Coalition Formation in Legislative Bargaining*

Abstract
We propose a new model of legislative bargaining in which coalitions have different values, reflecting the fact that the policies they can pursue are constrained by the identity of the coalition members. In the model, a formateur picks a coalition and negotiates for the allocation of the surplus it is expected to generate. The formateur is free to change coalitions to seek better deals with other coalitions, but she may lose her status if bargaining breaks down, in which case a new formateur is chosen. We show that as the delay between offers goes to zero, the equilibrium allocation converges to a generalized version of a Nash Bargaining Solution in which—in contrast to the standard solution—the coalition is endogenous and determined by the relative coalitional values. A form of the hold-up problem specific to these bargaining games may lead to significant inefficiencies in the selection of the equilibrium coalition. We use the equilibrium characterization of the distortions to study the role of the head of state in avoiding (or containing) distortions. We also show that the model helps rationalizing well known empirical facts that are in conflict with the predictions of standard non-cooperative models of bargaining: the absence of significant (or even positive) premia in ministerial allocations for formateurs and their parties; the occurrence of supermajorities; and delays in reaching agreements.

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1 Introduction

In most parliamentary democracies, public policies are not decided in elections, but are instead the outcome of elaborate bargaining processes in the Parliament. Elections often do not even determine the identity of the governing coalition, which may indeed be difficult to predict on the basis of the electoral outcome alone. After the 2017 German election, a coalition of the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) with the Social Democrats (SPD) on the left was formed only after a failed attempt to form a coalition between the CDU, the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the Greens; in Italy, the 5 Star movement contemplated the formation of a coalition with the Democratic Party (DP) on the left, before converging to the Northern League on the right. Predicting the outcome of legislative bargaining is generally hard because it is not just about dividing surplus within some minimal winning coalition. For the CDU/CSU, forming a government with the SPD is more than just the number of ministers that need to be conceded to the SPD compared to the FDP or the Greens: it is also about what can be achieved in each coalition. Understanding how these two often conflicting goals interact is clearly central in understanding how parliamentary democracies work.

In this paper we present a new theory of legislative bargaining in which formateurs need to reconcile the need to form the most productive coalition with the desire to maximize the share of output that they capture. The key assumptions underlying our analysis are that coalitions are heterogeneous in terms of the surplus that they are expected to generate for the legislators; and that formateurs can search for the optimal coalition, free to change the target coalition if they can’t reach an agreement. Are there general lessons to learn on which types of coalitions will form? Will the coalition generating the highest surplus emerge in equilibrium? If this is not the case, will at least the bargaining process avoid that the worst coalition emerges? Naturally, these are general questions that do not arise only in legislative bargaining problems, but in all environments in which the efficiency of the coalition formation process is an issue. While we focus on legislative bargaining, the bargaining model we develop in this paper can be applied to any such situations.

The traditional literature on legislative bargaining a’ la Baron and Ferejohn [1989] has focused on purely redistributive environments in which all coalitions generate the same surplus, thus de-emphasizing the issue of efficiency. The theoretical literature on non-cooperative bargaining with coalitions of heterogeneous values, on the other hand, has followed the tradition in cooperative games, studying superadditive environments in which the grand coalition including all players is the most efficient, and focusing on when this grand coalition with all players emerges in equilibrium. The environments studied in these papers are best suited to model environmental or peace negotiations, where inclusive outcomes are desirable; they are less suitable for legislative problems,
where redistributive considerations are important. In the legislative context, the grand coalition is typically not the most efficient and the more interesting questions are instead how inefficient the equilibria could be, who is in the majority, and who is out. Besides assuming superadditive environments and focusing on inclusive equilibria, moreover, these models adopt bargaining protocols that, while direct extensions of Rubinstein’s iconic approach, are not explicitly designed to describe legislative work.

The bargaining model that we propose attempts to fill the missing gap between these two literatures, extending the basic model of legislative bargaining by allowing for coalitions with heterogeneous values without superadditivity, and with a simple bargaining protocol designed to model actual legislative processes.

In our model, bargaining starts with the appointment of a formateur in charge of selecting a majority and allocating within its members the surplus it is expected to generate (for example by selecting ministerial appointments). Coalitions are heterogeneous because their feasible policy space, and thus the surplus that they generate, depends on their members. Each possible coalition $C$ generates a value $V(C)$ to be distributed; once a coalition is selected the formateur negotiates with their members on how to allocate it with a process of alternating proposals. A distinctive feature of this process in our model is that, even after the start of internal negotiations, the formateur is not bound to a coalition, s/he can always turn to a different coalition if optimal. This captures the specific role played by the formateur: s/he is not just bargaining on an allocation within a coalition, but primarily in search of a coalition, thus free to halt negotiations with a stubborn coalitional partner and turn to another. We assume that protracting negotiation is costly because at every round there is a probability of bargaining breakdown as in Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky [1986]. A bargaining breakdown leads to either a new election or to the nomination of a new formateur (perhaps after a new election). If a new formateur is selected, the process restart with the new formateur. Bargaining ends when a coalition reaches an agreement or (if it is a possibility) there is a bargaining breakdown that leads to a new election with exogenous status quo. The equilibrium of this game naturally depends on the order of formateurs. The goal is to generate general lessons that hold for all equilibria and all possible orders when the order is exogenous, and then to endogenize the order of formateurs by explicitly modeling the role of the head of state.

We first characterize the equilibrium of the bargaining game between formateur and the coalitions assuming exogenous continuation values in case of breakdown, as traditionally assumed in the literature. We show that bargaining leads to a unique stationary equilibrium in which an inefficient coalition is generally selected. The equilibrium choice of coalition depends on the

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1 See Osborne and Rubinstein [1990, ch.4] for a survey of models with the possibility of bargaining breakdown.
probability of bargaining breakdowns, the size of the coalition and its associated surplus. The inefficiency is due to a form of the hold-up problem that limits the formateur’s bargaining power, due to the fact that s/he can not credibly commit to switch to any other coalition. The threat of being held up does not lead to underinvestment as in the standard hold-up problem, but to an inefficient choice of coalition (in terms of net total surplus). As the delay between offers goes to zero, the equilibrium allocation converges to a generalized version of the Nash bargaining solution in which each coalition member receives its outside option plus an equal share of surplus net of reservation utilities. This is the same allocation as in the classic Nash bargaining solution: the difference is that in the n-person Nash bargaining solution the coalition is assumed to be comprised by all players (or some other exogenous coalition), while in our model it is endogenously (and inefficiently) determined.

To understand the types of coalitions that may emerge in equilibrium (minimal winning or super majorities, for example) and how surplus is allocated within them, we fully endogenize the reservation utilities by assuming that a bargaining breakdown by some formateur is followed by an attempt by some other formateur. We show that equilibria of this fully recursive version of the game are very different from the equilibria emerging in the existing non cooperative models a’ la Baron and Ferejohn [1989]. Multiple stationary equilibria with different welfare properties and different payoff allocations typically exist, even if the core is empty. This is in conflict with the finding of Baron and Ferejohn [1989], where multiple stationary equilibria are possible but they all lead to a unique value for the players. Multiplicity reflects the complexity of the strategic interaction in the model in which both the identity of the coalition and the allocation are part of the outcome. We show, however, that multiplicity does not lead to indeterminate behavior, but to a characterization that is tight enough for welfare and positive analysis. This allows us to study the condition under which an efficient equilibrium is feasible. Depending on the parameters, inefficient equilibria can coexist with efficient equilibria or be the unique outcome. Under some conditions the inefficiency can be so bad that the least efficient coalition is chosen in equilibrium: such inefficient equilibria always exist if the value of the feasible coalitions are sufficiently similar.

Besides providing a new perspective on an old problem, our model may provide a unified framework to explain empirical evidence that has been seen to conflict with standard models of legislative bargaining. Existing models of legislative bargaining a’ la Baron and Ferejohn [1989] predict a very large formateur’s premium in terms of the share of captured surplus (i.e. ministerial

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2 As we will show, the exact weights in the Nash bargaining solution may depend on the exact internal bargaining protocol. When bargaining within a coalition is done with random recognitions as in Baron and Ferejohn [1989], the equilibrium allocation coincides with a generalization of the weighted Nash Bargaining solution with weights that coincide with the recognition probabilities. In this case too the selected coalition is endogenous and generally inefficient (with the inefficiency depending on the recognition probabilities).
cabinets), in the order of three quarters of surplus. Our model may help to explain why we do not observe such large formateur’s premia and indeed why the real benefit of being a formateur is not in the share s/he appropriates within a coalition, but in the choice of coalition. Our model also explains why we might observe delays in bargaining even in the absence of asymmetric information, or shocks during the bargaining process. Finally, our model explains why we might observe supermajority even if the supermajorities are not much more efficient than the minimal winning coalitions. The idea that legislative bargaining leads to minimal winning coalitions has been at the center of theoretical models since the classic works by Riker [1962]. It is however the case that, since World War II, European parliamentary democracies have formed more supermajorities than minimal winning coalitions. With our model we show that supermajorities can emerge as equilibrium phenomena even if they are only marginally superior than minimal winning coalitions. This is surprising because for any coalition a party needs unanimity of participating parties and bargaining leads to a classic hold-up problem in which all coalition members capture a fixed share of net surplus over their reservation values.

We use our model to study the role of the head of state, a figure generally ignored in formal models of bargaining, but one who often plays an important role. Many parliamentary democracies (including Austria, Belgium, Italy, Poland and others) empower their heads of state with significant discretion in the government formation process, in large part through the choice of formateurs. To what extent can the head of state influence the selection of the equilibrium coalition? In practice, we do observe that heads of states’s role differ in quite significant ways both within the same country over time and between countries with similar constitutional rules. We show that the role of the head of state critically depends on the relative values of the coalitions; this fact can explain why the role of the head of state has significantly changed in Italy after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, despite no change in the constitutional rules.

The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. We discuss related literature in the next subsection. Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 presents the characterization of the equilibrium with exogenous outside options, highlighting the connection with the Nash bargaining solution. The characterization in Section 3 is used in Section 4 to endogenize the outside options in a fully recursive model in which a bargaining breakdown is followed by the appointment of a

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3 See for example, Browne and Franklin [1973], Laver and Schofield [1990], Warwick and Druckman [2001], and Laver [1998] for a survey. There is indeed evidence of negative formateurs’s premia relative to their size (Warwick and Druckman [2006]). These findings have been interpreted as major failures of noncooperative models (Laver [1998]).

4 Looking at parliamentary democracies in post War II Europe, Druckmand and Thies (2002) note that there have been over 80 cases of supermajoritas and only 74 minimum winning coalitions over the postwar period. See also Laver and Schofield [1990] and Volden and Carrubba [2004]. Note that we are referring to supermajoritas that are not unanimous (that are extremely rare).
new formateur. Section 5 presents the positive analysis of the model: the size of the formateur’s
premium, the emergence of super majorities, and strategic delays. Section 6 extends the normative
analysis by studying the role of the head of state. Section 7 presents extensions of the basic analysis
and compares the results of our model with intracoalitional bargaining with a model in which the
formateur makes take-it-or-leave-it offers. Section 8 concludes.

1.1 Related literature

The literature on legislative bargaining has traditionally focused attention on the study of divide
the dollar games in which all winning coalitions divide a “pie” of fixed size. The standard reference
in this body of work is Baron and Ferejohn [1989], one of the first papers to propose an elegant
extension of Rubinstein’s model of bilateral bargaining to the multilateral case. In this model a
legislator is randomly selected to propose a division of one dollar; if the proposal is approved by a
majority of legislators, it is implemented; if it is not approved, then another legislator is randomly
selected with replacement to propose another division of the dollar and the game repeats.\footnote{5}

Negotiations in which coalitions have heterogeneous values have been studied, in the larger
context of non-cooperative theories of multilateral bargaining, by Chatterjee et al. [1993], Okada
[1996] and Seidmann and Winter [1998] among others.\footnote{6} These papers follow the tradition in
cooperative games to focus on superadditive values, i.e. environments in which the coalition of all
players is always more productive than smaller coalitions. They moreover focus on the existence
of equilibria in which the coalition including all players is formed. In terms of bargaining protocol,
Chatterjee et al. [1993] and Seidmann and Winter [1996] assume a first rejector-proposes rule,
according to which the first legislator to reject a proposer’s offer becomes the new proposer.
This procedure is a straightforward extension of Rubinstein’s approach in a bilateral context, but
less natural in a multilateral context and at odds with the practice to give proposal power to a
formateur who is in charge of testing, potentially, more than one possible coalition. Okada [1996]
instead considers a protocol in which, if the selected coalition does not unanimously approve the
formateur’s proposal, the formateur is automatically removed and a new formateur is randomly
selected with replacement from the floor (even if the subset of the coalition approving the proposal
is a proper majority). This again does not capture the role of the formateur after a rejection, who
may decide to continue negotiations, perhaps with a subset of the initial coalition or an altogether

\footnote{5} The basic structure of the model has been extended to consider alternative bargaining protocols (Morelli [1999],
Seidman et al. [2007], Ali et al. [2019]) and others; to consider richer policy spaces (Austen Smith and Banks
[1988], Baron [1991]); to allow for imperfect information (Ali [2006], Baliga and Serrano [1995]); and to endogenize
the proposal power (Austen-Smith and Banks [1988], Baron and Diermeier [2001], Yildirim [2007], Ali [2015]).

\footnote{6} Gul [1989] and Hart and Mas-Colell [1996] provide microfoundations of the Shapley Value. Ray and Vohra
[2001] and Okada [2010] consider games in which multiple coalitions can simultaneously form and play against each
other in a game.
different coalition.

