, to the analogous results from Gallup, col. 3 of Table 2).\textsuperscript{44} Col. (2) shows that this estimate barely changes after adding fixed effects for each of the ANES income categories. Those arguing for economic development as the prime mover often refer not only to income growth \textit{per se}, but also the decline in the rural share of the Southern population. Col. (3) adds fixed effects for the three urbanicity categories in the ANES, and again the coefficient on \textit{South} \times \textit{Aft} barely changes. Finally, Col. (4) allows urbanicity and income to have different effects in the South and in the post-period (i.e., fully interacting dummies for each of the urbanicity and income categories with both \textit{South} and \textit{After}). The magnitude of the coefficient on \textit{South} \times \textit{After} in fact increases. In short, we find no role for economic development—even broadly and flexibly defined—in explaining the differential decline in Democratic allegiance among Southern whites after 1963.

As detailed in Section 2, other authors argue that Northern migrants and younger cohorts—two groups which should have little loyalty to Jim Crow—drive dealignment. In col. (5) we introduce a “restricted sample”: we drop all respondents (in the South and non-South) born after 1941 as well as all respondents living in the South at the time of the

\textsuperscript{43}When we perform our standard analysis on the subsample of Gallup surveys that include the income variable, the coefficient of interest on our triple interaction term is not affected by whether income is included as a control.

\textsuperscript{44}All results in Table 6 are robust to using “voted for the Democratic nominee in most recent presidential election” as the outcome instead of Democratic identification. Results available upon request.
survey but born elsewhere. Relative to the baseline in col. (1), our restrictive sample shows a post-period drop in Southern Democratic attachment that is 91% of the size of the drop in the full sample. The estimated dealignment in fact grows in size when in col. (6) we add the flexible controls for income and urbanicity included in col. (4).

A final exercise we perform in Table 6 is to ask whether richer and less rural Southerners—i.e., the so-called “New South”—were more likely to leave the party in the post-period.\(^{45}\) In col. (7) we define Rich as being in the top third of the U.S. income distribution. Besides its main effect (strongly negative, as expected) the interactions with Rich have very little explanatory power and while rich Southerners appear somewhat more likely to leave the party in the post-period, this effect is very small and insignificant. There is similarly no differential decline in Democratic identification among non-rural Southerners (col. 8).

6.3 Does timing of dealignment undermine Civil Rights as the cause?

There are three parts to this argument: Kennedy’s problems in the South pre-date Civil Rights; in the 1950s Southerners support Eisenhower, a Republican “race moderate;” and that dealignment is “too smooth” to be explained by a handful of years in the 1960s.

**Kennedy’s weakness in the South pre-dates Civil Rights.** As noted in Section 2, some authors have argued that Kennedy’s poor performance in the South in the 1960 election undermines the claim that Civil Rights was the key driver of dealignment, as Kennedy’s Civil Rights agenda was viewed as cautious until 1963 (Trende, 2012). Indeed, in 1960, Kennedy captures roughly fifty percent of voters in both the South and elsewhere, compared to a roughly twenty percentage point Southern advantage enjoyed by previous Democratic candidates in the twentieth century (Appendix Figure A.11).

A key confounding factor in 1960 is Kennedy’s Catholicism. Opposition to a Catholic president during this era, especially in the South, was so substantial that Kennedy felt compelled to deliver a now-famous speech to Southern ministers committing himself to secular government.\(^{46}\) In a 1958 Gallup poll, 48 percent of Southern whites state unwillingness to vote for a Catholic president, compared to only 22 percent of whites elsewhere. In the 1960 post-election portion of the ANES, respondents are asked to explain their presidential election vote. Nearly 29 percent of whites in the South said the most important reason they did

\(^{45}\)This exercise is of course different than asking whether economic development can *explain* dealignment, which col. (1) through (4) suggests it cannot.

not vote for Kennedy was his Catholicism, compared to 15 percent elsewhere. These percentages include (in the denominator) all those who did vote for him, suggesting anti-Catholic sentiment was a major factor in the election, especially in the South.\footnote{We tabulate only the “most important reason” (respondents can give up to five) and combine those who say “he’s a Catholic” and “Catholic church would control him.”}

On the other hand, Catholic voters (94% of whom lived outside the South) mobilized in support of Kennedy, further shrinking the South-versus-non-South advantage Kennedy received relative to non-Catholic Democratic nominees.\footnote{State residence of Catholic voters is based on authors’ calculation from the 1960 ANES.} While in the other presidential elections from 1952 to 2000, white Catholics, relative to other whites, favor Democrats by roughly eleven percentage points, the advantage in 1960 was over 45 percentage points (see Appendix Figure A.13. Beginning in 1952, we can use the ANES to “correct” for this pro-Catholic effect by dropping all Catholics. The first series of Figure 10 shows that, just as Trende and others note, Kennedy indeed has trouble in the South relative to other Democratic presidents, even when we restrict the sample to whites. But the second series shows that when we drop Catholics, the clear break again emerges between 1960 and 1964. As there is no consistent way to correct for anti-Catholic sentiment in the ANES as it is not asked regularly, this second series certainly understates how well Kennedy would have done in the South versus elsewhere but for his religion.

While the 1960 presidential election has been a focus of the dealignment literature, the focus of our paper has been on party identification. Perhaps more concerning than Kennedy’s 1960 numbers is that, if one looks carefully at Figure 1, Southern relative party dealignment begins in 1961, not 1963 as our hypothesis would have predicted. Unless white Southerners actually changed their party identification (as opposed to merely their presidential vote), at least temporarily, then the Democrats fielding a Catholic nominee in 1960 cannot explain why we see Southern party dealignment beginning in 1961 instead of 1963.

In fact, anti-Catholic sentiment indeed led Southerners to temporarily switch party identification in the early years of Kennedy’s administration. In Figure 11, we plot the coefficients from regressing, separately for the South and elsewhere, Democratic identification on a NoCatholicPrez variable for each survey date (i.e., the “no Catholic president” analogue to our main Figure 5). Those with anti-Catholic sentiment outside the South are always less likely to be Democrats throughout the sample period, with no obvious pattern over time emerging. In the South, the relationship bounces around zero, but 1961 (the first poll following Kennedy’s election) is a huge outlier: those with anti-Catholic views are roughly 27
percentage points less likely to identify as Democrats. While anti-Catholic sentiment is often noted in the 1960 election, the analysis above quantifies the effect and further demonstrates that, at least in the year after his election, it also affected Democratic party identification in the South.

Figure 11 also shows that, unlike the Figure 5 analogue with black president, anti-Catholic sentiment has little predictive power outside of 1961, suggesting that it cannot explain longer-run dealignment. Indeed, in the final two columns of Table 5 we measure the share of total dealignment that can be explained by Southern whites with anti-Catholic views leaving the party after Kennedy is elected (i.e., “after” is defined as 1961, the year of our first post-Kennedy-election Gallup poll, and beyond). Not surprising, given that Figure 11 shows the connection between anti-Catholic sentiment and party identification is a one-off effect, anti-Catholic specific dealignment explains only (a statistically insignificant) 15% of total dealignment.

Finally, we show visually the limited predictive power of anti-Catholic relative to anti-black sentiment in Figure 12. The figure depicts three series for white voters: the actual South-vs-non-South difference in party identification, that predicted by racially conservative Southerners leaving the party beginning in 1963, and that predicted by Southerners with anti-Catholic views leaving the party after 1961. For the two prediction equations, we set the coefficient on $Conf \times After$ to equal zero (i.e., the predicted series exclude the residual dealignment that cannot be explained by the interactions with $Noblackprez$ or $NoCathprez$, as appropriate). The predicted dealignment arising from the $Noblackprez$ regression equations tightly follows the actual series, with the exception, as expected, of 1961, when a shock (a Catholic nominee) exogenous to our racial views model takes place. In contrast, the prediction arising from the $NoCathprez$ equation performs very poorly: it catches part of the dip in 1961, but little else.

**Southerners join the Republican party as Eisenhower pushes Civil Rights.** As noted earlier, any movement among white Southerners towards the Republicans in the 1950s is also consistent with a continued reaction against the Democrats’ 1948 Civil Rights plank. We more quantitatively assess the role of Eisenhower’s Civil Rights initiatives in predicting dealignment by conducting an analysis of Eisenhower’s approval in the style of our earlier Kennedy analysis. While historians have debated the ultimate importance of Civil Rights initiatives under Eisenhower (e.g., the 1957 and 1960 Civil Rights Acts famously had no federal enforcement provisions), we put that debate to the side and instead focus on
the contemporaneous reaction to these episodes among white Southerners relative to other whites.

Figure 13 is the Eisenhower analogue to Figure 7. The red line shows the difference (South minus non-South) in presidential approval by region. Consistent with our claim that Civil Rights is not salient for most Americans until the 1960s, the overall article counts are much lower than in the analogous Kennedy graph. There is a clear increase in Eisenhower’s connection to Civil Rights issues in two periods: the fall of 1956 during his reelection campaign and the summer and fall of 1957 when the 1957 Civil Rights Bill was making its way through Congress and to the president’s desk that September, the same month in which Eisenhower sent federal troops to escort the nine students who integrated Little Rock Central High School. Only the latter of the two events is concurrent with a large drop in relative approval. Most notably there is a 25-point drop between the polls of September 21 and October 12, the period including Little Rock. The relationship between Civil Rights and Eisenhower approval more generally is quantified in the regression analysis shown in Appendix Table A.9. And just like for Kennedy, we see that Eisenhower paid an approval penalty in the South when the news made mention of him alongside Civil Rights (regardless of the search terms we use to identify articles), contradicting the claim that Southerners were not repelled by his Civil Rights gestures.

Dealignment is too smooth to be explained by 1963 shift. Finally, in a more general test of the secular trend hypothesis, we return to the Gallup data to examine whether 1963 is actually a break or a continuation of a longer trend. (We note that the graphical evidence of Figure 5 demonstrating an abrupt halt to the conservative-racial-attitude-Democratic-identification connection between 1961 and 1963 already suggests against 1963 as merely a part of a more general trend.) In col. (1) of Appendix Table A.10 we replicate our baseline specification from equation (1). Because we do not need racial attitudes for this analysis, in col. (2) we augment the black president sample to include all Gallup surveys from 1958-80 and find the same, 17 percentage point relative decline in Democratic identification among Southern whites. Finally, we add a linear South trend to the specification. Its negative and significant coefficient suggests a longer run trend of Southern whites turning away from the Democratic Party. Nonetheless the coefficient on South × Aft remains large and significant: 1963 does reflect a trend break with Southern whites fleeing the Democratic Party in larger numbers than previously. Although it is harder to separately identify a linear time trend alongside a one-time decline over a shorter time period, the 1963 trend break result remains
significant as we shrink the post-period window in the remaining columns of Appendix Table A.10.

7 Conclusion

The exodus of Southern whites from the Democratic party is one of the most transformative, and controversial, political developments in twentieth century U.S. history. While the qualitative literature pointed to the Democratic Party’s 1960s Civil Rights initiatives as the primary cause, more quantitative analysts have challenged this conclusion. Gallup microdata on racial attitudes dating back to the 1950s have allowed us to make progress on measuring the extent to which the exodus is motivated by racial attitudes. Using their consistent, frequent and cross-contextually relevant question on whether the respondent would vote for a qualified black candidate for president, we find that 100% (75%) of realignment from 1958 to 1980 (2000) can be explained, in a regression sense, by the movement of racially conservative whites away from the Democratic Party, after the Spring of 1963 when the Party established a liberal position on Civil Rights that threatened to end the South’s tradition of racial separation. Gallup’s higher frequency presidential approval data allow us to more finely pinpoint the large drop in Southern support for President Kennedy to the timing of his proposal of Civil Rights legislation. More generally, for both Kennedy and Eisenhower, we find a negative correlation between Southern white approval and the mention of the president alongside Civil Rights initiatives in the media, a correlation that survives even after allowing white Southerners to have differential reactions to other key events in these administrations.

While we have focused on the effects of the most salient Civil Rights period on partisanship, quantifying the impact of race on political and policy preferences in other contexts is an interesting direction for future research. In concurrent work, we are examining the reactions of white voters to school busing initiatives, which were most prominent outside of the South, and unlike the Civil Rights act were mostly triggered by geographically scattered court cases throughout the 1970s. The lack of a clear pre- and post-period for Civil Rights policies outside the South could explain why we find no real relationship between racial views and party identification among non-Southern whites, as the pre- and post-periods will depend on voters’ exact locality. Perhaps a greater challenge given the current social desirability bias against admitting conservative racial views (see Stephens-Davidowitz, 2014, Mas and Moretti, 2009 and Greenwald et al., 2009 on whether racism cost Barack Obama votes in his presidential elections), is to measure the extent to which racial views continue to shape U.S.
political outcomes today. We leave this important question to future work.

References


Figure 1: Share of Democrats among Whites in Confederate and non-Confederate States

Source: Individual-level data from Gallup polls (accessed via ipoll), 1944-2004. South is defined throughout as the eleven states of the former Confederacy.

Figure 2: Share of whites willing to vote for a black president, by region

Figure 3: Whites’ views of which party will ensure school integration, by year and region

Source: ANES 1960, 1964, and 1968 individual year files. “No difference between the two parties” is not plotted, but can be derived by subtracting the sum of the Republican and Democratic shares from one. We have dropped missing observations, so $\text{Dem} + \text{Rep} + \text{No difference}$ sum to 100%.

Figure 4: Frequency of Articles Mentioning “Kennedy” and Civil Rights terms in The New York Times, 1961-1963

Source: New York Times and Gallup Polls
Figure 5: Coefficient from regressing $Dem$ on $NoBlackPrez$, by region and year (whites in Gallup and GSS)

![Coefficient value graph]

**Notes:** Source: Gallup and GSS polls 1958-1984. Circles denote that the coefficient comes from a Gallup survey and triangles denote a GSS survey.

Figure 6: White approval of President Kennedy by region, 1961-1963

![Share of Kennedy Support graph]

*Source:* Gallup polls 1961-1963
Figure 7: Frequency of Articles Mentioning “President Kennedy” with Civil Rights terms and relative Presidential approval (whites in South versus non-South)

Notes: “Civil Rights terms” include the term “civil rights” and any form of the word “integration” and “segregation.” In the approval data, “approve” is coded as one, and disapprove or no opinion is coded as zero.

Figure 8: Predicted and actual regional approval differences for JFK among whites

Data come from Gallup polls 1961-1963. “Survey date” refers to the midpoint of the period each survey was in the field. “Predicted” approval comes from regressing Gallup micro data (for whites) on state fixed effects, the average number of Civil-rights related articles in the *NYT* in which President Kennedy’s name appears, and this variable interacted with a *South* dummy. Predictions are collapsed to *South* × *survey date* cells and we subtract the non-South from the South cells to generate the “predicted” series for each date. “Predicted, RA coding” uses the same procedure, but Civil-rights related articles are broken down into those that argue Kennedy is pro-Civil Rights and those that argue he is against Civil Rights (the rest are dropped). See text for further detail.

Figure 9: Hypothetical match-up between JFK and Goldwater, by survey and region (whites only)

Data come from Gallup polls, 1963. “Survey date” refers to the midpoint of the period each survey was in the field. We count “lean toward” a candidate as supporting that candidate.
Figure 10: Share of Democratic votes in Presidential Election among White non-Catholics in South versus non-South

Source: ANES 1952-2008

Figure 11: Coefficient from regressing Dem on NoCatholicPrez; by region and year (whites in Gallup)

Figure 12: Predicted versus actual Southern Democratic advantage among whites

Gallup 1958-1980. The first series is the actual South-non-South difference in Democratic identification among whites. The second comes arises from col. (4) of Table 2 after setting the residual dealignment not explained by differential dealignment among those against a black president (i.e., the coefficient on Conf × After) to zero. That is, the second series is predicted dealignment if racially conservative views are the only reason individuals switched parties beginning in 1963. The third series instead shows the predicted South-non-South difference if the only reason individuals switched parties were anti-Catholic sentiment beginning in 1961. See Section ?? for additional detail.
Figure 13: Frequency of Articles Mentioning “President Eisenhower” with Civil Rights terms and relative Presidential approval (whites in South versus non-South)

*New York Times* and *Gallup* Polls.
Table 1: Comparison of Summary Statistics for Whites by Time Period and Region (Gallup—ANES)

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Notes: Summary statistics are weighted using survey weights. Urban areas are defined as areas with populations of at least 2,500, although the variable varies in construction from survey to survey in the ANES.

Notes: See text for details on the Gallup and ANES data. “Urban area” in Gallup refers to areas with a population greater than 2,500. “Urban area” in ANES refers to “central cities” and “suburban areas” as defined in the original ANES variable VCF 0111. These definitions have changed over time. In general, what we code as an “urban area” designates a Census-defined Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). A full account of how the original ANES variable is coded can be found in the ANES Cumulative Data File (ICPSR 8475) codebook.
Table 2: Democratic Party identification among whites as a function of region and racial views

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Notes: Year fixed effects included in all regressions, and state fixed effects in column (3) and beyond. After is an indicator variable for being surveyed after April 1963. “No Bl prez” is an indicator variable for reporting unwillingness to vote for a qualified black presidential candidate (“don’t know” and “no” are both coded as one). “Controls” indicate that age (in ten-year intervals), gender, education categories and city-size categories have been added. “Interactions” includes these controls as well as their interactions with Confederate and After. “Max year” indicates the end point of the sample period (in all cases, the first year of the sample period is 1958) and “GSS” indicates where GSS data have been added to the regression. Standard errors clustered by state. *p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
Table 3: Testing for composition bias in main regression results

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Observations 17642 17642 17322 17322 47246 47246
Dataset Gallup Gallup Gallup Gallup Gallup all Gallup all
Mean 0.458 0.458 0.457 0.457 0.448 0.448

Notes: Year and state fixed effects are included in all regressions. After is an indicator variable for being surveyed after April 1963. “No Bl prez” is an indicator variable for reporting unwillingness to vote for a qualified black presidential candidate (“don’t know” and “no” are both coded as one). “No Bl prez (pr.)” refers to the predicted values from a regression of “No Bl prez” on state and occupation fixed effects, gender, city-size categories, and age (in ten-year intervals) interacted with education categories. The “Gallup” dataset refers to Gallup surveys in which the black president survey question is asked, and the “Gallup all” dataset refers to all Gallup surveys for which there was sufficient data to estimate “No Bl prez (pr.)”, including survey years in which the black president question was not asked. The sample period is 1958-1969. Standard errors clustered by state. *p < .1,** p < .05,*** p < .01
Table 4: White approval of JFK as function of Civil Rights coverage (NYT)

Search terms employed: “President Kennedy” and...

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Survey date FE? No Yes Yes Yes Yes
RA coding? No No No Yes No
Observations 81365 81365 81365 81365 81365

Notes: State fixed effects are included in all regressions. “Civil Rights” denotes frequency NYT of articles containing “President Kennedy” and “civil rights.” “Civil Rights Terms” denotes frequency of articles containing “President Kennedy” and “civil rights” or any form of the word “segregate” or “integrate”. “Negro” refers to the frequency of articles containing “President Kennedy” and “negro”. Placebo searches are articles containing “President Kennedy” and variations of the terms summarized in the coefficient labels. All media search variables are smoothed (weighted averages of nearby observations in the original time series). Regressions use all Gallup surveys that contain presidential approval question between January 1961 and November 1963. Standard errors clustered by survey date. *p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 5: Main results, controlling for attitudes toward other minority groups

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Notes: State and year FE included; the sample period used runs from 1958 to 1980, with 1963 as the first year of the 'after' period Gallup dataset, except in columns (13) and (14), where the first period of the after period is 1961. Analysis in columns (1) through (12) was conducted only on Gallup poll data for which both the "no to black president" and the no to other president questions were present. Together with the "no black president" question: the "no Catholic president" question was asked in Gallup polls from 1958, 1959, 1961, 1963, 1965, 1967, 1969, and 1978; the "no Jewish president" question was asked in 1958, 1959, 1961, 1963, 1965, 1967, 1969, and 1978; the "no woman president" question was asked in 1958, 1959, 1963, 1967, 1969, and 1978. For columns (13) and (14), the sample was expanded to Gallup poll data for which the "no Catholic president" question was asked. Standard errors clustered by state in parenthesis. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Table 6: Explanatory power of income and urbanicity on Democratic identification (ANES, 1952-1980)

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Observations: 19158 19158 19158 19158 15240 15240 19158 19158
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City Type FE: No No Yes Yes No Yes No No
Interactions: No No No Yes No Yes No No
Mean: 0.418 0.418 0.418 0.418 0.441 0.441 0.418 0.418

Notes: Year and state fixed effects are included in all regressions. After is an indicator variable for being surveyed after April 1963. “Rich” is an indicator variable for being in the 68th to 100th percentile of family income. “Non Rural” is an indicator variable for being a resident of “central cities” or “suburban areas” as defined in the ANES. The “Restricted” sample used in columns 5 and 6 excludes those aged below 21 in 1963 and migrants to the Confederate states. Income category and city-type fixed effects are included where specified in the table footer. Where “Interactions” are included, income category and city-type fixed effects have each been interacted with Conf and (separately) with Aft. The sample period is 1952-1980. Standard errors clustered by state.