This literature with heterogeneous coalitions and superadditive environments arrives at the conclusion that, with patient players, stationary efficient equilibria must be egalitarian, and they exist for some order of proposers only under conditions that are hard to satisfy in standard environments of legislative bargaining: that the core of the underlying game is not empty, and the efficient egalitarian outcome belongs to it. Legislative bargaining models have been introduced precisely to address the classical problem of an empty core in the presence of pressing distributive problems. If the efficient equilibrium is not unique and equal to the grand coalition, this literature does not provide a characterization of equilibrium coalitions, even for simple environments. With general values (not necessarily superadditive) and the formateur style bargaining protocol that we consider, on the other hand, we show that efficient equilibria exist even in the more realistic case in which the core is empty and, indeed, they always exist if the order is optimally selected by a benevolent head of state, thus rationalizing existing bargaining procedures in Western democracies.

To develop our theory with heterogeneous coalitions and endogenous coalition selection, we build on a model proposed by Osborne and Rubinstein [1990], who consider a simple bargaining environment with heterogeneous coalitions but without superadditivity. These authors consider an environment with 3 players, one seller and 2 potential buyers with different valuations for the good sold by the seller. In this case, the only feasible coalitions consist of the seller and one of the buyers. As in our model, the seller can switch partners after an offer is rejected and before making a new offer. This game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which the efficient allocation is always reached (i.e. the good is sold to the buyer with the highest valuation). We instead attempt to model a setting of multilateral bargaining with \( n \) players and more general coalition structures. While it is natural in Osborne and Rubinstein [1990] to assume that the player who can choose the partner is constant and exogenously given (the seller, in their model), it is more natural in our model to allow the formateur’s identity to change over the course of the negotiation if an agreement is not reached. The key differences with their work, therefore, are that we allow for more general coalitional structure, and for the formateur to be replaced by another formateur if s/he fails to form a coalition, thus making reservation utilities endogenous. These differences have important implications for the strategic analysis. For example, while Osborne and

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7 Remaining in the context of a superadditive environment, Compte and Jehiel [2010] show a model with random proposals in which the efficient grand coalition forms in equilibrium even if the allocation is not egalitarian. As in the literature cited above however, such an equilibrium exists only if the core is not empty.

8 This is possible because we show that equilibrium allocations generally are not egalitarian and the formateur can obtain even less than the other coalition members.

9 See Osborne and Rubinstein [1990, ch. 9.4]. The same bargaining procedure is adopted in an earlier model by Wilson [1984] and Binmore [1985].
Rubinstein’s [1990] model has a unique equilibrium in which the efficient coalition always forms, in our model the equilibrium can be inefficient and, with endogenous reservation utilities, multiple stationary equilibria are possible. Osborne and Rubinstein [1990], moreover, does not study the relationship between the equilibrium and the Nash bargaining solution.10

A model of legislative bargaining with heterogeneous coalitions is also presented by Diermeier et al. [2003]. In this model, a formateur selects a coalition ex ante and then negotiates with its members in a process a’ la Baron and Ferejohn with unanimity, without the possibility of shifting coalitions. Coalitions generate levels of surplus that depend on their size and on a stochastic state variable that is assumed to change during the negotiations and is unknown when the formateur selects the coalition. The equilibrium coalition depends on the legislators’ patience since patient legislators are more willing to embrace larger coalitions (that are assumed to be more durable) even if they are harder to form in the bargaining stage. A feature of this model is that distribution and efficiency considerations are independent of each other. This follows from the fact that in the bargaining stage unanimity is required and the formateur cannot switch coalition once bargaining has started, even if the state variable has changed. The authors use data from nine West European countries over the period 1947-1999 to structurally estimate the legislators discount factor and the degree to which the size of a coalition increases its durability.

The way we model the bargaining protocol is an important component of our theory, intimately connected with how coalitions are selected and thus with the equilibrium impact of their heterogeneity in values. With the exception of Osborne and Rubinstein [1990], the selection of the coalition and the allocation of the rents are collapsed in one step in the legislative protocols described above: a take-it-or-leave-it offer made by a proposer; if the offer is not accepted, then automatically a new proposer is selected or the first rejector becomes proposer. In our model, we explicitly model the negotiation within the coalition and we allow the formateur to switch coalitions in the midst of negotiations. As we discuss in greater detail in Section 7.3, where we compare our bargaining protocol with the standard take-it-or-leave-it protocol, this has important theoretical implications. In a world in which a take-it-or-leave-it offer is followed by the mechanical selection of another formateur, reservation utilities depend on the exogenous recognition probabilities, but they do not allow the formateur to react to a no agreement decision. When negotiations are allowed to continue, reservation utilities depends on whether a threat to switch coalitions is credible and whether negotiations are expected to lead to an agreement or not. Understanding the connection between these two elements, the heterogeneity of coalitions and the formateur’s choice

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10 The relationship between the equilibrium and the Nash Bargaining solution is also not studied in Binmore [1985]. Both Binmore [1985] and Osborne and Rubinstein [1992] assume a regular discount factor $\delta$ a’ la Rubinstein [1982], without bargaining breakdowns and an explicit modelling of outside options.
of coalitions, is key to understanding the logic behind our model and our results.\footnote{This feature of negotiations is not important only in legislative bargaining. The importance of separating between intra-coalition bargaining (i.e. how surplus in a coalition is divided) and the competitive pressure from other coalitions is also highlighted by the experimental evidence presented in Brown, Falk and Fehr [2004]. They find that markets resemble a collection of bilateral trading islands in which payoffs are split equitably between coalition partners, rather than a competitive market.}

As we noted, our model contributes in explaining some empirical “anomalies” from the standard model whose study has characterized the empirical literature on legislative bargaining. A number of important works have attempted to provide theories to explain them. In the context of a purely distributive model, Morelli [1999] has provided a demand theory of legislative bargaining that can explain why the proposer does not receive large premia. Baron and Diermeier [2001], Seidmann et al. [2007] have provided bargaining theories with a formateur in which supermajorities can emerge in equilibrium.\footnote{Supermajorities can also be explained in the Baron and Ferejohn [1989] model under the assumption of deliberations under an “open rule.” Even in this case however, the size of the coalition converges to the size of a minimal winning coalitions as the number of legislators is sufficiently large.} Ali [2006], Diermeier et al. [2003], among others, provide models with strategic delay in multilateral bargaining models.\footnote{See Section 5.3 for a more complete description of the literature.} While all these papers contribute to understanding different specific aspects of strategic bargaining, an advantage of our theory is that it provides a coherent and unified potential explanation of all these empirical “anomalies.”

Previous to our work, a welfare analysis of the role of head of state in a model of legislative bargaining is provided by Morelli [1999], where the head of state selects the first proposer in his original “demand bargaining” protocol. In his model, the first proposer selects a one-dimensional policy for which citizens have single peaked preferences, a coalition, and an order for its members, who then sequentially make demands. The coalition forms if the coalition members accept the proposer’s policy and their demands for transfers sum to one. Morelli [1999] shows that, in a version of this model with 3 parties, the head of state selects the party with ideology closest to the median voter.\footnote{Alternative models in which the head of state plays a role in legislative bargaining are presented by Bloch and Rottier [2002] and Akirav and Cox [2018]. These models, however, assume purely redistributive environments in which all coalitions generate the same amount of surplus, in which therefore there is no scope for welfare analysis.}

\section{Model}

We consider a model in which \(n\) parties bargain over the formation of a government. The set of parties is denoted \(N = \{1, ..., n\}\). A government is formed if a qualified majority approves it. The set of qualified majorities is denoted \(C\). We say that a coalition \(C\) is a minimal winning coalition if \(C \in C\) and for any \(C' \subset C\), then \(C' \notin C\). The set of minimal winning coalitions is denoted \(M\), its complement in \(C\), \(S\), is the set of supermajorities. The set of qualified majorities and minimal
winning coalitions to which party $i$ belongs are denoted, respectively, $\mathcal{C}_i$ and $\mathcal{M}_i$.

A government is defined by the supporting winning coalition and an internal allocation of the surplus generated by the government. Coalitions are not necessarily equivalent in terms of generated surplus. We assume that the surplus generated by a coalition $\mathcal{C}$ is $V(\mathcal{C}) \geq 0$ bounded above by a finite $\nabla = \max_{\mathcal{C}} V(\mathcal{C})$ and below by nonnegative $\underline{\chi} = \min_{\mathcal{C}} V(\mathcal{C})$. We assume that the members of the coalition can share the surplus in any way they want. A feasible allocation in $\mathcal{C}$ is $x \in X(\mathcal{C})$, where:

$$ X(\mathcal{C}) := \left\{ x \in \mathbb{R}^n(\mathcal{C}) \mid x_i \geq 0, \sum_{i \in \mathcal{C}} x_i \leq V(\mathcal{C}) \right\}. $$

where $n(\mathcal{C})$ is the number of parties in coalition $\mathcal{C}$. Parties evaluate the governments according to the surplus they receive, so $\{C, x\} \succeq_i \{C', x'\}$ if and only if $x_i \geq x'_i$. The parties that are left outside the coalition receive zero.

In the baseline model, bargaining is as follows. We assume that there is a set $T = \{0, ..., T\} \subseteq N$ of potential formateurs who are ordered by a priority list. This list may depend on the result of the election: indeed, typically parties are recognized as formateurs in order of their electoral size. Since we do not model the electoral stage, we take this order as exogenous. We will endogenize the order of formateurs in Section 6, where we study the role of the head of state in selecting them.

At time $t = 0$ the first formateur $f^0$ is recognized and makes a proposal $x \in X(\mathcal{C})$ to a coalition $\mathcal{C} \in \mathcal{C}$ with $f^0 \in \mathcal{C}$. If the proposal is accepted by all members of $\mathcal{C}$, the game stops and the government is $\{\mathcal{C}, x\}$. If the proposal is not unanimously accepted by the parties in $\mathcal{C}$, then bargaining within the coalition continues. To avoid spurious equilibria in which no party is ever pivotal, we assume that parties in $\mathcal{C}$ vote sequentially in some order. At period $t + \Delta$ a different member $i$ of $\mathcal{C}$ is recognized to make an offer to the coalition: again the proposal is accepted by all members of $\mathcal{C}$, the game stops; otherwise the process continues. In the baseline model, we assume that parties in $\mathcal{C}$ are ordered according to some permutation $\iota(k, \mathcal{C})$, so the proposer following at the $k$th stage for $k \leq n(\mathcal{C}) - 1$ is identified as $\iota(k, \mathcal{C})$. The formateur is always the first proposer ($\iota(1, \mathcal{C}) = f$) and the order is periodic ($\iota(n(C) + i, \mathcal{C}) = \iota(i, \mathcal{C})$), so after all members of the coalition have a chance to make a proposal, proposal power returns to the formateur. Every time that the formateur is recognized again, s/he can continue with the same coalition as in the previous rounds or move to a different coalition $\mathcal{C}'$. This reflects the fact that the formateur is not bound to a specific coalition and thus can strategically choose to change “partners.” The assumptions on the order of proposals within a coalition are not especially important for our results, we will relax

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15 If, for example, all parties are expected to vote no in a simultaneous vote, then voting no is always optimal since no party is pivotal. An alternative solution to this problem, common in voting games, is to assume the mild refinement requiring that parties vote as if they were pivotal.
them in Section 7.1 where we consider random recognitions.\footnote{Specifically, in Section 7.1 we assume that each coalition member is randomly recognized as proposer with a probability $q$, as in Baron and Ferejohn [1989].}

At any point in time after which a proposal is rejected and before a new proposal is made we have a negotiation breakdown with probability $p = 1 - e^{-\tau \Delta}$. In case the negotiation is interrupted, formateur $f$ loses the status of formateur and a new formateur in $T$ is appointed. If bargaining breaks down when the formateur is $f^\tau$ with $\tau < T$, formateur $f^\tau+1$ is selected according to an exogenous acyclical rule $f^\tau+1 = \Psi(f^\tau)$. Allowing for $p < 1$ generalizes the assumption in the existing literature that breakdowns occur with probability one after the formateur’s offer and allows bargaining within the coalition to go beyond a simple “take-it-or-leave-it” offer.

In Section 3 we first assume that if the last formateur $f^T$ fails to form a government, new elections are held, yielding utilities $u = (u_1, ..., u_n)$. In Section 4 we endogenize the reservation utilities assuming that in case $f^T$ fails to form a government, the process repeats itself restarting from $f^0$, so that $f^0 = \Psi(f^T)$. The case with exogenous outside options corresponds to a case in which failure to form the government leads to a new regime: for example a caretaker government or new elections with an exogenously given outcome. The case in which the process restarts with $f^0$ corresponds to a situation in which even if there are new elections, the bargaining positions in congress are not expected to change in a significant way, thus leading to the same strategic situation at the government formation stage. When the outside option is exogenous, we assume that reaching an agreement is better than obtaining $u$, formally $V(C) \geq \sum_{i \in N} u_i$ for at least a $C$ with $C \cap T \neq \emptyset$. Given this, a coalition $C$ is efficient if and only if $V(C) = \max_{C' \in \mathcal{C}} V(C')$. 

An history $h^t$ is defined in the usual way, as a description of the sequence of formateur and, for each of them, the sequence of coalition selections, proposals and votes. A (pure) strategy for a player $i$ assigns a choice of coalition $C(h^t)$ and a vector of proposals $x_i = \{x_{i,1}(h^t), ..., x_{i,n(C(h^t))}(h^t)\}$ in $X(C(h^t))$ to each history $h^t$ at which the player is formateur and proposer; a vector of proposals $x_i = \{x_{i,1}(h^t), ..., x_{i,n(C(h^t))}(h^t)\} \in X(C(h^t))$ to each history $h^t$ at which $C(h^t)$ is the coalition and $i$ is proposer but not formateur; and an acceptance thresholds $a_i(h^t)$ to each history $h^t$ at which the player is a responder. A (pure) stationary strategy for a player $i$ assigns a choice of coalition $(C_i)$ and proposal $x_i = \{x_{i,1}(C_i), ..., x_{i,n(C_j)}(C_i)\} \in X(C_i)$ when $i$ is formateur and proposer; a vector of proposals $x_i = \{x_{i,1}(C_j), ..., x_{i,n(C_j)}((C_j))\} \in X(C)$ when the coalition is $C$ and $j$ is the formateur; and an acceptance threshold $a_{i,j}(C,j)$ when the coalition is $C$, $l$ is the proposer, $i$ is the responder and $j$ is the formateur. A stationary equilibrium is a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in stationary strategies. Following a standard assumption in the literature, in the following we focus on stationary equilibria in pure strategies and for simplicity we refer to them simply as equilibria.
3 Bargaining with exogenous outside options

To study the equilibrium with finite rounds of formateurs and exogenous outside options, we start from the simple case in which there is only one formateur, i.e. $|T| = 1$: in this case if bargaining breaks down, parties receive their outside options $u$. The solution of this case will be key for the characterization of the more complicated cases and it will facilitate understanding of the logic behind the equilibria.

Assume an equilibrium exists and, in this equilibrium, a coalition $C_f$ is chosen by formateur $f$ with payoffs equal to $x_f^* = \{x_{f,1}^*, ..., x_{f,n(C_f)}^*\}$ with $x_f^* \in X(C_f)$. We can now characterize the payoffs that would be achieved if $f$ decides to choose a generic coalition $C$ (that may or may not coincide with $C_f$).

To this goal let us extend $x_f^*$ to comprise all players by defining $x_{f,i}^* = 0$ for $i \notin C_f$. We can now define the acceptance threshold of a player $i$ in $C$ at stage $n(C)$ of bargaining as:

$$a_{i(n(C),C),i}(C,C_f) = pu_i + (1-p)x_{f,i}^*$$

where we are using here the notation $a_{j,i}(C,C_f)$ to indicate the acceptance threshold of $i$ when $j$ proposes in coalition $C$ and the expected equilibrium coalition is $C_f$ to emphasize that the threshold depends on $C_f$. Player $i$ knows that if s/he refuses the offer one of two events occurs: with probability $p$, there is a bargaining breakdown, in which case the utility is $u_i$; with probability $1-p$, formateur $f$ is recognized after the $n(C)$th proposer. At this stage, if $C$ is equal to $C_f$, then the game continues recursively; if instead $C$ is different than $C_f$, then the formateur is expected to return to $C_f$. This implies that party $i$ expects to receive $x_{f,i}^*$. At this stage we can also easily define the proposal by proposer $i(n(C),C)$ as follows. If

$$V(C) - \sum_{i \in C \setminus i(n(C), C)} a_{i(n(C), C), i}(C, C_f) < a_{i(n(C), C), i}(n(C), C)(C, C_f)$$

then $i(n(C), C)$ can not make a proposal that is acceptable and that guarantees him/her the reservation utility, so the proposal at the $n(C)$ stage fails and the formateur is recognized again as proposer if there is not a bargaining breakdown. In this case the expected payoff at the beginning of stage $n(C)$ is $pu_i + (1-p)x_{f,i}^*$ for all players. If (2) is not satisfied, instead, we have $x_{i(n(C),C),i}(C, f) = a_{i(n(C),C),i}(C, C_f)$ for all $i \in C \setminus i(n(C), C)$ and $x_{i(n(C),C),i}(n(C), C)(C, f) = V(C) - \sum_{i \in C \setminus f} a_{i(n(C),C),i}(C, C_f)$.

Proceeding in the same way by backward induction, we can uniquely define the acceptance threshold for all bargaining stages up to the first, when the formateur makes a proposal for the first time. At this stage, $f$ proposes $a_{f,i}(C, C_f)$ to all other $i \in C \setminus f$, securing a payoff $V(C) - \sum_{i \in C \setminus f} a_{f,i}(C, C_f)$ if this is larger than $a_{f,f}(C, C_f)$, or a payoff $a_{f,f}(C, C_f)$ otherwise.
The initial coalition $C_f$ is chosen in equilibrium if and only if it is a fixed-point of the following correspondence that maps coalitions to coalitions:

$$C_f \in \arg \max_{C \in \mathcal{C}_f} \left\{ V(C) - \sum_{i \in C \setminus f} a_i(C, C_f) \right\}.$$  

(3)

When $C_f$ satisfies (3), then it is indeed optimal for $f$ to select it whenever s/he has proposal power. In this case, therefore, the expectation that after stage $n(C)$ the payoff will be $x^*_f$ is correct. The following result tells us that a fixed-point of (3) exists and it is generically unique. Let

$$C^*_f = \arg \max_{C \in \mathcal{C}_f} \left\{ \frac{p [V(C) - \sum_{i \in C} u_i]}{1 - (1 - p)^n(C)} \right\}.$$  

(4)

Naturally, since the set of coalitions is finite, $C^*_f$ is well defined and, except for a non-generic choice of payoffs, unique. We have:

**Lemma 1.** For a generic choice of payoffs, $C^*_f$ is the unique fixed-point of (3).

The idea behind Lemma 1 can be easily illustrated. In the appendix we explicitly solve for the acceptance thresholds $a_{i(\tau,C),i}(C; C^f)$ for all stages $\tau = 1, \ldots, n(C)$ and all $i \in C$ and show that
the equilibrium payoff obtained by \( f \) can be represented in a recursive way as:

\[
x_{f,j}^* = \max_{C \in \mathcal{C}_j} \left\{ \frac{p [V(C) - \sum_{i \in C} u_i]}{+p \left[ 1 + \sum_{k=1}^{n(C) - 1} (1 - p)^k \right] u_f + (1 - p)^n(C) \cdot x_{f,j}^*} \right\}.
\]

From (5) it can be seen that the choice of \( C \) has two effects on \( x_{f,j}^* \). Assume for simplicity, and only for the sake of this discussion, that the reservation utilities \((u_i)_{i \in \mathcal{N}}\) are zero. On the one hand, the choice of \( C \) affects the efficiency of the allocation, as represented by the intercept of (5) with the vertical axis in Figure 1, which is equal to \( V(C) \) when \( u_i = 0 \) for all \( i \). Naturally the formateur would like to choose an efficient coalition, since this guarantees a larger pie to be divided. On the other hand, the choice of \( C \) affects the fraction of surplus that can be extracted by \( f \): specifically, the larger is the coalition, the lower is the bargaining power of \( f \). This is the hold-up problem and it is reflected in the slope of (5), that is decreasing in the size of the coalition (see Figure 1). Naturally the formateur’s ability to extract surplus depends also on the probability of breakdown. When the probability is high, the formateur’s offer is basically a take-it-or-leave-it offer, and all surplus can be extracted: in this case the lines are almost flat; and \( C_j^* \) converges to the surplus maximizing coalition. As \( p \) decreases, however, the formateur’s commitment power and the share of surplus that s/he can appropriate is reduced.

Note that for all \( C \), the term in the brackets is a contraction. It follows that the upper contour is a contraction as well, as illustrated by the thick line in Figure 1. We must therefore have a unique fixed-point \( x_{f,j}^* \) and associated to it a (generically) unique optimal coalition for \( f \) that balances efficiency with bargaining power.

Given Lemma 1 we can now easily show that generically there is a unique equilibrium and it must be supported by parties in \( C_j^* \). By construction, every time that the formateur has an opportunity of choosing \( C \), s/he will chose \( C_j^* \). It follows that in equilibrium \( C_j^* \) is chosen and we must satisfy for all \( j \in C_j^* \)

\[
a_{i,j}^* = pu_j + (1 - p)x_{i,(i-1)\cup(i+1),j}^* \quad \text{for all } i \in C_j^*
\]

\[
x_{j,i}^* = V(C_j^*) - \sum_{i \in C_j^* \setminus j} a_{i,j}^* \quad \text{and } x_{j,i}^* = a_{j,i}^* \quad \text{for all } i \in C_j^* \setminus j.
\]

In the appendix we show that this system is reduced to a system of \( n(C_j^*) \times n(C_j^*) \) equations in \( n(C_j^*) \times n(C_j^*) \) unknowns that has a unique solution. Using this solution we obtain the equilibrium payoffs as \( x_{j,i}^* \) for all \( i \in C_j^* \) and \( u_j \) for \( j \in \mathcal{N} \setminus C_j^* \), and the equilibrium strategies when \( C_j^* \) is chosen. Using these equilibrium values we can also uniquely define the strategies in all out of equilibrium subgames in which some other coalition \( C \) are chosen. We therefore have:\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{17} A complete characterization of the equilibrium strategies is presented in the Proof of Proposition 1 in the appendix.
Proposition 1. The bargaining game has a unique stationary equilibrium in which coalition $C_f^*$ is selected and payoffs are uniquely defined as:

$$x^*_{f,f} = u_f + \frac{p[V(C_f^*) - \sum_{i \in C_f^*} u_i]}{1 - (1-p)^{n(C_f^*)}}$$ \hspace{0.5cm} (6)

$$x^*_{f,i} = u_i + \frac{p(1-p)^{i^{-1}(i,C_f^*)-1}[V(C_f^*) - \sum_{j \in C_f^*} u_j]}{1 - (1-p)^{n(C_f^*)}} \quad \text{for } i \neq f$$ \hspace{0.5cm} (7)

where $x^*_{f,f}$ is the payoff of the formateur, $x^*_{f,i}$ is the payoff of a party $i \in C_f^*$ different from the formateur who is in position $i^{-1}(i,C_f^*)$ in the bargaining queue. All other parties in $N \setminus C_f^*$ receive zero.

To gain insight on the equilibrium allocation, it is useful to consider the case in which the interaction between the parties is very frequent, that is when $\Delta \to 0$. This is important for two reasons. First, because it will give us a simple characterization of the payoffs that will be useful in the generalization studied in the next section. Second, because it highlights an interesting connection between the model of the previous section and the Nash Bargaining Solution (henceforth NBS). In the special case in which $N = 2$, the bargaining game considered in the previous section coincides with Rubinstein’s model with the risk of breakdown (see Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky [1986]). It is well known that in this case the solution of Rubinstein’s model coincides with the NBS. While the NBS formula can be extended to $n$ players, there are two basic reasons why a mechanical extension is not advisable. First, because there is not a unique way to rationalize the $n$-person NBS as the limit of a noncooperative game. Secondly, because even if one were to accept the specific bargaining protocol that rationalizes the $n$-person bargaining solution, then the solution would imply that the coalition of all players is formed and all players share the surplus. In the political context studied in this paper, such a scenario is highly unlikely. Ideally, a $n$-person generalization of NBS would provide indication of which coalition is selected and how surplus is divided in that coalition.

The following result shows that the equilibrium in Proposition 1 provides an alternative generalization of the Nash solution to the $n$-person case as the bargaining interval converges to zero. Define the $C$-Nash Bargaining Solution as:

$$N(C, u) = \max_{x \in X(C)} \prod_{i \in C} [x_i - u_i].$$ \hspace{0.5cm} (8)

where $N(C, u) = \{N_1(C, u), ..., N_{|C|}(C, u)\}$. This is the Nash bargaining solution when coalition $C$ is chosen. Let, moreover, $\mathcal{T}_f$ be the coalition with the largest per capita surplus such that $f \in \mathcal{T}_f$, i.e. that maximizes $[V(C) - \sum_{i \in C} u_i] / n(C)$ for $C \in \mathcal{C}_f$ and extend $N(C, u)$ to the players outside $C$ by setting $N_j(C, u) = 0$ for $j \in N \setminus C$. We have:
Proposition 2. As $\Delta \rightarrow 0$, the equilibrium of the bargaining problem converges to $x^* = N(C_f, u)$.

Proposition 2 can be seen as a generalization of Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky [1986], who have provided the first non-cooperative microfoundation of the Nash bargaining solution with 2 players. What sets this result apart from the 2-player case and other microfoundations with $n$ players is that in Proposition 2 the equilibrium coalition is endogenous, the environment does not require superadditivity, and the equilibrium is unique in the class of stationary equilibria.\(^\text{18}\)

A feature of the equilibrium characterized above is that, when $\Delta$ is small, the formateur does not receive a share of the pie net of the reservation utilities that is much larger than any of the other members of the winning coalition. Unsurprisingly, payoffs depend on the order of proposal power in the coalition, since $x_i^* \Delta$ is decreasing in $i$'s position in the bargaining queue. When the bargaining process is fast, however, the difference in payoffs net of reservation utilities converges to zero. Define the formateur advantage with respect to a legislator $i$ in the equilibrium coalition as $A_i(\Delta) = x_i^*(\Delta) - x_i^*(\Delta)$, where we have expressed the equilibrium payoffs $(x_i^*(\Delta))_{i \in N}$ as a function of $\Delta$. It follows immediately from Proposition 2 that $A_i(\Delta) \rightarrow u_f - u_i$ as $\Delta \rightarrow 0$, so $\lim_{\Delta \rightarrow 0} A_i(\Delta) = 0$ if $i$ and $j$ have the same (at this stage, exogenous) reservation utilities. The presence of a significant payoff advantage for the formateur is one of the key characteristics of existing non-cooperative models of legislative bargaining and it has been criticized by the empirical literature, since a formateur advantage has not been detected in many empirical studies. In the next section where we endogenize $u$, we will see that indeed we might have $\lim_{\Delta \rightarrow 0} A_i(\Delta) = 0$ or even $\lim_{\Delta \rightarrow 0} A_i(\Delta) < 0$.