*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Appendix A. Supplementary figures and tables noted in the text

Appendix Figure A.1: Mean Personal Income by Race in Confederate and non Confederate States

Source: Census IPUMS files 1950-1990. Absolute differences (in 2013 dollars) are plotted on the left-hand side and the ratio on the right-hand side.
Appendix Figure A.2: Democratic share of votes in Presidential Elections

Appendix Figure A.3: Would Vote for a black president, full sample (including non-white respondents)

Source: Gallup polls 1958-2003 and GSS surveys 1974-2010
Appendix Figure A.4: Share of whites who would not move if black family moved next door

Source: Gallup polls 1958-1978

Appendix Figure A.5: Share of whites who would not move if neighborhood became half black

Source: Gallup polls 1958-1978
Appendix Figure A.6: Whites’ views of which party will ensure blacks get fair treatment in obtaining jobs, by year and region

Source: ANES 1960, 1964, and 1968 individual year files. “No difference between the two parties” is not plotted, but can be derived by subtracting the sum of the Republican and Democratic shares from one. We have dropped missing observations, so Dem + Rep + No difference sum to 100%. In 1960, the question actually refers to “jobs and housing,” whereas in 1964 and 1968 only jobs are mentioned.

Appendix Figure A.7: Frequency of articles mentioning “Civil Rights” in 1963, Southern newspapers

(a) Dallas Morning News

(b) New Orleans Times-Picayune
Appendix Figure A.8: Share of Respondents Identifying Civil Rights as the Most Important Problem

Notes: Gallup polls 1950-1979. This item has at least four limitations to note. First, it is not asked on a regular schedule. The question is fielded six times in 1962 but only once in the key year of 1963. Second, we are unable to produce analysis by race and region. In order to retain as many data points as possible, we graph the frequencies using the website Gallup Brain rather than reading in the data ourselves, which would mean losing those surveys without usable data on ipoll. Third, in some surveys Gallup allows individuals to provide more than one response to the most important problem question, which adds noise to our analysis. Finally, Gallup does not code the responses consistently from survey to survey. In some surveys the frequency responding “civil rights” is reported alone. In other surveys “civil rights” responses are grouped with, e.g., “racial problems, discrimination and states rights,” in other surveys with “integration,” and in still others with “demonstrations.” For each survey, we graph the frequency responding to the category that includes “civil rights,” so inconsistencies arise year-to-year.

Given these data limitations, we cannot replicate the analysis for all surveys by race and region, but below we do so for four key surveys: two from the low-importance early 1960s and two from the high-importance mid-1960s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-period</th>
<th>Post-period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whites, South</td>
<td>.095 .140</td>
<td>.400 .510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks, South</td>
<td>.310 .270</td>
<td>.640 .730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites, Non-South</td>
<td>.036 .058</td>
<td>.380 .420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks, Non-South</td>
<td>.170 .230</td>
<td>.650 .670</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The levels differ in the expected manner. Southern whites rate Civil Rights as more important than non-Southern whites, consistent with the targets of proposed Civil Rights legislation—discrimination in public accommodations and voting—existing only in the South and thus only Southern whites being affected. Not surprisingly, blacks care more about the issue than whites, regardless of region.
Appendix Figure A.9: Approval of JFK among black Gallup respondents, 1961-1963

Appendix Figure A.10: Predicted and actual regional approval differences for JFK among whites (Social Security and safety net issues)

Notes: Data come from Gallup polls 1961-1963. “Survey date” refers to the midpoint of the period each survey was in the field. “Predicted” approval comes from regressing Gallup micro data (for whites) on state fixed effects, the average number of Social Security and safety net articles in the NYT in which President Kennedy’s name appears, and this variable interacted with a South dummy. Predictions are collapsed to South × survey date cells and we subtract the non-South from the South cells to generate the “predicted” series for each date. See text for further detail.
Appendix Figure A.11: Democratic share of votes in Presidential Elections

![Graph showing Democratic share of votes in Presidential Elections from 1900 to 2012. The graph includes data for Confederate states, non-Confederate states, and the difference between them.](image)


Appendix Figure A.12: Democratic share of white votes in presidential elections in Confederate and non Confederate States

![Graph showing Democratic share of white votes in Presidential Elections from 1952 to 2008. The graph includes data for Confederate states, non-Confederate states, and the difference between them.](image)

*Source:* ANES 1952-2008
Appendix Figure A.13: White Catholic support for Democratic presidential candidates relative to other whites

Source: ANES 1952-2008
### Appendix Table A.1: Whites’ opinions on race-related questions, by response to black president question (GSS, 1972-1980)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinions</th>
<th>Would vote for a black president</th>
<th>Would not vote for a black president</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree that blacks shouldn’t push themselves where they are not wanted</td>
<td>.3671737 [N=2827]</td>
<td>.6797642 [N=1018]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree that government does too much to improve condition of blacks</td>
<td>.2325276 [N=3806]</td>
<td>.4933712 [N=1056]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against busing of black and white school children from one district to another</td>
<td>.8347466 [N=4835]</td>
<td>.9147287 [N=1548]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree that white and black children should go to separate schools</td>
<td>.0562566 [N=1902]</td>
<td>.3559557 [N=722]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Object to sending children to a school where a few of the children are black?</td>
<td>.0278278 [N=4995]</td>
<td>.1737747 [N=1571]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favors laws against marriages between blacks and whites</td>
<td>.2575914 [N=3886]</td>
<td>.640031 [N=1289]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would object to family member bringing black friend for dinner</td>
<td>.1835052 [N=2910]</td>
<td>.561245 [N=996]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix Table A.2: Comparison of Summary Statistics for Whites by Time Period and Region (Gallup—IPUMS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non Confederate States</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed high school</td>
<td>.479</td>
<td>.458</td>
<td>.570</td>
<td>.586</td>
<td>.655</td>
<td>.715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.516</td>
<td>.517</td>
<td>.523</td>
<td>.527</td>
<td>.529</td>
<td>.526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resident in urban area</td>
<td>.671</td>
<td>.718</td>
<td>.732</td>
<td>.737</td>
<td>.726</td>
<td>.749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>10263</td>
<td>772823</td>
<td>6374</td>
<td>848060</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>974156</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Confederate States</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed high school</td>
<td>.362</td>
<td>.418</td>
<td>.478</td>
<td>.516</td>
<td>.552</td>
<td>.650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.514</td>
<td>.516</td>
<td>.526</td>
<td>.524</td>
<td>.523</td>
<td>.523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resident in urban area</td>
<td>.448</td>
<td>.603</td>
<td>.581</td>
<td>.652</td>
<td>.704</td>
<td>.672</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2416</td>
<td>199391</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>244145</td>
<td>5820</td>
<td>327401</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Summary statistics are weighted using survey weights. Years reported are census years. For each census year, Gallup statistics are drawn from surveys in the 5-year period around the census year. E.g. for census year 1960, Gallup surveys 1958-1962 are used.

Notes: See text for details on the Gallup data. The years reported in the table refer to census years. For each census year, Gallup statistics are drawn from surveys in the 5-year period around the census year. E.g. for census year 1960, Gallup surveys 1958-1962 are used. “Urban area” in Gallup refers to areas with a population greater than 2,500. The definition of “Urban area” in IPUMS has changed over time. A full account of how the variable has been defined can be found in the IPUMS documentation ([https://usa.ipums.org/usa/](https://usa.ipums.org/usa/)). Summary statistics are weighted using survey weights.

Appendix Table A.3: Share of Gallup respondents naming “Civil Rights” the country’s “most important problem,” by race and region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-period</th>
<th>Post-period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>February 1961</td>
<td>June-July 1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites, South</td>
<td>.095</td>
<td>.140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks, South</td>
<td>.310</td>
<td>.270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whites, Non-South</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks, Non-South</td>
<td>.170</td>
<td>.230</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: See text for details on the Gallup data. “Pre” and “Post” indicate before and after April 1963, respectively. Surveys used are restricted to the survey dates indicated.
Appendix Table A.4: Robustness of main triple-interaction results to estimating model, control group and outcome variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Democrat</th>
<th>Republican</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x Aft</td>
<td>-0.432**</td>
<td>0.00673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.179)</td>
<td>(0.153)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Bl prez</td>
<td>0.0173</td>
<td>-0.0235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0414)</td>
<td>(0.0344)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x No Bl prez</td>
<td>0.494***</td>
<td>0.210***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.153)</td>
<td>(0.0690)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Bl prez x Aft</td>
<td>-0.0326</td>
<td>0.0198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0630)</td>
<td>(0.0690)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x No Bl prez x</td>
<td>-0.492**</td>
<td>-0.210*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aft</td>
<td>(0.198)</td>
<td>(0.107)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: These specifications replicate cols. (3) and (4) of Table 2. Year and State FE are included; the sample period used starts in 1956, with 1963 as the first year of the ‘after’ period and continues through 1980. Probit specifications report marginal effects. Standard errors clustered by state in parenthesis. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Appendix Table A.5: Robustness of main triple-interaction results in samples restricted by age and gender

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Gender</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x Aft</td>
<td>-0.159*</td>
<td>0.000311</td>
<td>-0.167**</td>
<td>-0.00629</td>
<td>-0.183**</td>
<td>0.00483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0865)</td>
<td>(0.0633)</td>
<td>(0.0637)</td>
<td>(0.107)</td>
<td>(0.0712)</td>
<td>(0.0757)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Bl prez</td>
<td>0.0244</td>
<td>0.00154</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0112</td>
<td>0.00126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0199)</td>
<td>(0.0239)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0172)</td>
<td>(0.0219)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x No Bl prez</td>
<td>0.164***</td>
<td>0.166*</td>
<td>0.199***</td>
<td>0.186**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0514)</td>
<td>(0.0921)</td>
<td>(0.0558)</td>
<td>(0.0864)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Bl prez x Aft</td>
<td>-0.0249</td>
<td>-0.0104</td>
<td></td>
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<td>0.0245</td>
<td>-0.0402</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0304)</td>
<td>(0.0297)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0313)</td>
<td>(0.0323)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x No Bl prez x Aft</td>
<td>-0.188**</td>
<td>-0.178</td>
<td>-0.223**</td>
<td>-0.169**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0705)</td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td>7789</td>
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<td>12403</td>
<td>9685</td>
<td>9685</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>40 and under</td>
<td>Over 40</td>
<td>Over 40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>0.441</td>
<td>0.441</td>
<td>0.459</td>
<td>0.459</td>
<td>0.437</td>
<td>0.437</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: These specifications replicate cols. (3) and (4) of Table 2. Year and State FE are included; the sample period used starts in 1958, with 1963 as the first year of the ‘after’ period and continues through 1980. Standard errors clustered by state in parenthesis.