4 Endogenizing the outside options

In the previous section we have assumed that if bargaining with the formateur fails, then a caretaker is appointed or there are new elections and the parties receive exogenously specified expected utilities $(u_i)_{i \in N}$. It is however common in legislative processes that if there is a bargaining breakdown, then a new party is selected as formateur and the process restarts. By explicitly modelling what happens after a bargaining breakdown, we can endogeneize the outside options. This is important because it allows us to explain commonly observed phenomena such as low or negative formateurs’ premia, supermajorities and strategic delays, without making ad hoc

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\(^\text{18}\) For games in which all the coalitions have the same value, specific bargaining protocols achieving the Nash Bargaining Solution with the grand coalition $N$ are presented by Chae and Yang [1994] and Krishna and Serrano [1996], among others. The protocols used in these papers are different than that of Baron and Ferejohn [1989] and the model described above since they rely on the possibility of players to commit to partial agreements. For games in which coalitions may generate heterogeneous values, specific bargaining protocols achieving the Nash Bargaining Solution have been presented by Okada [2010], who focuses on stationary equilibria assuming that the grand coalition $N$ forms; and Gomes [2019], who focuses on Strong Nash Stationary equilibria, in which players are assumed to be able to coordinate to the most efficient outcome.
assumptions on exogenous outside options.

To extend the theory of the previous section to environments with multiple formateurs, let $T = \{0, ..., T\} \subseteq N$ be the set of formateurs and let us assume that after breakdown of bargaining with formateur $\tau \in T$, formateur $\tau + 1$ is called to the job. In a finite horizon extension after $\tau = T$, the players receive exogenous utilities $u_{T+1} = \{u_1, ..., u_n\}$ as in the previous section. In an infinite horizon extension, after $\tau = T$, formateur $\tau = 0$ is called again to the job and the process repeats. If no agreement is ever reached, the agents’ payoffs are zero.

In the following we focus on the infinite horizon extension and the case in which $\Delta \to 0$ and $p \to 0$. A very similar analysis can be done for the case with $\Delta > 0$. Define $F_i(u, C)$ as party $i$’s payoff if coalition $C$ is chosen and the continuation values are $u = \{u_1, ..., u_n\}$. From the previous analysis we have:

$$F_i(u, C) = \begin{cases} N_i(C, u) & \text{if } V(C) - \sum_{i \in C} u_i \geq 0 \\ u_i & \text{else} \end{cases}$$

for all $i \in N$ and $F(u, C) = \{F_1(u, C), ..., F_n(u, C)\}$. Define, moreover, $C^*_\tau(u)$ as the family of coalitions in $C_\tau$ with maximal average surplus when the outside option is $u$:

$$C^*_\tau(u) = \left\{ C' \in C_\tau \text{ s.t. } C' \in \arg \max_{C \in C_\tau} \left\{ \left[ V(C) - \sum_{i \in C} u_i \right] / n(C) \right\} \right\}.$$

At stage $\tau$ the coalition either belongs to $C^*_\tau(u)$, or formateur $\tau$ is unable to form a coalition. We can now define the following operator. At the last stage when $T$ is formateur:

$$F^*_T(u) := \{ v \text{ s.t. } v = F(u, C) \text{ for some } C \in C^*_\tau(u) \}.$$

The operator $F^*_\tau(u)$ maps the expected reservation utilities $u$ if there is a bargaining breakdown with the last formateur $T$, to the equilibrium utilities that are reached with formateur $T$. For the previous stages, we define the payoffs recursively as:

$$F^*_{\tau-1}(u) := \{ v \text{ s.t. } v = F(u^T, C) \text{ for some } C \in C^*_\tau(u^T) \text{ and } u^T \in F^*_\tau(u) \}.$$

The operator $F^*_{\tau-1}(u)$ maps the reservation utilities $u$ to the utilities reached in equilibrium if formateur $\tau - 1$ is reached. For a generic choice of $u$, $C^*_\tau(u)$ is a singleton and thus either bargaining with $\tau - 1$ fails to form a government and we move to $\tau$, or there is a unique optimal coalition for $\tau - 1$, thus $F^*_{\tau-1}(u)$ is a function. It is however convenient to allow $F^*_{\tau-1}(u)$ to be a correspondence since when $u$ is endogenous, the formateur may be indifferent among different coalitions.

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19 As another benchmark, in Section 7.2 we also characterize the equilibria for the game as $p \to 1$. In this case the formateurs make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the coalition partners before being replaced by another formateur.
In this environment it is very natural to focus the analysis on pure strategy equilibria. As we mentioned, the optimal choice of coalition at stage \( \tau \), \( C^*_\tau(u) \) and the feasible payoffs \( F^*_\tau(u) \) are uniquely defined for a generic choice of \( u \). The same is true in a finitely repeated version of the game (in which the complete loop of formateurs from 0 to \( T \) is repeated for a finite number of times, after which a generic \( u \) is assigned to the players if there is no agreement). Any finite horizon version of the model, therefore has generically a unique pure strategy equilibrium. When, after formateur \( T \), the first formateur is reappointed, the game becomes recursive: the reservation utilities are endogenized and equal to equilibrium values of the continuation game. We define:

**Definition 1.** An equilibrium outcome in the extended bargaining game is a vector of utilities \( u^* \) and a coalition \( C^* \) such that \( u^* \in F^*_0(u^*) \) and \( C^* \in C^*_0(u^*) \).

We can now study the equilibria of the stationary game described above. Given that the economic environment in which the bargaining takes place is characterized by the set of parties \( \mathcal{N} \) and the characteristic function \( \mathcal{V} \), the core of the coalitional structure \((\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{V})\) is a natural benchmark for the solution of the game. Let \( \mathcal{F} \) be the set of feasible payoffs, defined as:

\[
\mathcal{F}(\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{V}) = \{x \in \mathbb{R} \text{ s.t. } x_i \geq 0 \text{ for } i \in \mathcal{N} \text{ and } \sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}} x_i \leq \max_{C} V(C)\}.
\]

Any feasible \( x \) must be “backed” by some coalition \( C \) that generates the surplus to be distributed. We define the core of a coalition structure \((\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{V})\) as the subset of \( \mathcal{F}(\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{V}) \):

\[
\mathcal{K}(\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{V}) = \{x \in \mathcal{F}(\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{V}) \text{ s.t. } \sum_{i \in S} x_i \geq V(S) \text{ for any } S \subseteq \mathcal{N}\}.
\]

Intuitively, a feasible point \( x \) is in the core if it cannot be challenged by some coalition \( S \): that is, there is no coalition of parties \( S \subseteq \mathcal{N} \) that can be formed and reward all of its members \( i \in S \) with a payoff \( y_i > x_i \). The following result establishes that, under general conditions, any point \( x^* \) in the core corresponds to a stationary equilibrium of the extended game. We say that the set of formateurs \( T \) is regular if for any \( C \in \mathcal{C} \), there is a \( l \in T \cap C \). We have:

**Proposition 3.** Assume \( T \) is regular, then for any \( x^* \in \mathcal{K}(\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{V}) \) there is an equilibrium outcome \((C^*, u^*)\) with \( u^* = x^* \).

Besides establishing a relationship between the equilibria of the extended game and a classic solution concept, this result provides an easy way to identify an equilibrium in potentially very complex environments with a large \( n \) and a general characteristic function \( V \). This has an immediate welfare implication. We say that an equilibrium is efficient if the efficient coalition is selected in equilibrium with probability one. In an efficient equilibrium we might have that first formateur who manages to form a government chooses an efficient coalition, but some other formateur forms an inefficient coalition out of the equilibrium path. In this case the welfare properties depend
on the exact identity of the first formateur. We say that an equilibrium is strongly efficient, if
the efficient coalition is selected in equilibrium with probability one starting from any possible
formateur. We have:

**Corollary 1.** If \( T \) is regular and \((N, V)\) admits a non empty core, then a strongly efficient
equilibrium exists.

Intuitively, it is easy to see if \( x^* \in K(N, V) \) is realized in equilibrium, then it must be supported
by an efficient coalition \( C^* \), since otherwise we would have \( \sum_{i \in C} x_i^* \leq \sum_{i \in N} x_i^* < \max_C V(C) = V(C^*) \), a contradiction. Proposition 3 and Corollary 1 show that there is an equilibrium in which
all formateurs who are able to form a government select \( C^* \).

Is the set of equilibria fully characterized by the core? If this were the case, all equilibria
would be efficient, but a stationary equilibrium would fail to exist when the core is empty. In
many environments of interest the assumption that the core is not empty is very demanding.
Bargaining problems often include important redistributive components: when the redistributive
motives are sufficiently important, the core is typically empty.\(^{20}\) Indeed, as we show below, not
all equilibria are associated with payoffs in the core and inefficient equilibria may exist. Luckily,
however, a non-empty core is not a necessary condition for existence.

To study all the equilibria of the extended game with and without an empty core, we now
specialize the model assuming that there are three parties and each party has a chance to be
formateur in some order, so \( N = \{1, 2, 3\} \) and \( N = T \). Without loss of generality we can
assume that parties are formateurs in order of their index and the value of the coalitions are
\( V(\{1, 2\}) = a - d \), \( V(\{1, 3\}) = a + e \) and \( V(\{2, 3\}) = a \), where \( a > 0 \); either \( d \) and \( e \) are
nonnegative, or \( d \) and \( e \) are non-positive; and, finally, \( a - d \geq 0 \) and \( a + e \geq 0 \).\(^{21}\) We also assume
here that the coalition of all players \( N = \{1, 2, 3\} \) does not find policy agreements easier to
implement than the best of the minimal winning coalitions, thus \( V(\{1, 2, 3\}) < \max_{C \in \mathcal{M}} V(C) \).\(^{22}\)

Under this condition, as it can be easily verified, \( \{1, 2, 3\} \) is never the equilibrium coalition, and
we can focus on minimal winning coalitions. We relax this assumption in Section 5 where we
study supermajorities.

\(^{20}\) For example, this is always the case when for any two \( C, C' \in C \), \( |V(C) - V(C')| \leq \eta \) for some sufficiently
small \( \eta \).

\(^{21}\) To see that there is no loss of generality in this specification, note that, for example, the game with \( (d, e) = (-f, -g) > 0 \) and order of proposal is 1, 3, 2 is equivalent to the game with order 1, 2, 3 and \( (d, e) = (-f, -g) \). The
game with, say, \( d > 0 \) and \( e < 0 \) with \( |d| \leq |e| \) and order 1 \( \rightarrow \) 2 \( \rightarrow \) 3 is equivalent to a game with the same order
and payoffs: \( V(\{1, 3\}) = a' - d', V(\{1, 2\}) = a' \) and \( V(\{2, 3\}) = a' + e' \) with \( a' = a - d \), \( d' = -(e + d) > 0 \) and
\( e' = d > 0 \). Moreover, since the Markov equilibrium is memoryless, once we have characterized the equilibrium
with some order starting from 1, we have also characterized any game with the same order starting from 2 or 3.

\(^{22}\) The idea is that if a winning coalition can agree on a policy that generates a surplus \( V(C) \), then additional
member who can veto it in a larger coalition \( C' \) can only reduce the attainable value.
A clockwise equilibrium

\[ a - d \quad \text{and} \quad a + e \]

A counter-clockwise equilibrium

\[ a \]

A strongly efficient equilibrium

\[ \alpha \quad \text{and} \quad 1 - \alpha \]

A mixed equilibrium

Figure 2: Classification of the possible equilibria when \( d, e > 0 \).

The assumption of three parties is an assumption that has been previously adopted by Austen-Smith and Banks [1988], Baron [1991], Baron and Diermeier [2001] and many others: it allows us to keep the key strategic feature of the problem, minimizing the analytical complications. It is also realistic since many political systems have this feature.

Our first result characterizes the strategies that are feasible in a pure strategy equilibrium. Note first that there is essentially only one way to achieve a strongly efficient equilibrium, that is an equilibrium in which the efficient coalition is reached for any initial formateur: if \( d, e > 0 \), coalition \{1, 3\} should form, no matter who is the formateur; if \( d, e < 0 \), coalition \{1, 2\} should form, no matter who is the formateur. This happens if the party who is not included in the efficient coalition is unable to form a coalition and no other party includes it in a coalition.

**Definition 2.** If \( d, e > 0 \), an equilibrium is strongly efficient if formateur 1 forms a coalition with 3, 3 forms a coalition with 1 and 2 is unable to form a coalition. If \( d, e < 0 \), an equilibrium is strongly efficient if formateur 1 forms a coalition with 2, 2 forms a coalition with 1 and 3 is unable to form a coalition.

On the other hand, strategies that are not strongly efficient come in different types and shapes. Two forms of inefficient strategies are particularly salient.
Definition 3. A clockwise equilibrium is an equilibrium in which, when given a chance, party 1 selects 3, party 3 selects 2 and party 2 selects 1.

Definition 4. A counterclockwise equilibrium is an equilibrium in which, when given a chance, party 1 selects 2, party 2 selects 3 and party 3 selects 1.

The top left panel of Figure 2 illustrates the clockwise equilibrium, where the choice of coalition is illustrated by a pointed arrow (from the chooser to the chosen). The top right and bottom left panels illustrate the counterclockwise and strongly efficient equilibria respectively. This classification is important because, as the following result shows, it exhausts all the possible cases that can occur in equilibrium. In the appendix we prove that:

Proposition 4. A pure strategy equilibrium is either clockwise, counterclockwise or strongly efficient.

The intuition behind Proposition 4 is simple. Assume, for the sake of the discussion here, that \( d, e > 0 \). Suppose that 1 chooses 2 to be in a coalition with her. Is it possible that 3 also finds it optimal to select 2 as her coalition partner if given a chance to be formateur? The problem with such a scenario is that if this were the case, then 2 would always be in a coalition, thus making her equilibrium outside option high (and making the equilibrium outside option of 3 very low); this would reduce the incentive to include 2 in a coalition, and make 3 more appealing. But then it is natural to expect that 1 will choose 3, since a coalition \( \{1, 3\} \) is more valuable and 3 is “cheap.” Proposition 4 shows that indeed 3 will not find it optimal to include 2, thus leaving only three other scenarios: either offers are “spread out” following the order of the formateurs (the counterclockwise equilibrium); or offers are spread out following the opposite order (the clockwise equilibrium); or only the efficient coalition is feasible in which case 1 would not offer to 2 if \( d, e > 0 \) and the party that does not belong to the efficient coalition will never be included in the winning coalition.

We can now turn to the characterization of the equilibria. Note that the game can be seen as a classic stochastic game in which the only state variable at any point in time is the identity of the formateur. Proposal strategies are easily represented by functions \( x^i_j \); describing the proposal that \( i \) makes to \( j \) when \( i \) is the formateur.

Assume we are in a counterclockwise equilibrium and consider the problem of formateur 1. She selects party 2 and makes a payment that depends on 2’s expected reservation utility, that is

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23 The bottom right panel illustrates a mixed equilibrium that will be discussed below.

24 As we will see, this may occur in equilibrium even if \( d, e > 0 \).

25 We adopt the simplified notation here since it will not lead to confusion. In terms of the more general notation of Section 2, we have \( x^i_j = x_j(\{i, j\}, i) \).

20
the utility that 2 expects to achieve if bargaining with 1 breaks down. The reservation utilities at this stage correspond to $\xi_2$, the payment that formateur 2 in equilibrium offers to $j$. From Proposition 2, $x_j^1$ must satisfy as $\Delta \to 0$:  

$$x_1^1 = x_2^1 + \frac{a - d - x_1^2 - x_2^2}{2}, \quad x_2^1 = x_2^2 + \frac{a - d - x_1^2 - x_2^2}{2}, \quad x_3^1 = 0.$$ (9)

Compared to the analysis of Section 3, now the parties’ reservation utilities are endogenous and they themselves depend on what is expected to happen if bargaining with formateur 2 breaks down. Following the same logic as in (9), we obtain the allocations when 2 and 3 are formateurs: 

$$x_1^2 = 0, \quad x_2^2 = \frac{a}{2} - \frac{x_3^3}{2}, \quad x_3^2 = \frac{a}{2} + \frac{x_3^3}{2},$$

$$x_1^3 = \frac{a + e}{2} + \frac{x_1^3}{2}, \quad x_2^3 = 0, \quad x_3^3 = \frac{a + e}{2} - \frac{x_1^3}{2}.$$ (10)

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26 The formulas look analogous, just a little more complicated when $\Delta > 0$. For example, we would have: and $x_1^1 = x_1^2 + \frac{p(1-p)}{(1-\rho)\rho} [a - d - x_1^2 - x_2^2], \quad x_3^1 = 0, \quad x_2^2 = x_2^2 + \frac{p(1-p)}{(1-\rho)\rho} [a - d - x_1^2 - x_2^2].$ Analogous formula can be derived for the reservation values in (10) below.
Equations (9)-(10) define a system of nine equations in nine unknowns that gives us the following unique solution:

\[
\begin{align*}
x_1^1 &= \frac{3a - 4d + e}{9}, & x_2^1 &= \frac{6a - 5d - e}{9}, & x_3^1 &= 0, \\
x_1^2 &= 0, & x_2^2 &= \frac{3a - d - 2e}{9}, & x_3^2 &= \frac{6a + d + 2e}{9}, \\
x_1^3 &= \frac{6a - 2d + 5e}{9}, & x_2^3 &= 0, & x_3^3 &= \frac{3a + 2d + 4e}{9}. \\
\end{align*}
\]

These are the equilibrium allocations under the assumption that we are in a counterclockwise equilibrium. To complete the characterization we need to make sure that the coalitions chosen in this type of equilibrium are the players’ best responses. Let \(S_\tau(C)\) be the average surplus in coalition \(C\) when \(\tau\) is the formateur, that is

\[
S_\tau(C) = \frac{1}{2} \left[ V(C) - \left( \sum_{j \in C} x_j^{\tau+1} \right) \right].
\]

For illustration, let us assume here that \(d\) and \(e\) are negative, so that the most efficient coalition is \(\{1, 2\}\) (the case in which \(d\) and \(e\) are positive is very similar and presented in the appendix). Consider first the case in which \(2\) is the formateur. From Proposition 2, formateur 2 selects coalition \(\{2, 3\}\) if \(S_2(\{2, 3\}) \geq S_2(\{1, 2\})\). From (11), we have:

\[
\begin{align*}
S_2(\{1, 2\}) &= \frac{1}{2} (a - d - x_1^3) = \frac{3a - 7d - 5e}{18}, \\
S_2(\{2, 3\}) &= \frac{1}{2} (a - x_3^3) = \frac{6a - 2d - 4e}{18}.
\end{align*}
\]

so \(S_2(\{2, 3\}) \geq S_2(\{1, 2\})\) if \(d \geq -\frac{2}{5}a - \frac{1}{5}e\). Proceeding analogously we can verify that formateur 1 and 3 finds it optimal to select, respectively, coalitions \(\{1, 2\}\) and \(\{1, 3\}\) if and only if \(d \leq 3a + 7e\).\(^{27}\) We conclude that a counterclockwise equilibrium exists only if \(d \geq -\frac{2}{5}a - \frac{1}{5}e\) and \(d \leq 3a + 7e\) (the darkly shaded region in the negative orthant in Figure 3). Using a similar logic we can characterize all the other feasible equilibria and obtain the following full characterization of equilibrium bargaining:

**Proposition 5.** We have that:

- A clockwise equilibrium exists if and only if \(d \leq \min \left( \frac{3}{4}a + \frac{4}{5}, 3a - 2e \right)\) when \(d, e > 0\), and if \(d \geq -\frac{3}{2}a - 2e\) if \(d, e < 0\).
- A counterclockwise equilibrium exists if and only if: \(d \leq \frac{3}{4}a - \frac{4}{5}e\) if \(d, e > 0\); and \(d \geq -\frac{3}{2}a - \frac{1}{5}e\) and \(d \leq 3a + 7e\) if \(d, e < 0\).

\(^{27}\) Details on these derivations are presented in the proof of Proposition 5.
• An efficient equilibrium exists if an only if \( d \geq a - e \) when \( d, e > 0 \), and if \( d \geq -(a + e) \) if \( d, e < 0 \)

The equilibrium structure is described in Figure 3. We conclude this section by commenting on three important aspects of the characterization that make the analysis distinctive from previous work on legislative bargaining: the possibility of inefficient equilibria; the possibility of multiple equilibria with different welfare properties depending on the parties’ expectations of likely coalitions; and the possible lack of existence of a pure strategy equilibrium.

The issue of inefficient equilibria has been studied little in the previous literature on legislative bargaining because it focused on distributive politics. Noncooperative models a’ la Baron and Ferejohn [1989] assume that all coalitions generate the same surplus, thus restricting the analysis to how surplus is allocated and making the choice of coalition irrelevant; cooperative models of bargaining (such as the Shapley value, for example), on the contrary, effectively assume that the largest coalition is the most efficient and always selected. In the model studied above, instead, the focus is on which equilibrium coalition is chosen and how this choice depends on the associated surplus. Proposition 5 shows that indeed inefficient coalitions can be selected even if the formateur is a member of the efficient coalition, and the selected coalition may not even be the one that maximizes average surplus. This happens when the equilibrium “expectation” of some other member of the efficient coalition is too high, thus making convenient to choose a less efficient coalition. Surprisingly, this is not just one of the equilibrium outcomes, but under some condition the unique equilibrium outcome.

Note that in the game presented above the core is empty whenever \( d \) and \( e \) are sufficiently small (i.e. \( d + e < a \)), a natural condition to assume in a legislative bargaining environment. In strictly superadditive environments with the first rejector-becomes-proposer bargaining protocol (as in Chatterjee et al. [1993]) or the random proposer protocol (as in Okada [1996]) efficient equilibria do not exist with an empty core. Relaxing the assumption of superadditive values and assuming the formateur protocol, we instead can have an efficient outcome with pure strategies even with an empty core, thus in environments that are relevant for legislative bargaining.

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28 In Figure 3, \( a \) is normalized at \( a = 1 \).

29 Welfare in legislative bargaining models has been explicitly studied in models involving public goods (for instance, Battaglini and Coate [2007], Volden and Wiseman [2007]), endogenous status quo (Dziuda and Loeper [2016]), and public debt with distortionary taxation (Battaglini and Coate [2008]).

30 For example, with \( d, e < 0 \) and \( d > -(a + e) \), \( d < -\frac{2}{3}a - \frac{1}{3}e \), this is the unique equilibrium when 1 is the first formateur (who selects 3 instead of the efficient 2); with \( d, e > 0 \) and \( d > \frac{1}{3}a - \frac{1}{3}e \), \( d < \min\{(a - e), \frac{1}{3} + \frac{2}{3} \} \), this is the unique equilibrium when 3 is the first formateur (who selects 2 instead of the efficient 1).

31 For these results see, respectively, Chatterjee et al. [1993] and Okada [1996].

32 For example, for \( d, e \geq 0 \), there is an efficient equilibrium for any order of formateurs if \( d \leq \frac{1}{3}a - \frac{1}{3}e \) when
protocol are common in Western democracies.

Consider now the issue of multiplicity. Assume here, for the sake of the discussion, $d, e > 0$. In the area below the counterclockwise equilibrium threshold (the lower solid line) in Figure 3, both the counterclockwise and the clockwise equilibria exist (but no efficient equilibrium exists); in the area above the efficient equilibrium threshold (the dashed line) and below the clockwise equilibrium threshold (the higher solid line), we have both an efficient and an inefficient equilibrium. Contrary to what happens in Baron and Ferejohn [1989], this multiplicity of equilibria is payoff relevant.\(^{33}\)

For example in the area in which both the clockwise and the counterclockwise equilibria coexist, the counterclockwise equilibrium is associated to the payoffs $\sin(1 + 1)$; as we show in the proof of Proposition 5 in the appendix, the payoffs with a clockwise equilibrium are:

\[
\begin{align*}
 x_1^1 &= \frac{6a + 5e - 2d}{9}, \quad x_2^1 = 0, \quad x_3^1 = \frac{3a + 4e + 2d}{9} \\
 x_1^2 &= \frac{3a + e - 4d}{9}, \quad x_2^2 = \frac{6a - e - 5d}{9}, \quad x_3^2 = 0 \\
 x_1^3 &= 0, \quad x_2^3 = \frac{3a - 2e - d}{9}, \quad x_3^3 = \frac{6a + 2e + d}{9}.
\end{align*}
\]

The payoff of party 1 when s/he is the formateur, for example, is much higher in the clockwise equilibrium than in the counterclockwise equilibrium. The multiplicity of equilibria captures the complexity of the strategic interaction in this model and is natural in this environment, since it reflects the fact that reservation utilities depend in a non trivial way on endogenous expectations of the future. As we will discuss in the following section, this multiplicity has important implications for understanding the limits of presidential power to control bargaining outcome by just controlling the order and identity of formateurs. Despite this, the model generates only few equilibria and thus allows to derive sharp predictions on behavior and welfare.

The fact that by endogenizing the reserve values $u_i$ we obtain payoff relevant multiplicity should not be surprising; what is surprising is that we still obtain useful restrictions on behavior. To see this, consider the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) in which $n$ players divide a pie of size $\pi$. When $n = 2$ this solution can be seen as the limit of the model in Binmore et al. [1986] as the frequency of offers increases.\(^{34}\) In the NBS the payoffs $v = (v_1, ..., v_n)$ are uniquely defined by the $n$ equations $v_i = u_i + (1/n)(\pi - \sum_{i=1}^{n} u_i)$ for $i = 1, ..., n$. If we attempt to endogenize the reservation utilities by imposing $u_i = v_i$, the system collapses to one equation, the feasibility constraint $\sum_{i=1}^{n} u_i = \pi$, thus making the solution indeterminate. The reason why $d, e \geq 0$, and $d \geq -\frac{3}{2}a - \frac{1}{2}e$ and $d \leq 3a + 7e$ if $d, e < 0$ the core is empty, but there is an efficient equilibrium in which 1 is the first proposer.

\(^{33}\) As first proven by Eraslan [2002], in Baron and Ferejohn [1989] we typically have multiple stationary equilibria, but they all lead to the same equilibrium payoffs.

\(^{34}\) It can also be seen as the limit of the model in Rubinstein [1982], if we interpret the discount factor as the probability that bargaining is terminated, in which case an impasse payoff $u$ is reached.
in our model we obtain meaningful restrictions on the equilibrium outcome lies in an important feature of legislative bargaining (as well as many other bargaining environments): when there is a bargaining breakdown, the game does not repeat itself identically; instead, proposal power moves to a different formateur who, typically, may want to select a different coalition. This fact is sufficient to break the indeterminacy that was described above. A similar feature is true for the Baron and Ferejohn’s model where, after an offer is declined, the proposer automatically loses proposal power and the game restarts with a randomly selected proposer (who also typically selects a different coalition). In Baron and Ferejohn [1989] the assumption of a take-it-or-leave-it offer, of exogenous separation after a rejection and of coalitions with the same value leads to a unique stationary equilibrium in which the proposer appropriates most of the surplus if the value of all coalitions is the same, but it may lead to multiple equilibria if the values of the coalitions are heterogeneous as in our more general environment.  