*p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Appendix Table A.9: Predicting approval of Eisenhower among whites by region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Rights</td>
<td>-0.0167</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0128)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x Civil</td>
<td>-0.0225</td>
<td>-0.0369***</td>
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<td>Rights</td>
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<td>(0.00668)</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x Civil</td>
<td>-0.0282***</td>
<td>-0.0290***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.0129)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x Negro</td>
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<td>-0.0527***</td>
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<td>Conf x Placebo:</td>
<td>0.0172***</td>
<td>0.0167***</td>
<td>0.0130***</td>
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<td>Foreign, Policy,</td>
<td>(0.00570)</td>
<td>(0.00484)</td>
<td>(0.00453)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>War</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Conf x Placebo:</td>
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<td>0.0410</td>
<td>0.0316</td>
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<td>(0.0325)</td>
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<td>Conf x Placebo:</td>
<td>-0.0315***</td>
<td>-0.0276***</td>
<td>-0.0222***</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
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<td>(0.00724)</td>
<td>(0.00583)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>-0.00959</td>
<td>-0.00745</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Cuba, Castro</td>
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<td>(0.00571)</td>
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<td>Communism, Socialism</td>
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<td>(0.00792)</td>
<td>(0.00689)</td>
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<td>(0.00760)</td>
<td>(0.00634)</td>
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<td>(0.0100)</td>
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<td>(0.0125)</td>
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<td>(0.00987)</td>
<td>(0.00900)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Conf x Placebo:</td>
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<td>0.00784</td>
<td>0.0181**</td>
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<td>Korea</td>
<td>(0.00948)</td>
<td>(0.00842)</td>
<td>(0.00783)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x Placebo:</td>
<td>0.0798*</td>
<td>0.0686*</td>
<td>0.0832**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highways</td>
<td>(0.0435)</td>
<td>(0.0377)</td>
<td>(0.0341)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations 82508 82508 82508 82508 82508 82508
Survey Date FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mean 0.651 0.651 0.651 0.651 0.651 0.651

Notes: State fixed effects are included in all regressions. “Civil Rights” refers to the frequency of articles containing “President Eisenhower” that employ the terms “civil rights” in the New York Times. “Civil Rights Terms” is an expanded version of this search that refers to frequency of articles containing “President Eisenhower” that employ the terms “civil rights” or any form of the word “segregate” or “integrate”. “Negro” refers to the frequency of articles containing “President Eisenhower” that employ the term “negro”. Placebo searches are articles containing “President Eisenhower” and variations of the terms summarized in the coefficient labels, interacted with Conf. All media search variables are smoothed (weighted averages of nearby observations in the original time series). Regressions use all Gallup surveys that contain presidential approval data. The sample period is Eisenhower’s presidential term, January 1953 – January 1961. Standard errors clustered by survey date. *p < 0.1,**p < 0.05,***p < 0.01
Appendix Table A.6: Predicting approval of Kennedy among whites by region – Regress on Articles as Fraction of Total Daily Article Count

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conf x Share of Civil Rights</td>
<td>-21.66***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.050)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x Share of Civil Rights Terms</td>
<td>-15.51***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.571)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x Share of Negro</td>
<td>0.637</td>
<td>1.656</td>
<td>0.280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.887)</td>
<td>(4.663)</td>
<td>(5.323)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x Share of Foreign Policy, War</td>
<td>17.71</td>
<td>24.98</td>
<td>16.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13.37)</td>
<td>(15.03)</td>
<td>(14.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x Share of Crime, Drugs</td>
<td>-0.596</td>
<td>0.0608</td>
<td>-1.960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.412)</td>
<td>(2.767)</td>
<td>(2.786)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x Share of USSR</td>
<td>-4.706</td>
<td>-2.353</td>
<td>-1.858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.517)</td>
<td>(4.518)</td>
<td>(4.782)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x Share of Cuba, Castro</td>
<td>5.468</td>
<td>5.641</td>
<td>5.998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.208)</td>
<td>(5.223)</td>
<td>(6.177)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x Share of Communism, Socialism</td>
<td>-2.149</td>
<td>-4.374</td>
<td>-2.953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.018)</td>
<td>(2.939)</td>
<td>(2.975)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x Share of Taxes, Budget</td>
<td>2.484</td>
<td>-1.473</td>
<td>1.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.377)</td>
<td>(5.810)</td>
<td>(6.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8.607)</td>
<td>(8.634)</td>
<td>(10.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x Share of Agriculture</td>
<td>2.760</td>
<td>3.487</td>
<td>3.373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.557)</td>
<td>(4.833)</td>
<td>(5.296)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>81365</td>
<td>81365</td>
<td>81365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>0.673</td>
<td>0.673</td>
<td>0.673</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: State and survey date fixed effects are included in all regressions. “Civil Rights” refers to the frequency of articles containing “President Kennedy” that employ the terms “civil rights” in the New York Times. “Civil Rights Terms” is an expanded version of this search that refers to frequency of articles containing “President Kennedy” that employ the terms “civil rights” or any form of the word “segregate” or “integrate”. “Negro” refers to the frequency of articles containing “President Kennedy” that employ the term “negro”. Placebo searches are articles containing “President Kennedy” and variations of the terms summarized in the coefficient labels, interacted with Conf. All media search variables are smoothed (weighted averages of nearby observations in the original time series). Regressions use all Gallup surveys that contain presidential approval data. The sample period is Kennedy’s presidential term, January 1953 – January 1961. Standard errors clustered by survey date. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Appendix Table A.7: Predicting approval of Kennedy among whites by region, controlling for South linear time trend

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conf x Civil Rights</td>
<td>-0.0434***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00756)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x Civil Rights Terms</td>
<td>-0.0340***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00716)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x Negro</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0391**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0144)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x Linear Date</td>
<td>-0.000189***</td>
<td>-0.000185**</td>
<td>-0.000185*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0000640)</td>
<td>(0.0000674)</td>
<td>(0.000105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x Placebo: Foreign Policy, War</td>
<td>-0.00862</td>
<td>-0.00137</td>
<td>-0.00468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0101)</td>
<td>(0.0118)</td>
<td>(0.0174)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x Placebo: Crime, Drugs</td>
<td>0.00521</td>
<td>-0.000764</td>
<td>-0.00251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0260)</td>
<td>(0.0299)</td>
<td>(0.0243)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x Placebo: USSR</td>
<td>0.0203***</td>
<td>0.0287***</td>
<td>0.0196**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00604)</td>
<td>(0.00669)</td>
<td>(0.00878)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x Placebo: Cuba, Castro</td>
<td>-0.00303</td>
<td>0.00139</td>
<td>0.00271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00806)</td>
<td>(0.00917)</td>
<td>(0.0101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x Placebo: Communism, Socialism</td>
<td>-0.00875</td>
<td>-0.0152**</td>
<td>-0.00973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00584)</td>
<td>(0.00706)</td>
<td>(0.0126)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x Placebo: Taxes, Budget</td>
<td>0.0163**</td>
<td>0.0199**</td>
<td>0.0183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00736)</td>
<td>(0.00757)</td>
<td>(0.0117)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x Placebo: Employment</td>
<td>0.00405</td>
<td>-0.0144</td>
<td>-0.0111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0101)</td>
<td>(0.0136)</td>
<td>(0.0141)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x Placebo: Social Security</td>
<td>-0.00270</td>
<td>0.00676</td>
<td>0.00696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0131)</td>
<td>(0.0139)</td>
<td>(0.0232)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x Placebo: Agriculture</td>
<td>0.0219***</td>
<td>0.0228***</td>
<td>0.0225**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00704)</td>
<td>(0.00768)</td>
<td>(0.0102)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations: 81365
Mean: 0.673