Finally, we discuss the need to look for mixed equilibria. While it is natural to focus on pure strategy equilibria when they exist, Proposition 5 shows that a pure strategy equilibrium does not always exist when the core is empty. When \( d, e < 0 \), no pure equilibrium exists if \( d > -(a + e) \) and \( d < -\frac{3}{2}a - 2e \), i.e. the triangle defined by the dashed efficiency frontier and the solid line of the clockwise equilibrium in the negative orthant of Figure 3. Similarly, when \( d, e > 0 \), no pure strategy equilibrium exists if \( d > \min\left(\frac{3}{4}a + \frac{3}{4}a - 2e\right) \) and \( d < a - e \), i.e. the triangle defined by the dashed efficiency frontier and the solid line of the counterclockwise equilibrium in the positive orthant of 3. These are situations in which, if we believe in a literally infinite horizon, the equilibrium can be searched among the mixed equilibria; but if we believe the model has a finite but perhaps long horizon, then the exact number of stages is important.

For completeness in the online appendix, we have characterized a mixed equilibrium in these regions as well. In this equilibrium, party 1 randomizes between forming a coalition with 2 and 3; party 2 forms a coalition with party 1 with probability one, and party 3 forms a coalition with party 2 with probability one (see the lower right quadrant in Figure 3).

An interesting qualitative feature of this equilibrium is that it illustrates a point that we will make in the next section: how using the “formateur premium” as a way of measuring the advantage of being a formateur may lead to misleading and even puzzling conclusions. Let \( \Delta_{i,j} = x_i^j - x_j^i \)

35 It is easy to see that the result of a unique stationary payoff vector in Baron and Ferejohn [1989] is no longer valid when coalitions have heterogenous values. Consider an example in which \( N = \{1, 2, 3\}, V\{1, 3\} = a_1, V\{1, 2\} = a_2, V\{2, 3\} = a_3, V\{1, 2, 3\} = 0 \) with \( a_i > 0 \) for \( i = 1, 2, 3, \delta = 1 \), and recognition probability \( p = 1/2 \) for all players. In this case it is easy to see that any division of the pie \((x_1, 0, x_3)\) with \( x_1 \geq a_2, x_3 \geq a_3 \) and \( x_1 + x_3 = a_1 \) is an equilibrium if \( a_1 \geq a_2 + a_3 \). Note that this equilibrium would not be possible if \( a_1 = a \) for some \( a \). It is immediate to generalize this example for cases in which \( \delta < 1 \) and recognition probabilities are heterogeneous.
be the premium of formateur $i$ when forming a government with $j$. In the case in which $d, e < 0$, formateur 1 receives a premium $\Delta_{1,2} = -a - 2e < 0$ when $\{1, 2\}$ is chosen (with probability $\alpha$); and a premium $\Delta_{1,3} = a + e > 0$ when $\{1, 3\}$ (with probability $\alpha$): so the formateur’s premium is simultaneously positive and negative. Naturally, this is irrelevant, since in both cases the payoff of the formateur is the same, $x_1^1 = a + e$.

5 Positive analysis

In this section we discuss how the model can help explain a number of empirical facts that have traditionally been seen as at odds with formal theories of legislative bargaining: the lack of a formateur’s premium; the prevalence of supermajorities; and the presence of delays in forming the coalition.

The formateur’s premium. A key prediction of standard noncooperative models a’ la Baron and Ferejohn [1989] is that the party selecting the coalition receives a very significant premium in terms of surplus allocation. This reflects the fact that in these models the proposer has, at least temporary, monopoly power on the choice of the allocation and can exploit this advantage. A surprising but robust finding in the empirical literature is that not only does such a premium not exist, but that indeed formateurs suffers a proposer’s penalty. For instance, Warwick and Druckman [2001] show that the payoﬀ formateurs receive falls short of their vote contributions to the coalition by 13.3%.36 For instance, Warwick and Druckman [2001] show that the payoff formateurs receive falls short of their vote contributions to the coalition by 13.3%.37

Proposition 5 makes clear that a positive formateur’s premium is not a necessary prediction. For example, assume that the different coalitions generate similar valuations, so there is not an obviously superior or inferior coalition and we always have a counterclockwise equilibrium (the area in the dark shadow in Figure (3)). Consider party 1 when it is the formateur: can it extract a formateur’s premium? It is easy to see that this is not possible and indeed it will be very willing to concede a bonus to the coalition partner. If negotiation fails 2 becomes proposer: 1 expects 2 to form a coalition with 3, leaving himself marginalized. This makes it rational for 1 to leave 2 more than 50% of the surplus generated in their coalition. Naturally, 1 can try with 3, but 3 would require an even higher surplus since he expects to be in a coalition with 2 in which indeed 2 will be willing to leave him more than 50% of the surplus (again, this because 2 fears that if

36 This literature, started by Browne and Franklin [1973], typically relies on ministerial portfolio allocations (often weighted by the importance of the cabinets) as a measure of surplus allocation. See, among many others, Warwick and Druckman [2001] and [2006].

37 This finding does not only rely on the fact that coalitions split surplus equally but the formateur is systematically the largest party. Warwick and Druckman [2001] find that the coefficient of a variable interacting the size of a political party with a dummy equal to one when the party is formateur has a signiﬁcantly negative sign.
proposal power movers to 3, then 3 will form a coalition with 1). This is a manifestation of the hold-up problem in multilateral bargaining. Formateur’s 1 can threaten 2 to switch to 3 while bargaining, but the threat would not be credible. Party 2 knows that 1 will either return to the table or fail as formateur. Party 2 then can comfortably hold 1 up and extract more than 50% of the surplus.39

In the online appendix we formally characterize when we should expect to observe a formateur’s premium and when we should not. The characterization of Proposition 5, however, suggests a more important point regarding how surplus is distributed in government formation. Most of the discussion has focused on how surplus is divided between parties in the realized coalition. Failure of the formateur to capture more than 50% has been interpreted as evidence that the formateur does not benefit from its proposal power. This is natural in a world in which all coalitions have the same value (as in standard non cooperative models) and in which the “grand coalition” is the most valuable coalition (as implicitly assumed in all cooperative models, that have little to say on the choice of coalition). In a model in which coalitions have heterogeneous values and equilibria may be inefficient, the formateur’s benefit of proposal power mostly comes from the choice of the coalition, rather than from the share of surplus that is obtained. For example, party 1 obtains less than 50% of \( a - \delta \) when proposer in a counterclockwise equilibrium leading to a coalition \( \{1, 2\} \), but even less than this if he attempts to form the more efficient coalition \( \{1, 3\} \), and exactly zero if he loses proposal power (since \( \{2, 3\} \) forms in this case). The real benefit of being formateur for party 1 is in selecting \( \{1, 2\} \).

**Supermajorities.** In Section 4, we assumed that there is no intrinsic benefit in the size of a coalition. If \( \eta^* \) is the most efficient policy that can be achieved by some minimal winning coalition, then considering a supermajority can only add veto players, thus reducing the surplus to be divided.40 Formally, we assumed \( V(\{1, 2, 3\}) < \max_C V(C) \). Under this assumption, a supermajority is never optimal in equilibrium. It is intuitive that the model presented above may explain the emergence of supermajorities if we drop this assumption and allow supermajorities to

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38 The argument is indeed general and true for any party who may be proposer and indeed for any order of proposer.

39 Another natural environment in which the formateur’s premium does not need to occur is the case in which there is a clearly superior (and a clearly inferior) coalition \( (d + \epsilon > a) \). In this case too party 1 can not credibly extract a positive proposer’s bonus. Party 3 knows that party 1 really has no choice, since the coalition \( \{1, 2\} \) is so inferior. Parties 1 and 3 are basically stuck with each other, so 1 can expect to receive anything in \([a - d, \epsilon]\); and 3 can expect to receive the reminder \( a + \epsilon - x_1 \). Positive, zero or negative proposer’s bonuses are now possible in equilibrium. Again, the hold-up problem is at work here: this time one in which 1 and 2 can hold each other up.

40 In our formalization we have not specified policies, but they are implicit in the value function \( V(C) \). The government chooses a policy \( \eta_C \) in coalition \( C \) that generates a surplus \( s_i(\eta_C) \) to party \( i \in C \). We can link \( \eta_C \) to \( C \) by letting \( V(C) = \sum_i s_i(\eta_C) \). Assuming transferable utilities as in Austen-Smith and Banks [1988] and Baron and Diermeier [2001], each party can now achieve \( u_i(\eta_C) = s_i(\eta_C) + t_i \), where naturally we need \( \sum t_i \leq \sum s_i(\eta_C) \) and \( t_i \in [-s_i(\eta_C), \sum s_i(\eta_C)] \).
be more valuable than smaller coalitions. In a supermajority the formateur needs to compromise with more parties, but if the surplus is sufficiently large this may be worthwhile. It would however not be extremely surprising if we could only explain supermajorities by assuming a very large surplus advantage for a large coalition. The interesting question is: can we explain supermajorities even when the supermajorities are only marginally better than minimal winning coalitions? This would go a long way in explaining why we observe them so often.

When does an equilibrium in which all formateurs choose the supermajority $N = \{1, 2, 3\}$ emerge? To shorten the notation, let us say that a coalition $a e a s i b l e p a y o$ would go a long way in explaining why we observe them so often.

A coalition $\alpha \leq \text{equilibrium even if its welfare advantage on the minimal winning coalition is minimal; or indeed even this occurs if and only if with 2 only, despite the fact that in bargaining with a grand coalition he will have to leave surplus preference to propose a grand coalition including 2 and 3 rather than a minimal winning coalition. This is surprising because it implies that, for example, even when the supermajorities are only marginally better than minimal winning coalitions. In a supermajority the formateur needs to compromise with more parties, but if the surplus is sufficiently large this may be worthwhile. It would however not be extremely surprising if we could only explain supermajorities by assuming a very large surplus advantage for a large coalition. The interesting question is: can we explain supermajorities even when the supermajorities are only marginally better than minimal winning coalitions? This would go a long way in explaining why we observe them so often.

When does an equilibrium in which all formateurs choose the supermajority $N = \{1, 2, 3\}$ emerge? To shorten the notation, let us say that a coalition $C$ is in the core, if there exist a feasible payoff vector in the core $x^* \in \mathcal{K}(N, V)$ such that $\sum_{j \in C} x^*_j = V(C)$. If all parties choose this supermajority, then a player $j$ must receives a payoff $x^*_j$ independent from the identity of the formateur. Assume that the set of formateurs $T$ is regular, so that if for any $C \in C$, there is a $l \in T \cap C$. It follows that a supermajority $C^*$ is selected in equilibrium by all formateurs by all formateurs who are able to form a government only if it is in the core, else there would be some formateur and coalition that would defeat it. But by Proposition 3 we know that the associated payoff $x^* \in \mathcal{K}(N, V)$ with $\sum_{j \in C^*} x^*_j = V(C^*)$ can be supported as an equilibrium. So a supermajority $C^*$ is selected in equilibrium by all formateurs who are able to form a government if and only it is in the core. In the three party case with $d, e > 0$, if we assume that $V(\{1, 2, 3\}) = a + e + g$ with $g \geq 0$, the supermajority $N$ is selected by all formateurs if and only if $g \geq (a - d - e) / 2$. We have:

**Proposition 6.** If $T$ is regular, then we have an equilibrium in which all parties who can form a government choose a supermajority $C^*$ if and only if $C^*$ is in the core. In the three party case, this occurs if and only if $g \geq (a - d - e) / 2$.

The most important implication of this result is that the grand coalition can emerge in equilibrium even if its welfare advantage on the minimal winning coalition is minimal; or indeed even zero, when $a - d - e$ is small or negative. Note that for $g > (a - d - e) / 2$ there is indeed an equilibrium in which all parties strictly prefer the grand coalition to a minimal winning coalition. This is surprising because it implies that, for example, even when $g$ is arbitrarily small party 1 prefers to propose a grand coalition including 2 and 3 rather than a minimal winning coalition with 2 only, despite the fact that in bargaining with a grand coalition he will have to leave surplus

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41 To see this, assume $i$ is the proposer who is followed by $i + 1$ in case of bargaining breakdown, then $j$ receives: $x^*_j = x_j^{i+1} + \frac{1}{3} \left[ V(N) - \sum_{j \in C^*} x^*_j \right] = x_j^{i+1}$, where the second equality follows from the fact that $\sum_{j \in C^*} x_j^{i+1} = V(N)$.

42 Party 1 chooses $N$ if the average surplus $S_1(N) = (V(N) - \sum x^*_j) / 3$ in equilibrium is larger than the surplus in the other two alternatives: $S_1(\{1, 2\})$, $S_1(\{1, 3\})$. This implies two conditions on payoffs must be verified: $x^*_1 + x^*_2 \geq a - d$ and $x^*_1 + x^*_3 \geq a + e$. When considering the constraints implied by 2 and 3 optimal response and the budget $\sum_{j=1}^{n} x^*_j = a + e + g$, we obtain that a supermajority equilibrium emerges if and only if: $x^*_1 \leq e + g$, $x^*_2 \leq g$, $x^*_3 \geq a - d - x^*_1$.
to two other parties, while in a minimal coalition with 3 he can generate most of the surplus and safely ignore 2’s demands. The general lesson is that the hold-up problem in legislative bargaining may be mitigated when reservation utilities are endogenous. It is also interesting to note that the possibility of a supermajority critically depends on the heterogeneity of coalitional values. As $d$ and $e$ converges to zero, the lowerbound on the bonus value required by the grand coalition to sustain a grand coalition equilibrium converges to 50% of the value of the minimal winning coalitions, a very high threshold.

The finding that a supermajority can exist even if it is not significantly more efficient than minimal winning coalitions is not a general feature of bargaining models even if we assume coalitions with heterogeneous values in which the most efficient coalition is a supermajority. Consider for example the first rejector-becomes-proposer bargaining protocol as the discount factor converges to one (Chatterjee et al. [1993]). Even allowing for a non empty core, a necessary condition to obtain that there is an efficient equilibrium in which the coalition of all $\mathcal{F}$ forms is that $V(N)/|N| \geq V(S)/|S|$ for $S \subseteq N$. This condition is obviously never satisfied when $V(N) - V(S)$ is sufficiently small for some $S$. With the formateur bargaining protocol studied in this paper, however, these strong conditions are not necessary because an efficient equilibrium is not necessarily egalitarian as in these models, so supermajorities are easier to occur in equilibrium.

Strategic delays. Proposition 2 and 5 show that we may have strategic delay in equilibrium. An equilibrium with strategic delay occurs when the efficient coalition is possible, say $\{1, 3\}$ with $d, e > 0$, and 2 has a chance to be formateur; delay is inevitable when the equilibrium with the efficient coalition is the unique equilibrium. An interesting observation is that delays in our model are not due to the fact that there is an expected opportunity in the future that, by assumption, is too large not to be waited for (in terms of expected surplus). In the case with $d, e > 0$, for example, when $d \leq \min \left( \frac{3}{4} a + \frac{1}{4} 3a - 2e \right)$ and $d \geq a - e$ (the area marked “B” in Figure 3), both an efficient equilibrium with delay and an inefficient clockwise equilibrium coexist: party 2 is unable to form a government because of the players’ (self-fulfilling) equilibrium beliefs. The delays in reaching an agreement, therefore, is a strategic phenomenon. Our model is not the first to show the possibility of strategic delays in a model of bargaining. Previous stories about strategic delays extended the basic model to identify important economic factors that may cause them.

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43 The condition $V(S)/|S| \geq V(S')/|S'|$ for $S \subseteq S'$ is necessary for a subgame efficient equilibrium to exist with the random proposer protocol as the discount factor converges to one (Okada [1996]). A subgame efficient equilibrium is an equilibrium that is efficient in all subgames.

44 To see this assume $g = (a - d - e + \delta)/2$, for $d, e, \delta > 0$. By Proposition 6, the efficient grand coalition $N$ is an equilibrium for any order of proposers, still, $V(N)/|N| < (1/2)V(\{1, 3\})$ for $\delta$ sufficiently small. This is a subgame efficient equilibrium in which the efficient grand coalition forms for any order of formateurs.
Avery and Zemsky [1994] and Diermeier et al. [2003] consider models in which the size of the pie to divide changes stochastically during the negotiations. Ali [2006] considers environments without common priors in which players may be optimistic about their recognition probabilities. Jehiel and Moldovanu [1995] and Iaryczower and Oliveros [2019] consider principal agent models in which the principal negotiates bilaterally with each agent. The results presented above contribute to this literature showing that strategic delays can arise in a model without any of these features and that can also explain negative formateur benefits and supermajorities.

6 Welfare and the role of the head of state in legislative bargaining

The characterization of the bargaining equilibrium presented in the previous section allows us to study the role of the head of state in affecting legislative bargaining and thus shaping governing coalitions by exerting his/her prerogatives in selecting the formateurs. Among the prerogative of a head of state in a parliamentary democracy, that of choosing the government formateur is one of the most important. Many European constitutions empower their heads of state with significant discretion in the government formation process, including Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, France, Iceland, Italy, Poland and constitutional monarchies such as Belgium, Denmark, Luxemburg, Norway, and the United Kingdom. The role of the head of state in this process is not generally formally regulated and it may change over time. Italy, for example, used to have relatively weak heads of state; but this tradition ended with President Scalfaro (1992-1999) who leveraged his prerogatives in the face of a weakened party system after the corruption scandals of the 90s and the fall of the Berlin wall (Italy had the largest communist party in Western Europe at the time). In the United Kingdom the monarch has repeatedly showed its influence in the presence of a “hung parliament.” In some cases the power of the head of state is so strong that legislatures proceeded to curb it, as in the case of Sweden and the Netherlands in 1975 and 2012 respectively.

The equilibrium characterization of the previous section suggests three questions. As we have seen, the legislative process does not generally arrive to an efficient equilibrium in which the coalition that generates the most surplus is chosen (even when the cost of delay is small). Indeed, we have seen that it is even possible that the worst equilibrium, in which the least efficient of the coalitions forms in equilibrium, is achieved. First, is there room for a head of state to improve the

45 See also Acharia and Ortner [2013], Ortner [2017] for models with a related approach.

46 See Amorim Neto and Strom [2006], Tavits [2009], Carroll and Cox [2011] among others for a discussion of the role of the head of state. Other important prerogatives of the president include the timing of dissolution and the vetoing of legislation which are less relevant to our discussion.
outcome of the bargaining process, just by controlling the order of formateurs?\(^{47}\) Second, if this is the case, what are the limits of this power? Ideally the head of state would want to induce an efficient equilibrium; under what conditions is this possible?

In the online appendix we prove that:\(^{48}\)

**Proposition 7.** *If the order of formateurs is chosen by a benevolent head of state, then there is always an efficient equilibrium, though it may be in mixed strategies.*

This result is interesting because it is in sharp contrast with the finding in the literature assuming superadditive values and the first rejector-proposer protocol (as in Chatterjee et al. [1993]) or random proposer protocol (as in Okada [1996]) in which, for high discount factors, there exists no order of proposers that achieves an efficient outcome if the core is empty. The presence of multiple equilibria, however, creates other challenges to a benevolent head of state. Does the order selected by the head of state matter at all? When can the head of state implement the efficient outcome in the unique equilibrium? Finally, if full control of the outcome is impossible, can at least the head of state avoid that the worst equilibrium is achieved?

To address these questions, it is useful to normalize \(a\) to 1 and use the notation according to which \(e = \epsilon \cdot \theta\) and \(d = \vartheta \cdot \theta\), where \(\epsilon\) and \(\vartheta\) are generic coefficients in \((0, 1)\) and \(\theta\) can be positive or negative with \(|\theta| < \min\{1/\epsilon, 1/\vartheta\}\). It is easy to see that when \(|\theta|\) is sufficiently large (the area in the light shade in Figure 3), the choice of the formateurs’ order is irrelevant: no matter what the order of formateur is, the efficient coalition is so much better than the others, that it will form anyway.\(^{49}\) In this case we say that the head of state is *irrelevant*. When, instead, \(|\theta|\) is sufficiently small, the head of state is faced with multiple inefficient equilibria, no matter the order of formateurs. Consider point \(C\) in Figure 3. Here the head of state can achieve an efficient equilibrium by choosing an order \(1 \rightarrow 2 \rightarrow 3\) and aim at a clockwise equilibrium. If this happens, then 1 forms a coalition with 3 and an efficient outcome is achieved. If however, the parties play a counterclockwise equilibrium, the result is the opposite: 1 offers to 2 and the least efficient coalition forms in equilibrium. The head of state can attempt to achieve an efficient equilibrium by choosing an order \(1 \rightarrow 2 \rightarrow 3\), letting 3 to go first and aim at a counterclockwise equilibrium: in this case 3 proposes to 1, and again we have an efficient outcome. If however the players play a clockwise equilibrium, the outcome is again inefficient, though not the least.

\(^{47}\) As a starting point, we assume here that the head of state aims at maximizing aggregate surplus. A similar analysis can be done for the case in which the head of state maximizes any other type of social welfare function.

\(^{48}\) For the most part, this result follows immediately from Proposition 5. In the region \(d > \frac{1}{3}a + \frac{1}{2} \) and \(d < a - e\), however, a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist, so we prove that there is a mixed equilibrium in which the efficient coalition is selected with probability one.

\(^{49}\) Assume for example that \(d, e > 0\). If 1 or 3 are selected, then \(\{1, 3\}\) forms; if 2 is selected, then 2’s attempt is destined to fail and \(\{1, 3\}\) forms again. A similar phenomenon is true for \(d, e < 0\), in which case \(\{1, 2\}\) always forms if \(|\theta|\) is sufficiently large.
efficient coalition. The natural choice for the head of state is to go for this second scenario since it makes sure that the least efficient equilibrium is not achieved: but it is impossible to guarantee an efficient equilibrium. In this case, we say the head of state has incomplete control. The head of state can make sure the outcome is efficient in any possible equilibrium of the bargaining game only for intermediate values of $\|\theta\|$ and specific value of $d, e$ (for example points $A$ or $B$ in Figure 4) In these cases, we say that the head of state has full control.

In the online appendix we present a precise characterization of when the head of state is irrelevant, s/he has incomplete control, or full control. An implicit assumption in this discussion, however, is that the head of state can commit to an order of formateurs. This is however problematic. Consider point $A$ in Figure 3, where $d, e > 0$. If the head of state selects and order $1 \rightarrow 2 \rightarrow 3$ and this is credible, then $1$ forms with $3$ and the efficient equilibrium forms. But what if, out of equilibrium, $1$ fails to form and the head of state needs to select a different formateur? In this case it would not be optimal to select $2$, who would form a coalition $\{1, 2\}$, the least efficient. The choice of an order $1 \rightarrow 2 \rightarrow 3$ would not be credible absent some form of commitment device. It turns out that the head of state can still implement an efficient equilibrium by inducing a clockwise equilibrium an order $1 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow 2$, but in a much smaller region. We have:

**Proposition 8.** The head of state can implement the efficient outcome without commitment as
the unique equilibrium iff:

\[
\begin{align*}
\theta & \leq \frac{3}{4\theta + 2\epsilon} \text{ and either } \theta \geq \frac{3}{\theta + 5\epsilon} \text{ or } \theta \leq \frac{3}{7\theta - \epsilon} \text{ if } \theta > 0 \\
\theta & \leq 3 \cdot \max\{1/(\theta - 7\epsilon), -1/(2\theta + 4\epsilon)\} \text{ and } \theta \geq -\frac{3}{5\theta + \epsilon} \text{ if } \theta < 0.
\end{align*}
\]

Following the formateurs’ order, the equilibrium is in pure strategies without loss of generality.

Figure 4 illustrates the region in which the head of state can implement an efficient equilibrium committing to a specific order of formateurs (the colored area between the dark lines). The region defined by the inequalities in Proposition 8 in which commitment is not required is defined by the darker section delimited by the dashed lines in Figure 4.\(^{50}\)

Proposition 8 presents two general lessons. First, the head of state can affect legislative bargaining even without commitment, although his/her power is severely limited when, realistically, s/he cannot commit to an order of formateurs. The second lesson is that the influence of the head of state depends on the relative coalitional values of the potential coalitions. This dependency of the head of state’s power on relative values of coalitions can explain why heads of states may play dramatically different roles over time in the same institutional context. We have mentioned the case of President Scalfaro in Italy (1992-1999) who played a key role in shaping the Italian governments compared to previous presidents. Here the change in the environment was the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the cold war, that made the traditional coalition formed by the Christian Democrats (CD) less compelling, and a coalition led by Democratic Party (DP, former Communist party) less of a taboo. The pre-1992 period corresponded to a period in which a coalition \(\{1, 3\}\) (led by the CD) was the most viable coalition \((d + e > a)\): with the end of the cold war, the stigma of a leftist coalition led by the DP decreased (fall in \(d\)), moving the equilibrium to the region with presidential full control.

7 Extensions

7.1 Discounting

As in the model by Binmore et al. \([1986]\), in the previous analysis we assumed a positive probability of bargaining breakdown and a discount factor of one. While it is plausible and standard to assume patient players, we certainly do not want to rule out situations in which the parties discount the payoffs obtained after a bargaining breakdown at a rate \(\delta < 1\).\(^{51}\) The model presented above can be easily extended to allow for these situations: the analysis remains qualitatively the same, just

\(^{50}\) In the proof of Proposition 9 we present the formulas also in terms of \(d\) and \(e\).

\(^{51}\) For example, it may be that after a breakdown there is a temporary suspension in negotiations.
with an additional parameter. Consider for example the counterclockwise equilibrium with \( n = 3 \) characterized in (9)-(10). If the players discount the payoffs following a bargaining breakdown at a rate \( \delta < 1 \), then the equilibrium conditions become:

\[
\begin{align*}
    x_1^1 &= \frac{(a - d + \delta x_2^3)}{2}, \quad x_1^1 = \frac{(a - d + \delta x_2^3)}{2}, \quad x_2^1 = 0 \\
    x_2^2 &= 0, \quad x_2^2 = \frac{(a - \delta x_3^3)}{2}, \quad x_3^2 = \frac{(a + \delta x_3^3)}{2} \\
    x_3^3 &= \frac{(a + e + \delta x_1^3)}{2}, \quad x_2^3 = 0, \quad x_3^3 = \frac{(a + e - \delta x_1^3)}{2},
\end{align*}
\]

which has a unique solution, continuous in \( \delta \), converging to the solution of (9)-(10) as \( \delta \to 1 \).

The same is true for the other two possibilities, the clockwise and strongly efficient equilibria.

The important observation is that in the interior of the parameter space for existence of these equilibria, the formateurs have strict preferences for the coalitions they select. This implies that all the equilibria of Proposition 5 can be seen as limit of equilibria in games with \( \delta < 1 \) as \( \delta \to 1 \).

When this is the case, we say that an equilibrium is robust. While this definition is not especially discriminating for the equilibria of the game studied above, we will see in the next section that it has a bite when we consider environments as \( \rho \to 1 \), that is situations in which the formateur can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer.