Notes: State and survey date fixed effects are included in all regressions. “Civil Rights” refers to the frequency of articles containing “President Kennedy” that employ the terms “civil rights” in the New York Times. “Civil Rights Terms” is an expanded version of this search that refers to frequency of articles containing “President Kennedy” that employ the terms “civil rights” or any form of the word “segregate” or “integrate”. “Negro” refers to the frequency of articles containing “President Kennedy” that employ the term “negro”. Placebo searches are articles containing “President Kennedy” and variations of the terms summarized in the coefficient labels, interacted with Conf. All media search variables are smoothed (weighted averages of nearby observations in the original time series). Regressions use all Gallup surveys that contain presidential approval data. The sample period is Kennedy’s presidential term, January 1953 – January 1961. Standard errors clustered by survey date. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Appendix Table A.8: Pre-period policy differences between whites in South and non-South (ANES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>—Economic policy</th>
<th>South N</th>
<th>Non-South N</th>
<th>Diff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gov’t should guarantee jobs</td>
<td>3.63  483</td>
<td>3.57 1914</td>
<td>0.067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree that gov’t should guarantee jobs</td>
<td>0.55  552</td>
<td>0.54 2134</td>
<td>0.0090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov’t sd not cut taxes if causes cuts elsewhere</td>
<td>3.47  267</td>
<td>3.49 1063</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree gov’t should not cut taxes</td>
<td>0.46  327</td>
<td>0.48 1283</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov’t sd help ppl get medical care at low cost</td>
<td>3.64  501</td>
<td>3.53 1885</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree gov’t sd help with medical care</td>
<td>0.58  552</td>
<td>0.52 2134</td>
<td>0.057**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov’t sd limit pol. influ. of big business</td>
<td>4.00  241</td>
<td>3.84 954</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree that gov’t should limit infl. of business</td>
<td>0.54  327</td>
<td>0.51 1283</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov’t sd. <em>not</em> limit pol. influ. of unions</td>
<td>2.23  241</td>
<td>2.20 1002</td>
<td>0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree gov’t sd. <em>not</em> limit infl. of unions</td>
<td>0.19  327</td>
<td>0.20 1283</td>
<td>-0.0030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov’t sd <em>not</em> leave utilities, housing to priv. biz.</td>
<td>2.46  404</td>
<td>2.41 1623</td>
<td>0.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree that gov’t sd <em>not</em> leave...to priv biz.</td>
<td>0.22  552</td>
<td>0.22 2134</td>
<td>-0.0048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fed gov’t sd help finance local school construction</td>
<td>3.63  500</td>
<td>3.79 1906</td>
<td>-0.16**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree fed gov’t sd help finance schools</td>
<td>0.58  552</td>
<td>0.61 2134</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>—Foreign policy, communism</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gov’t cannot fire suspected communists</td>
<td>3.71 285</td>
<td>3.78 1111</td>
<td>-0.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree gov’t cannot fire susp. communists</td>
<td>0.57 327</td>
<td>0.58 1283</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keep soldiers abroad to help countries fight comm.</td>
<td>4.14 456</td>
<td>4.05 1772</td>
<td>0.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree we sd keep soldiers abroad....</td>
<td>0.64 552</td>
<td>0.63 2134</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We sd give aid to poor countries even if can’t pay back</td>
<td>3.28 479</td>
<td>3.40 1829</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree we shoulid give aid to poor countries</td>
<td>0.46 552</td>
<td>0.47 2134</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Give for. aid even if country not anti-communist</td>
<td>2.74 247</td>
<td>2.85 954</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree give for. aid even if country...</td>
<td>0.28 327</td>
<td>0.30 1283</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best way to deal with commun. countries is get tough</td>
<td>4.04 255</td>
<td>4.15 1078</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree best way is to get tough</td>
<td>0.58 327</td>
<td>0.65 1283</td>
<td>-0.066**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>—Civil rights</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gov’t sd enforce fair jobs/housing for negros</td>
<td>3.33 477</td>
<td>3.86 1832</td>
<td>-0.53***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree that gov’t schould enforce fair...</td>
<td>0.50 552</td>
<td>0.61 2134</td>
<td>-0.11***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fed gov’t sd. get involved in sch. integration</td>
<td>2.15 305</td>
<td>2.99 1118</td>
<td>-0.84***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree that fed gov’t sd get involved...</td>
<td>0.25 327</td>
<td>0.40 1283</td>
<td>-0.15***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations  2686

Notes: All questions taken from the 1956 and 1960 ANES. If the ideological orientation of the question is obvious, we reorient the question if needed so that answers are increasing in the liberal position. The wording we use to label each question has been lightly edited to limit total characters while retaining the meaning of the question. Each question is presented in two ways. First, as continuous agreement with the statement from one to five (”don’t know” is dropped). Second, as a binary variable indicating agreement or strong agreement (”don’t know” is included). Sample sizes vary because while all questions appear in 1956, but only some are repeated in 1960. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Appendix Table A.10: Regressing Democrat on Conf × After with and without Confederate time trend

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
<th>(7)</th>
<th>(8)</th>
<th>(9)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conf x Aft</td>
<td>-0.154** (0.0677)</td>
<td>-0.180*** (0.0282)</td>
<td>-0.0522* (0.0300)</td>
<td>-0.154** (0.0677)</td>
<td>-0.175*** (0.0269)</td>
<td>-0.100*** (0.0334)</td>
<td>-0.165** (0.0658)</td>
<td>-0.173*** (0.0254)</td>
<td>-0.133*** (0.0347)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x Year</td>
<td>-0.0107*** (0.00126)</td>
<td>-0.00529*** (0.00167)</td>
<td>-0.00247* (0.00140)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Observations  | 18921 | 521874 | 521874 | 18921  | 632494 | 632494  | 20192  | 755560  | 755560  |
| Dataset       | Gallup | Gallup all | Gallup all | Gallup | Gallup all | Gallup all | Gallup | Gallup all |
| Mean          | 0.453 | 0.432   | 0.432   | 0.453  | 0.425   | 0.425   | 0.452  | 0.427   |

Notes: Year and state fixed effects are included in all regressions. After is an indicator variable for being surveyed after April 1963. A time trend is included in the regression wherever the variable Conf × Year, an interaction between Confed and survey year, is specified. The “Gallup all” includes survey years in which the “black president” question was not asked. The “Gallup” dataset restricts the sample to only survey years in which the “black president” question was asked, in line with the main results tables. “Max year” indicates the end point of the sample period (in all cases, the first year of the sample period is 1958). Standard errors clustered by state. *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Appendix B. Details on “black president” questions from Gallup and GSS

Appendix Table B.1: Details on the Gallup “black president question”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mon/Year</th>
<th>Black President Question Wording</th>
<th>Question Preceding Black President Question</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7/8/1958</td>
<td>If he happened to be a Negro.</td>
<td>If he happened to be a Jew.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/1958</td>
<td>Between now and 1960, there will be much discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates - their education, age, religion, race and the like... If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for president and he happened to be a Negro, would you vote for him.</td>
<td>Questions 53A and 53B to be coded together. If “yes” to part A, edit answers into part B. Q.53A. Do you, yourself, plan to vote in the election this November or not. F. If “yes”, ask: Q.53B. How certain are you that you will vote - absolutely certain, fairly certain, or not certain.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/1959</td>
<td>Between now and the time of the conventions in 1960, there will be much discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates - their education, age, religion, race, and the like... If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for president and he happened to be a Negro, would you vote for him.</td>
<td>Do you think Jesus Christ will ever return to earth. F. If “yes” to Q.66C, ask: Q.66D. When do you think this will happen.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/1961</td>
<td>Between now and 1964 there will be much discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates - their education, age, religion, race, and the like... Q.31A. If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for president and he happened to be a Negro, would you vote for him.</td>
<td>Suppose there were only two major parties in the United States, one for liberals and one for conservatives, which one would you be most likely to prefer.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8/1963</td>
<td>If he happened to be a Negro.</td>
<td>If he happened to be a Catholic.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The main black president question reads as follows: "Between now and 1960, there will be much discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates... If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for president, would you vote for him?" Each of the response options follows the main question.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mon/Year</th>
<th>Black President Question Wording</th>
<th>Question Preceding Black President Question</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7/1965</td>
<td>If he happened to be a Negro.</td>
<td>If he happened to be a Catholic.</td>
<td>The main black president question reads as follows: &quot;There's always much discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates - their education, age, race, religion, and the like... If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for president and he happened to be divorced, would you vote for him?&quot; Theoretically, the respective options (e.g., Catholic, Negro, etc.) would replace &quot;divorced.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/1967</td>
<td>-- a Negro.</td>
<td>-- a Jew.</td>
<td>The main black president question reads as follows: &quot;There's always much discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates - their education, age, race, religion, and the like... If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for president and he happened to be divorced, would you vote for him?&quot; Theoretically, the respective options (e.g., Jew, Negro, etc.) would replace &quot;divorced.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/1969</td>
<td>If he happened to be a Negro.</td>
<td>If he happened to be a Catholic.</td>
<td>The main black president question reads as follows: &quot;There's always much discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates - their education, age, race, religion, and the like... If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for president and he happened to be a Jew, would you vote for him?&quot; Theoretically, the respective options (e.g., Catholic, Negro, etc.) would replace &quot;Jew.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/1971</td>
<td>There's always much discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates - their education, age, race, religion, and the like. If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for president and he happened to be a Negro, would you vote for him.</td>
<td>Is there any man not on this list whom you would like to see as the Republican candidate for vice president in 1972.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix Table B.1: Details on the Gallup “black president question” (continued)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mon/Year</th>
<th>Black President Question Wording</th>
<th>Question Preceding Black President Question</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7/1978</td>
<td>Between now and the time of the convention in 1980 there will be more discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates – their education, age, religion, race, and the like... Q8a. If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for President and he happened to be a black, would you vote for him?</td>
<td>Which political party do you think would be more likely to keep the United States out of World War III -- the Republican party or the Democratic party?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/1983</td>
<td>If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for president and he happened to be black, would you vote for him?</td>
<td>Now, which of the persons on the list would be UNACCEPTABLE to you as the Democratic candidate for president in 1984.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/1984</td>
<td>This year there has been much discussion about the qualifications of Presidential candidates—their education, age, religion, race, and the like. If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for President, would you vote for him if he happened to be black?</td>
<td>Some people have very traditional values about such matters as sex, morality, family life and religion. If 1 represents someone who has VERY TRADITIONAL, OLD-FASHIONED values and 7 represents someone who has very LIBERAL, MODERN values about these matters, where on this 1 to 7 scale would you place yourself?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/1987</td>
<td>If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for president and if he happened to be black would you vote for him?</td>
<td>If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for president and if he happened to be an atheist would you vote for him?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/1999</td>
<td>Between now and the 2000 political conventions, there will be discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates – their education, age, religion, race, and so on. If your party nominated a generally well-qualified person for president who happened to be [INSERT A-H], would you vote for that person?</td>
<td>Would you generally favor or oppose each of the following proposals as part of this year's federal budget package?</td>
<td>Note that for the main black president question, &quot;An atheist&quot; precedes &quot;Black&quot; in the list of response options A-H.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-6/2003</td>
<td>Between now and the 2004 political conventions, there will be discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates – their education, age, religion, race, and so on. If your party nominated a generally well-qualified person for president who happened to be [INSERT A-D], would you vote for that person?</td>
<td>In the next few years, do you think the United States' efforts against terrorism will -- or will not -- require the U.S. to put military troops in combat situations in other countries as it did in Iraq and Afghanistan?</td>
<td>Note that for the main black president question, &quot;Jewish&quot; precedes &quot;Black&quot; in the list of response options A-D.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Appendix Table B.2: Details on the GSS “black president question”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month/Year</th>
<th>Black President Question Wording</th>
<th>Question Preceding Black President Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2/1972</td>
<td>If your party nominated a Negro for President, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?</td>
<td>A. Would you yourself have any objection to sending your children to a school where a few of the children are Negroes? No (ASK B) Don't know (ASK B) B. IF NO OR DK TO A: Where half of the children are Negroes? No (ASK C) Don't know (ASK C) C. IF NO OR DK TO B: Where more than half of the children are Negroes?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/1974</td>
<td>If your party nominated a (Negro/Black) for President, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?</td>
<td>Compared with American families in general, would you say your family income is -- far below average, below average, average, above average, or far above average? (PROBE: Just your best guess.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/1975</td>
<td>If your party nominated a (Negro/Black) for President, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?</td>
<td>Are there any (Negroes/Blacks) living in this neighborhood now? Yes... (ASK A-C). A. Are there any (Negro/Black) families living close to you? B. How many blocks (or miles) away do they (the [Negro/Black] families who live closest to you) live? C. Do you think this neighborhood will become all (Negro/Black) in the next few years, or will it remain integrated?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/1977</td>
<td>If your party nominated a (Negro/Black) for President, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?</td>
<td>Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements A. You can expect special problems with marriages between (Negroes/Blacks) and whites. B. You can expect special problems with (Negro/Black) supervisors getting along with workers that are mostly white. C. A school board should not hire a person to teach if that person belongs to an organization that opposes school integration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3/1978</td>
<td>If your party nominated a (Negro/Black) for President, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?</td>
<td>Suppose there is a community-wide vote on the general housing issue. There are two possible laws to vote on: (READ CATEGORIES A &amp; B) Which law would you vote for? A. One law says that a homeowner can decide for himself whom to sell his house to, even if he prefers not to sell to Whites. B. The second law says that a homeowner cannot refuse to sell to someone because of their race or color. Neither. Don't know.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/1982</td>
<td>If your party nominated a (Negro/Black) for President, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?</td>
<td>A. In general, do you favor or oppose the busing of (Negro/Black) and white school children from one school district to another? B. Now, thinking about ten years ago, that is in 1972, did you then favor or oppose the busing of (Negro/Black) and white school children from one school district to another?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/1983</td>
<td>If your party nominated a (Black/NEGRO) for President, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?</td>
<td>Suppose there is a community-wide vote on the general housing issue. There are two possible laws to vote on: (READ CATEGORIES A &amp; B) Which law would you vote for? A. One law says that a homeowner can decide for himself whom to sell his house to, even if he prefers not to sell to Whites. B. The second law says that a homeowner cannot refuse to sell to someone because of their race or color. Neither. Don't know.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/1985</td>
<td>If your party nominated a (Black/NEGRO) for President, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?</td>
<td>In general, do you favor or oppose the busing of (Black/NEGRO) and White school children from one school district to another?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/1985 (1986 GSS)</td>
<td>If your party nominated a (Black/NEGRO) for President, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?</td>
<td>Suppose there is a community-wide vote on the general housing issue. There are two possible laws to vote on: (READ CATEGORIES A &amp; B) Which law would you vote for? A. One law says that a homeowner can decide for himself whom to sell his house to, even if he prefers not to sell to Whites. B. The second law says that a homeowner cannot refuse to sell to someone because of their race or color. Neither. Don't know.</td>
</tr>
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Appendix Table B.2: Details on the GSS “black president question” (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mon/Year</th>
<th>Black President Question Wording</th>
<th>Question Preceding Black President Question</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/1988</td>
<td>If your party nominated a (Black/Negro) for President, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?</td>
<td>May vary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/1989</td>
<td>If your party nominated a (Black/Negro) for President, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?</td>
<td>May vary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/1990</td>
<td>If your party nominated a (Black/Negro) for President, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?</td>
<td>May vary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/1991</td>
<td>If your party nominated a (Black/Negro) for President, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?</td>
<td>May vary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 GSS</td>
<td>If your party nominated a/an (Black/African-American) for President, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?</td>
<td>May vary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 GSS</td>
<td>If your party nominated a/an (Black/African-American) for President, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?</td>
<td>May vary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring 1996</td>
<td>If your party nominated a/an (Black/African-American) for President, would you vote for him if he were qualified for the job?</td>
<td>May vary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1996 GSS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C. ANES analysis

In this section, we detail the questions that the ANES includes on racial equality during the Civil Rights era and explore how viable they are to use in an analysis similar to that in the main text of the paper.

C.1 Questions on school integration

As noted earlier, the ANES cumulative file includes questions from its individual year files if those questions are deemed reasonably comparable and were repeated with sufficient frequency. The only question related to civil rights that spans our pre- and post-periods that the ANES deems comparable over time is on school integration. It covers only a single pre-period year (1962) and is then asked most years from 1964 through 2000. Appendix Table C.1 gives the exact wording of the question each year it is asked (ignore 1956–1960 for the moment). Even though the ANES deems the question comparable from 1962 onward, non-trivial differences arise year to year. For example, in 1962 supporting integration but “not by force” is an option (and coded as support), whereas in 1964 that option is not offered. In 1964, the justification of it not being the “government’s business” is introduced, but this wording is not included in 1962.

These caveats aside, in Appendix Table C.2 we replicate our main analysis, using opposition to school integration in the same manner we used refusal to vote for a black president (those who answer “don’t know” or “unsure” are coded as being against integration). Again, we use only data from the ANES cumulative file. Col. (1) shows that the decline in Southern white support for the Democrats relative to other whites is smaller when we use this very abbreviated pre-period. As noted in Section 6, Catholics (almost all of whom lived outside the South) reacted to JFK’s administration with unprecedented support, whereas nearly half of white Southerners told Gallup they would never vote for a Catholic. As such, the small coefficient on South × After is likely an artifact of our single pre-period year being 1962 (the middle of JFK’s administration).

Nonetheless, while the small sample size reduces precision, the sign and magnitude of the triple interaction term reported in col. (2) supports the Gallup analysis. Relative to 1962, white Southerners against integration are nine percentage points less likely to identify as Democrats in 1964-1980, compared to their non-Southern counterparts. Whereas the Gallup analysis showed non-Southern whites with conservative racial views only slightly moving away from the party, the effect in the ANES is larger and achieves significance. These patterns of coefficients hold in when we extend the post-period to 2000 (cols. 3 and 4) or end it in 1970 (cols. 5 and 6).

The key drawback to restricting ourselves to the cumulative file is that its one question on racial attitudes that spans our two periods provides only a single pre-period year. We thus explore the viability of adding additional data from the individual year files, even though ANES did not deem these questions sufficiently comparable. The closest candidate is a question asked in 1956, 1958 and 1960. As detailed in Appendix Table C.1 , the question asks for respondents’ agreement with the statement: “The government in Washington should stay out of the question of whether white and colored children go to the same school” and unlike the version in the cumulative file offers respondents five possible answers based on the
strength of their opinion.

Given evidence that question wording significantly affects survey answers, (see for example Gaines et. al, 2007) flipping the default between 1960 and 1962 is certainly not ideal (agreement with the pre-1962 statement would generally signal opposition to integration, whereas agreement with the 1962 and later versions would signal support of integration). Moreover, especially in 1956, it is not clear whether the government in Washington “staying out” of the question would signal opposition or support of school integration. In reaction to Brown, U.S. Senators and Representatives from the South drafted the Southern Manifesto in March of 1956, calling on all possible legal action to circumvent Brown. It is thus quite possible that Southerners especially could interpret Washington “staying out” as in fact allowing Brown to progress.

These caveats notwithstanding, we attempt to combine these additional years, coding any degree of agreement that the government should “stay out” as opposition to integration. Appendix Figure C.1 plots the share of whites against integration by year and region. Overall, those outside the South are uniformly more in support of integration throughout the sample period. In 1956, the difference between regions is unusually small, consistent with some Southerners assuming federal intervention might be on the side of school segregation. There is a very large decline in support for segregation among non-Southerners in 1962, perhaps due to the change in the way the question is asked.

Cols. (7) through (12) of Appendix Table C.2 replicate the analysis in the first six columns, but include the three additional pre-period years from the individual year data files. Adding these additional years adds power as well as makes the South × After coefficient larger in magnitude. Essentially, the results look very similar to the main Gallup analysis.

However, examining coefficients year-by-year paints a noisier picture (Appendix Figure C.2). Perhaps because of the Southern Manifesto, 1956 appears to be an extreme outlier, where white Southerners who wanted the government to involve themselves in school integration were also staunchly Democratic. Nor do we see a sharp drop in the Southern coefficient estimate between 1962 and 1964. Overall, however, we continue to see that in the pre-period, opposition to integration positively predicts Democratic identification in the South relative to elsewhere, and that this difference for the most part disappears in the post-period.

Given that the ANES cautions against longitudinal analysis with variables they do not include in the cumulative file, we show these results mostly for the sake of completeness and emphasize that we prefer the Gallup given the serious issues of question consistency highlighted above.

C.2 Questions on jobs and housing

The ANES cumulative file contains two questions on fair treatment of blacks in the areas of employment and housing (pre 1964) and employment alone (1964 and beyond), and thus in isolation we cannot use them to replicate the Gallup analysis. As Appendix Table C.3 shows, besides the inconsistent inclusion of housing, there are other non-trivial differences between these two series, likely the reason why ANES does not combine them into a single question.

49Richard Russell (D-GA) was its main author.
in the cumulative file. First, whereas before 1964 it is left unclear as to which level (federal, state or local) “the government” refers, the “the federal government” is specified in 1964 and later. Second, as with the school integration question, more flexibility on the degree of one’s agreement or disagreement are offered in the earlier years. Third, though not a fault of the question, the way that one answers is likely very different before and after the Civil Rights Bill of 1964, which in principle would have addressed many of these issues.

A final issue with this question unrelated to its consistency across time is that “fair treatment” is vague. If one believes that blacks are innately inferior or that the races should not mix, then limiting blacks to low-status jobs and segregated housing could be viewed as “fair.” Indeed, in 1958, the ANES specifically asks respondents to explain their views about school integration. Among those whose views were classified by ANES as “anti-Negro,” still only 32% percent disagreed that government should ensure “fair treatment” for blacks in the area of jobs and housing.50 This cross-tabulation suggests the notion of fairness in the jobs/housing question may be so vague as to be meaningless.

Indeed, Appendix Figure C.3 is consistent with many of these concerns. First, regional differences on this question are very small relative to those for school integration. A sizable majority of Southerners agree that the government should guarantee “fair” treatment in jobs and housing, suggesting the notion is vague enough for most people to support. Unlike the black president question, whites in both regions become less supportive of the idea of time, perhaps because of a presumption CRA64 took care of the problem or because the understanding of “fair treatment” became broader over time. In any case, whether it is the addition of “federal government” to the wording of the question, the change in the number of options given as potential answers, or the passage of the CRA that summer, the new version of the question beginning in 1964 elicits significantly less support among whites than did the older question.

Despite these serious reservations and ANES classifying them as incomparable questions, for the sake of completeness we replicate our standard analysis by combining these two jobs/housing questions in Appendix Table C.4. Not surprising given that the question changes just at the point when our post-period begins, we do not find that including our triple interaction decreases the coefficient on South × After nor is the triple interaction term itself significant.

50Authors’ calculation from 1958 ANES individual year file.
Appendix Figure C.1: Share against school integration, by region and year


Appendix Figure C.2: Coefficient from regressing Dem on Against school integration by region and year (whites in ANES)

Appendix Figure C.3: Share against government guaranteeing “fair” treatment of blacks for jobs/housing

Source: ANES cumulative file. For 1956-1960, the question asks about jobs and housing. For 1964 onward, the question asks only about jobs. See details in Appendix Table C.3.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Codes/Frequency</th>
<th>ANES cum. var name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Q. 12P. 'THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD STAY OUT OF THE QUESTION OF WHETHER WHITE AND COLORED CHILDREN GO TO THE SAME SCHOOL.'</td>
<td>615 1. AGREE STRONGLY 144 2. AGREE BUT NOT VERY STRONGLY 110 3. NOT SURE, IT DEPENDS 163 4. DISAGREE BUT NOT VERY STRONGLY 518 5. DISAGREE STRONGLY 22 8. DK 10 9. NA 180 0. NO OPINION</td>
<td>Not in cumulative file</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Q. 18A. 'THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD STAY OUT OF THE QUESTION OF WHETHER WHITE AND COLORED CHILDREN GO TO THE SAME SCHOOL. * DO YOU HAVE AN OPINION ON THIS OR NOT. (IF YES) DO YOU THINK THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD DO THIS.</td>
<td>646 1. AGREE STRONGLY 149 2. AGREE BUT NOT VERY STRONGLY 94 3. NOT SURE, IT DEPENDS 124 4. DISAGREE BUT NOT VERY STRONGLY 612 5. DISAGREE STRONGLY 154 7. NO OPINION 28 8. DK 15 9. NA</td>
<td>Not in cumulative file</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Q. 25A. 'THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD STAY OUT OF THE QUESTION OF WHETHER WHITE AND COLORED CHILDREN GO TO THE SAME SCHOOL.'</td>
<td>629 1. AGREE STRONGLY 118 2. AGREE BUT NOT VERY STRONGLY 129 3. NOT SURE, IT DEPENDS 155 4. DISAGREE BUT NOT VERY STRONGLY 641 5. DISAGREE STRONGLY 51 8. DK 31 9. NA 200 0. NO OPINION</td>
<td>Not in cumulative file</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Q. 47A. (IF HAS OPINION ON FEDERALLY ENFORCED SCHOOL INTEGRATION) DO YOU AGREE THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD DO THIS OR DO YOU THINK THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT DO IT. [* THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD SEE TO IT THAT WHITE AND COLORED CHILDREN ARE ALLOWED TO GO TO THE SAME SCHOOLS. *]</td>
<td>596 1. YES 33 2. YES, QUALIFIED 27 3. YES, BUT THERE SHOULD BE NO FORCE, MODERATE, GRADUAL 13 4. NO, QUALIFIED 404 5. NO 9 8. DK 32 9. NA 183 0. INAP, Coded 5, 8, or 9 in ref. no. 61</td>
<td>VCF0816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Q. 23. 'SOME PEOPLE SAY THAT THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD SEE TO IT THAT WHITE AND NEGRO (COLORED) CHILDREN ARE ALLOWED TO GO TO THE SAME SCHOOLS. OTHERS CLAIM THAT THIS IS NOT THE GOVERNMENT'S BUSINESS. * HAVE YOU BEEN CONCERNED ENOUGH ABOUT THIS QUESTION TO FAVOR ONE SIDE OVER THE OTHER. Q. 23A. (IF YES) DO YOU THINK THAT THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD:</td>
<td>647 1. (YES) SEE TO IT THAT WHITE AND NEGRO (COLORED) CHILDREN GO TO THE SAME SCHOOLS 113 3. (YES) OTHER, DEPENDS, BOTH BOXES CHECKED 602 5. (YES) STAY OUT OF THIS AREA AS IT IS NONE OF ITS BUSINESS 52 8. DK 7 9. NA 150 0. NO INTEREST</td>
<td>VCF0816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Codes/Frequency</td>
<td>ANES cum. var name</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>A3. <em>SOME PEOPLE SAY THAT THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD SEE TO IT THAT WHITE AND COLORED CHILDREN ARE ALLOWED TO GO TO THE SAME SCHOOLS. OTHERS CLAIM THAT THIS IS NOT THE GOVERNMENT'S BUSINESS</em>. HAVE YOU BEEN CONCERNED ENOUGH ABOUT THIS QUESTION TO FAVOR ONE SIDE OVER THE OTHER? (IF YES) DO YOU THINK THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD --</td>
<td>594 1. (YES) SEE TO IT THAT WHITE AND COLORED CHILDREN ARE ALLOWED TO GO TO THE SAME SCHOOLS 96 3. (YES) PRO-CON, DEPENDS, BOTH BOXES CHECKED, OTHER 434 5. (YES) STAY OUT OF THIS AREA AS IT IS NOT ITS BUSINESS 32 8. DK 9 9. NA 126 0. NO INTEREST (&quot;NO&quot; ANSWER TO Q.A3)</td>
<td>VCF0816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Q. 24, 24A. <em>SOME PEOPLE SAY THAT THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD SEE TO IT THAT WHITE AND NEGRO CHILDREN ARE ALLOWED TO GO TO THE SAME SCHOOLS. OTHERS CLAIM THIS IS NOT THE GOVERNMENT'S BUSINESS.</em> HAVE YOU BEEN CONCERNED ENOUGH ABOUT THIS QUESTION TO FAVOR ONE SIDE OVER THE OTHER? (IF YES) DO YOU THINK THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD --</td>
<td>593 1. (YES) SEE TO IT THAT WHITE AND NEGRO CHILDREN GO TO THE SAME SCHOOLS 103 3. (YES) OTHER, DEPENDS, BOTH BOXES CHECKED IN Q. 24A 681 5. (YES) STAY OUT OF THIS AREA AS IT IS NONE OF ITS BUSINESS 24 8. DK 10 9. NA 146 0. NO INTEREST (&quot;NO&quot; BOX CHECKED IN Q. 24)</td>
<td>VCF0816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td><strong>TYPE 2 QUESTION</strong>, <strong>(IF ‘YES’ TO Q.10) Q.10A. DO YOU THINK THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD: SEE TO IT THAT WHITE AND NEGRO CHILDREN ARE ALLOWED TO GO TO THE SAME SCHOOLS OR STAY OUT OF THIS AREA AS IT IS NOT ITS BUSINESS?</strong></td>
<td>399 1. SEE TO IT THAT WHITE AND NEGRO CHILDREN ARE ALLOWED TO GO TO THE SAME SCHOOLS 295 5. STAY OUT OF THIS AREA AS IT IS NOT ITS BUSINESS 86 7. OTHER; DEPENDS; BOTH BOXES CHECKED 12 8. DON'T KNOW 2 9. NA 98 0. INAP, CODED 1 IN REF. NO. 3, CODED 5, 8, OR 9 IN Q.10</td>
<td>VCF0816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td><strong>FORMS 1 AND 2</strong> PRE-ELECTION QUESTION --IF RESPONDENT IS CODED 1 IN Q.D2-D2A. DO YOU THINK THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD SEE TO IT THAT WHITE AND BLACK CHILDREN GO TO THE SAME SCHOOLS OR STAY OUT OF THIS AREA AS IT IS NOT ITS BUSINESS?</td>
<td>995 1. SEE TO IT THAT WHITE AND BLACK CHILDREN GO TO THE SAME SCHOOLS 1200 5. STAY OUT OF THIS AREA AS IT IS NOT ITS BUSINESS 182 7. OTHER; DEPENDS 38 8. DK 5 9. NA 285 0. INAP., CODED 5, 8 OR 9 IN Q.D2</td>
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Appendix Table C.1: ANES school integration questions (cont’d)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Codes/Frequency</th>
<th>ANES cum. var name</th>
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<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>-- IF RESPONDENT IS CODED 1 IN Q.E3--Q.E3A. DO YOU THINK THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD SEE TO IT THAT WHITE AND BLACK CHILDREN GO TO THE SAME SCHOOLS OR STAY OUT OF THIS AREA AS IT IS NOT ITS &lt;THE GOVERNMENT'S&gt; BUSINESS?</td>
<td>690 1. SEE TO IT THAT WHITE AND BLACK CHILDREN GO TO THE SAME SCHOOLS 1125 5. STAY OUT OF THIS AREA AS IT IS NOT ITS &lt;THE GOVERNMENT'S&gt; BUSINESS 237 7. OTHER; DEPENDS, ANTI-BUSING COMMENT QUALIFIED WITH STATEMENT THAT R IS NOT AGAINST INTEGRATION OR OPPORTUNITY 37 8. DK 49. NA 778 0. INAP., CODED 5, 8 OR 9 IN Q.E3</td>
<td>VCF0816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>-- IF RESPONSE TO Q.F2 WAS &quot;YES&quot; -- Q.F2A. DO YOU THINK THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD SEE TO IT THAT WHITE AND BLACK CHILDREN GO TO THE SAME SCHOOLS OR STAY OUT OF THIS AREA AS IT IS NOT ITS (THE GOVERNMENT'S) BUSINESS?</td>
<td>616 1. SEE TO IT THAT WHITE AND BLACK CHILDREN GO TO THE SAME SCHOOLS 924 5. STAY OUT OF THIS AREA AS IT IS NOT ITS (THE GOVERNMENT'S) BUSINESS 237 7. OTHER; DEPENDS 22 8. DK 49. NA 499 0. INAP., CODED 5, 8 OR 9 IN Q.F2</td>
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Appendix Table C.2: Regressing Democrat identification on views on school integration, by time and region

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<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x Aft</td>
<td>-0.0143 (0.0495)</td>
<td>0.0788 (0.0824)</td>
<td>-0.0566 (0.0554)</td>
<td>0.0430 (0.0810)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0069)</td>
<td>-0.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No school integ</td>
<td>0.0289 (0.0280)</td>
<td>0.0288 (0.0281)</td>
<td>0.0316 (0.0281)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x No school integ</td>
<td>0.108 (0.0943)</td>
<td>0.112 (0.0990)</td>
<td>0.105 (0.0971)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No school integ x Aft</td>
<td>-0.0654* (0.0358)</td>
<td>-0.0914*** (0.0335)</td>
<td>-0.0779* (0.0421)</td>
<td>-0.0330 (0.0203)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x No school integ x</td>
<td>-0.0896 (0.118)</td>
<td>-0.0952 (0.109)</td>
<td>-0.0693 (0.101)</td>
<td>-0.114*** (0.0358)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>11396</td>
<td>11396</td>
<td>17190</td>
<td>17190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>0.404</td>
<td>0.404</td>
<td>0.374</td>
<td>0.374</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Year and State FE are included in all columns. “After” is 1963 and later (so, in ANES, first post-period year is 1964). 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
### Appendix Table C.3: ANES fair jobs/housing questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Code/Frequency</th>
<th>ANES cum. var. name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Q. 12F. &quot;IF NEGROES ARE NOT GETTING FAIR TREATMENT IN JOBS AND HOUSING, THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD SEE TO IT THAT THEY DO.&quot;</td>
<td>750 1. AGREE STRONGLY 320 2. AGREE BUT NOT VERY STRONGLY 114 3. NOT SURE, IT DEPENDS 114 4. DISAGREE BUT NOT VERY STRONGLY 224 5. DISAGREE STRONGLY 30 8. DK, 7 9. NA 269 0. NO OPINION</td>
<td>VCF0818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Q. 16A. &quot;IF NEGROES ARE NOT GETTING FAIR TREATMENT IN JOBS AND HOUSING, THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD SEE TO IT THAT THEY DO.&quot; DO YOU HAVE AN OPINION ON THIS? NOT. (IF YES) DO YOU THINK THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD DO THIS.</td>
<td>860 1. AGREE STRONGLY 293 2. AGREE, BUT NOT VERY STRONGLY 107 3. NOT SURE, IT DEPENDS 100 4. DISAGREE BUT NOT VERY STRONGLY 230 5. DISAGREE STRONGLY 205 7. NO OPINION, 15 8. DK, 12 9. NA</td>
<td>VCF0818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Q. 22A. &quot;IF NEGROES ARE NOT GETTING FAIR TREATMENT IN JOBS AND HOUSING, THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD SEE TO IT THAT THEY DO.&quot;</td>
<td>889 1. AGREE STRONGLY 338 2. AGREE BUT NOT VERY STRONGLY 141 3. NOT SURE, IT DEPENDS 91 4. DISAGREE BUT NOT VERY STRONGLY 258 5. DISAGREE STRONGLY 31 8. DK 34 9. NA 172 0. NO OPINION</td>
<td>VCF0818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Q. 22. &quot;SOME PEOPLE FEEL THAT IF NEGROES (COLORED PEOPLE) ARE NOT GETTING FAIR TREATMENT IN JOBS THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON OUGHT TO SEE TO IT THAT THEY DO. OTHERS FEEL THAT THIS IS NOT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S BUSINESS. * HAVE YOU HAD ENOUGH INTEREST IN THIS QUESTION TO FAVOR ONE SIDE OVER THE OTHER. Q. 22A. (IF YES) HOW DO YOU FEEL. SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON:</td>
<td>611 1. (YES) SEE TO IT THAT NEGROES (COLORED PEOPLE) GET FAIR TREATMENT IN JOBS 115 3. (YES) OTHER, DEPENDS, BOTH BOXES CHECKED 626 5. (YES) LEAVE THESE MATTERS TO THE STATES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES 53 8. DK 6 9. NA 160 0. NO INTEREST</td>
<td>VCF9037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Q. 23, 23A. &quot;SOME PEOPLE FEEL THAT IF NEGROES ARE NOT GETTING FAIR TREATMENT IN JOBS THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SHOULD SEE TO IT THAT THEY DO. OTHERS FEEL THAT THIS IS NOT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S BUSINESS. * HAVE YOU HAD ENOUGH INTEREST IN THIS QUESTION TO FAVOR ONE SIDE OVER THE OTHER? (IF YES) HOW DO YOU FEEL? SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON:</td>
<td>593 1. (YES) SEE TO IT THAT NEGROES GET FAIR TREATMENT IN JOBS 99 3. (YES) OTHER, DEPENDS, BOTH BOXES CHECKED IN Q. 23A 663 5. (YES) LEAVE THESE MATTERS TO THE STATES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES 30 8. DK 9 9. NA 163 0. NO INTEREST (NO BOX CHECKED IN Q. 23)</td>
<td>VCF9037</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix Table C.3: ANES fair jobs/housing questions (cont’d)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Code=Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td><strong>FORMS 1 AND 2</strong> Pre-Election Question --IF RESPONDENT IS CODED 1 IN Q.D1-- D1A. HOW DO YOU FEEL? SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON SEE TO IT THAT BLACK PEOPLE GET FAIR TREATMENT IN JOBS OR LEAVE THESE MATTERS TO THE STATES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES?</td>
<td>1122 1. SEE TO IT THAT BLACK PEOPLE GET FAIR TREATMENT IN JOBS 952 5. LEAVE THESE MATTERS TO THE STATES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES 161 7. OTHER, DEPENDS 25 8. DK 7 9. NA 438 0. INAP, CODED 5, 8 OR 9 IN Q.D1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix Table C.4: Regressing Democrat on views on jobs/housing, by time and region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
<th>(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conf x Aft</td>
<td>-0.114**</td>
<td>-0.110**</td>
<td>-0.173**</td>
<td>-0.151*</td>
<td>-0.0880</td>
<td>-0.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0534)</td>
<td>(0.0511)</td>
<td>(0.0649)</td>
<td>(0.0801)</td>
<td>(0.0666)</td>
<td>(0.0891)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No fair jobs</td>
<td>-0.0391</td>
<td>-0.0425</td>
<td>-0.0377</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0278)</td>
<td>(0.0276)</td>
<td>(0.0278)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x No fair jobs</td>
<td>0.118**</td>
<td>0.113*</td>
<td>0.120**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0553)</td>
<td>(0.0573)</td>
<td>(0.0562)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No fair jobs x Aft</td>
<td>-0.0252</td>
<td>-0.0454</td>
<td>-0.0611*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0313)</td>
<td>(0.0308)</td>
<td>(0.0328)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf x No fair jobs</td>
<td>-0.0436</td>
<td>-0.0653</td>
<td>0.00403</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>x Aft</td>
<td>(0.0559)</td>
<td>(0.0625)</td>
<td>(0.0835)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>7561</td>
<td>7561</td>
<td>11669</td>
<td>11669</td>
<td>5745</td>
<td>5745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>0.439</td>
<td>0.439</td>
<td>0.397</td>
<td>0.397</td>
<td>0.458</td>
<td>0.458</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Year and State FE are included in all columns. “After” is 1963 and later (so, in ANES, first post-period year is 1964). *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Appendix D. Details on machine learning methodology

STILL INCOMPLETE.
Appendix E. Details on media searches

E.1 NYT searches

The full code (in R) used to generate the article counts is available upon request. The table below provides the exact search terms used for each of the Civil Rights searches as well as the searches for “placebo issues.” Searches were performed for each date of Kennedy’s administration.

Appendix Table E.1: Details on NYT article searches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Search terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Civil Rights” (narrow)</td>
<td>“Civil Rights”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Rights terms (broad)</td>
<td>“civil rights,” “segregation,” “segregate,” “segregated,” “integration,” “integrate,” “integrated”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negro</td>
<td>“Negro”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Policy, War</td>
<td>“war”, “peace”, “atomic”, “security”, “defense”, “foreign policy”, “international relations”, “international tensions”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime, Drugs</td>
<td>“crime”, “juvenile delinquency”, “narcotics”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>“russia”, “soviet”, “soviet”, “russian”, “ussr”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba, Castro</td>
<td>“cuban”, “cuba”, “castro”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communism, Socialism</td>
<td>“communism”, “socialism”, “communist”, “socialist”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes, Budget</td>
<td>“tax”, “taxes”, “budget”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Security</td>
<td>“Social security”, “social services”, “welfare”, “old age”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>“farm”, “agriculture”, “agricultural”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For each search, “President” and “Kennedy” was also appended. Full code available upon request. Searches are not case-sensitive.

E.2 Research assistant article coding

Each RA received a spreadsheet that included the title of the article and its link (which they read via the NYT TimesMachine option).

The instructions were given via email as follows (note that, sadly, typos indeed appear in the original):

Please skim each article. We are interested in your assessment of the article after reading the headline, first few paragraphs, and skimming the rest.

Please categorize each article into one of the following four categories:
1. False hit (main subject of article is NOT civil rights).

2. Pro civil-rights (article suggests that Kennedy administration or Democrats more generally are pushing toward greater racial equality, that Southerners are unhappy about JFK/Dem stance on this issue, that Southerners worry that JFK/Dems are about to push forward on this issue, etc.)

3. Anti civil-rights (article suggests that Kennedy administration or Democrats are holding the status quo on the issue of racial equality, that Southerners are NOT worried or are even pleased about JFK/Dems on this issue relative to Republicans, etc. )

4. Mixed (article suggests that JFK/Dem efforts on issue of racial equality are mixed or unclear)

Note that there many articles will probably offer at east some “on the one hand....on the other” analysis, but when possible try to decide if it is general more “pro” or “anti” (though certainly if you feel it is truly mixed, you should categorize it as such).

Excel instructions:

1. For “false hit” enter “F”
2. For “pro civil rights” enter “P”
3. For “anti civil rights” enter “A”
4. For “mixed” enter “M”

Thank you!

A basic summary of the RAs’ coding outcomes is presented below. Further details available upon request.

Appendix Table E.2: RA coding statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Avg. Daily</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>2230</td>
<td>2.1546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro (Averaged across RAs)</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>0.6899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro (RA1)</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>0.5932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro (RA2)</td>
<td>814</td>
<td>0.7865</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: RA1 was not aware of our hypothesis that the Spring of 1963 represented a major turning point in Kennedy’s association with Civil Rights but knew about the overall project. RA2 did not know anything about the project at the time she coded the articles (but was informed ex post).