7.2 Take-it-or-leave-it offers and intra-coalitional bargaining

An interesting special case of the model presented in Section 2 is the case in which the formateur makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer (TIOLI) to the coalition partners and, if the offer is not accepted by the coalition, the formateur is replaced with probability one, as in Baron and Ferejohn [1989]. This case can be seen as a special case of our model in which \( p \) converges to 1.

When we have exogenous reservation utilities as in Section 3, Proposition 1 tells us that the formateur selects the coalition \( C_f \) that maximizes \( V(C) - \sum_{i \in C} u_i \); and s/he appropriates all the surplus net of the reservation utilities of the coalition partners. When instead, as in Section 4, we endogenize the reservation utilities, as \( p \to 1 \) the extended model becomes a version of Baron and Ferejohn [1989] with a deterministic rotating order of proposers/formateurs. The analysis in this case can be done as in Section 4. Consider the coalition formation process that we have in a “clockwise equilibrium” under the assumption that \( d, e > 0 \): that is, an equilibrium in which there is immediate agreement and 1 forms a coalition \( \{1, 3\} \), 2 forms \( \{1, 2\} \), and 3 forms \( \{2, 3\} \). In this scenario, party 1 makes a TIOLI equal to \( x_2^3 \) to 3 and takes \( x_1^1 = a + e - x_3^3 \) for itself: the offer is \( x_3^3 \) since this is the payoff 3 would receive from 2 if there is a bargaining breakdown with 1. Similarly, party 2 makes a TIOLI equal to \( x_1^1 \) to 1; and party 3 makes a TIOLI equal to \( x_2^3 \) to
2. If such an equilibrium exists, the payoffs are uniquely characterized by the system:

\[
\begin{align*}
\theta_1^1 &= \alpha + \epsilon - \theta_2^3, \quad \theta_1^2 = 0, \quad \theta_1^3 = \theta_3^2 \\
\theta_2^1 &= \theta_1^2, \quad \theta_2^2 = a - d - \theta_1^3, \quad \theta_2^3 = 0 \\
\theta_3^1 &= 0, \quad \theta_3^2 = \theta_2^1, \quad \theta_3^3 = a - \theta_2^1
\end{align*}
\] (13)

This system has a unique solution in which each formateur fully expropriates the coalition partner: \(\theta_1^1 = a + e, \theta_2^2 = a - d, \theta_3^3 = a\). Moreover, given these payoffs, it can be verified that the clockwise coalition formation process is indeed an equilibrium for any feasible \(d, e\).

As in the previous analysis, this equilibrium is not generally unique. In the proof of Proposition 9 we show that there is also a counterclockwise equilibrium in which the formateur is forced to share the surplus with the coalition member; and, when the core is not empty, we can also have a strongly efficient equilibria in which the efficient coalition is formed and the remaining party is unable to form a government. In the counterclockwise equilibrium the payoffs are:

\[
\begin{align*}
\theta_1^1 &= (a + e - d)/2, \quad \theta_1^2 = (a - e - d)/2, \quad \theta_1^3 = 0 \\
\theta_2^1 &= 0, \quad \theta_2^2 = (a - e - d)/2, \quad \theta_2^3 = (a + e + d)/2 \\
\theta_3^1 &= (a + e - d)/2, \quad \theta_3^2 = 0, \quad \theta_3^3 = (a + e + d)/2
\end{align*}
\] (14)

Note that as \(d, e \to 0\), this equilibrium is such that in all coalitions both members receive \(a/2\). This is surprising, since Ali et al. [2019] showed that when \(d, e = 0\) there is a unique stationary equilibrium in which the proposer extracts all surplus (as in the clockwise equilibrium described in (13)). This discrepancy is explained by the fact that the construction behind (14) is fragile. Indeed, it can be verified that with the payoffs in (14), all formateurs are exactly indifferent between coalitions (remarkably, for any \(d, e\)). Recall that in Section 7.1 we defined an equilibrium to be robust if it is the limit of equilibria as \(\delta \to 1\), where \(\delta\) is the rate at which the players discount the payoffs following a bargaining breakdown. While all the equilibria characterized in Section 4 along with the clockwise equilibrium and the strong efficient equilibrium of this section are robust, the counterclockwise equilibrium in (14) exists only in the limit when \(\delta = 1\). We have:

**Proposition 9.** As \(p \to 1\), in the game with three parties we have:

- If \(a > |d| + |e|\) (i.e. the core is empty), then there is only one robust equilibrium: a clockwise equilibrium in which the formateur forms the government with a party that is not next in line as formateur and fully extracts all the surplus. There is also a counterclockwise equilibrium with payoffs as in (14), but this equilibrium is not robust.

- If \(a < |d| + |e|\), then in addition to the clockwise equilibrium, there is a set of robust strongly efficient equilibria in which the most efficient coalition is formed, and the payoffs
Comparing this result with Proposition 5, we can learn two important lessons on the determinants of efficiency in coalitional bargaining: how efficiency depends on the negotiating environment and why it is important to model intra-coalitional bargaining with \( p < 1 \). Assume first that the core is empty, a condition that is always satisfied when the value of the coalitions are sufficiently close and probably the most plausible scenario in legislative negotiations. In the unique robust equilibrium with TIOLI offers, the formateurs follow a simple strategy that allows them to fully extract all the surplus: they make an offer to the party with the weakest bargaining position (that is, the party who is not next in line to be appointed as formateur), regardless of its contribution to the surplus of the coalition. In this case, whether we have an efficient equilibrium or not, does not at all depend on the values of the coalitions, but only on the order of the formateurs: the equilibrium is efficient if 1 is the first formateur; but it is inefficient otherwise. In the case in which 3 is the formateur, for example, the inefficient coalition \( \{2, 3\} \) is formed despite the fact that 3 could form a coalition with 1. This happens because 3 knows that 1 is next in line as formateur, thus (because of the the assumption of take-it-or-leave-it-offers) in a strong bargaining position. In this process, the holdup problem is completely absent since the formateur extracts all the surplus net of the reservation utilities. What makes this description of the strategic interaction between the parties unsatisfactory is the fact that, when party 1 is the formateur, party 3 knows that its participation is necessary to form an efficient coalition; and, importantly, that if 1 fails, both itself and 1 are left with zero utility by 2. Still, party 1 is able to capture the entire surplus of the partnership. Indeed, party 1’s formateur’s premium is independent of its reservation value and the reservation value of its partner. In such a situation it would instead be natural to allow 1 and 3 to negotiate some more beyond the TIOLI before proposal power passes to 2: it is in the interest of both of them. This is however made impossible by the assumption that party 1’s offer is take-it-or-leave-it.

The holdup problem plays a role only when we allow for meaningful intra-coalitional bargaining. In this case, the holdup problem forces the formateur to share surplus with the coalition partners. This changes the coalitional calculus considerably. On the one hand, now, even if 1 is the formateur, there are multiple robust equilibria: only one of which (the clockwise equilibrium) leads to an efficient equilibrium; the other (the counterclockwise) leads to the least efficient equilibrium. On the other hand, however, an efficient equilibrium is feasible even if 3 is the formateur: no matter who is the formateur, however, we have multiple robust equilibria.

It is important to stress that there is not an a priori “correct” way to model the bargaining

\[ (x_1, x_2, x_3) \text{ with } x_1 + x_3 = a + e, x_1 \geq a - d, x_3 \geq a \text{ and } x_2 = 0 \text{ if } d, e \geq 0, \text{ and with } x_1 + x_2 = a - d, x_1 > a + e, x_2 > a \text{ and } x_3 = 0 \text{ if } d, e < 0. \]
procedure: the cases as $p \to 1$ (TIOLI) and $p \to 0$ (intra-coalitional negotiations) capture two different strategic environments, both of which may be relevant in different contexts. This discussion however shows that the assumptions matter for positive and welfare results. If we believe that a formateur/proposer can credibly make take-it-or-leave-it offers, then assuming $p \to 1$ is the correct option. In this case, we have a model that predicts an extreme version of the formateur’s premium in which the formateur receives all the surplus. If instead we believe that a formateur needs to engage in meaningful negotiations with the coalition partners, then we have to solve for the general model with $p < 1$ and the natural case to consider is with $p \to 0$, as we have done in Propositions 1, 3 and 4. As seen in the previous analysis, the model with intra-coalitional bargaining can explain why we do not observe extreme allocations of “surplus” favoring the formateur in government formation processes, even if the order of formateurs is predictable.

The second lesson from Proposition 10 is that multiple robust equilibria can exist even with TIOLI offers when the value of the coalitions are heterogeneous. When $|d| + |e| > a$, we can have robust equilibria in which the formateur is forced to share the surplus with the coalition partner, indeed it may be forced to leave more than half of the surplus to the coalition partner: if 1 is the formateur, then we may have $x_1/x_3 = 1 - d/a < 1$. This happens because coalition $\{1, 3\}$ is so efficient that 2 is unable to form a government, thus forcing 1 to commit to 3 (and vice versa). Again this phenomenon is impossible with coalitions with the same value where the unique robust equilibrium is an equilibrium in which the formateur extracts all surplus. We should finally note that, when $|d| + |e| < a$, even the non robust counterclockwise equilibrium is interesting. When the players are patient, an allocation in which the formateur does not extract all the surplus is almost an equilibrium. Given that there may be powerful behavioral and social forces pushing toward an equitable solution, the players may choose it even when it is not exactly an equilibrium.

### 7.3 Random recognition of proposers

Proposition 2 shows that as the interaction between parties become frequent ($\Delta \to 0$), the order is irrelevant and the allocation within the coalition converges to the C-Nash solution (8). An alternative specification of the bargaining inside the coalition is to assume that each member of the coalition $i \in C$ has a probability $q_i(C)$ of being recognized and thus make a proposal. As in the previous analysis, whenever the formateur is recognized, s/he can choose to continue bargaining in $C$ or move to an alternative coalition. The analysis in this variant is qualitatively similar to the analysis presented above, but as it adds an additional source of information (the recognition probabilities $q_i(C)$).

In this case a stationary equilibrium in pure strategies is defined as follows. For a non formateur party $j$ when the formateur is $i$ and $i$ selects coalition $C$ with $j \in C$, a strategy is a function
\( \sigma_j(C, i) \rightarrow X(C) \times [0, V(C)] \) that maps the identity of the formateur and the coalition \( C \) chosen by \( i \) to a proposal \( x_j(C, i) = \{x_{j,1}(C, i), ..., x_{j,n(C)}(C, i)\} \in X(C) \) when \( j \) is selected as proposer in \( C \), and an acceptance threshold \( a_j(C, i) = \{a_j(C, i)\} \) when \( j \) has to vote.\(^{52}\) For formateur \( i \) a strategy is similarly defined by an allocation strategy \( \sigma_i(C, i) \rightarrow X(C) \times [0, V(C)] \) defined as above; and by a government proposal \( C^f(i) \), that selects the coalition in \( C_t \) chosen by \( i \) whenever \( i \) becomes formateur and when, during coalitional bargaining s/he is recognized as proposer.

As in the analysis of Section 3, the equilibrium coalition must be optimal for the formateur given the requests of the coalition members, who expect the same coalition to be chosen by the formateur, thus being a fixed-point in (3). Similarly as in (5), the formateur’s payoff can be characterized recursively as the fixed-point of a contraction that now takes the form:\(^{53}\)

\[
x^*_f(C, C_f) = \max_{C \in C_f} \left\{ p \left[ V(C) - \sum_{l \in C_f} u_l \right] + (1 - p) \left[ q_f(C)x^*_f(C, C_f) + (1 - q_f(C))u_fp \right] \right\}
\]

(15)

where we use the notation \( x^*_f(C, C_f) \) to indicate the formateur’s payoff when \( C \) is selected and the equilibrium coalition is \( C_f \), to emphasize how it depends on \( C_f \). Naturally, now (15) depends on the recognition probabilities associated to each coalition \( C \). In the appendix, we show that there is (generically) a unique coalition that the formateur chooses in equilibrium and it is:

\[
C^*_q = \arg\max_{C \in C_f} \left\{ (1 - (1 - p)(1 - q_f(C))) \left[ V(C) - \sum_{l \in C} u_l \right] \right\}.
\]

(16)

Given this, it is immediate to derive equilibrium payoffs for all players as in Proposition 1. It is however useful to see what happens as \( \Delta \rightarrow 0 \). Define the \( C_q \)-Nash Bargaining Solution as:

\[
Q(C, u) = \arg\max_{x \in X(C)} \prod_{l \in C} [x_l - u_l]^{q_l(C)}
\]

(17)

where \( Q(C, u) = \{Q^1(C, u), ..., Q^n(C, u)\} \). This is the weighted Nash Bargaining solution when coalition \( C \) is chosen and legislators have weights \( q(C) = \{q_1(C), ..., q_n(C)\} \). We have:

**Proposition 10.** As \( \Delta \rightarrow 0 \), the equilibrium of the bargaining problem in the model with recognition probabilities \( q(C) \) converges to \( x^*_i = Q^i(C_f(q), u) \) for \( i \in C_f(q) \) where

\[
C_f(q) = \arg\max_{C \in C_f} \left\{ q_f(C) \cdot \left[ V(C) - \sum_{l \in C} u_l \right] \right\}
\]

and \( x^*_i = u_i \), \( i \notin C_f(q) \).

\(^{52}\) Proposal \( x_j, i(C, i) \) is the surplus allocated to \( l \) when \( j \) is the proposer in a coalition \( C \) chosen by \( i \). The threshold \( a_j(C, i) \) is the minimal level of surplus acceptable by \( j \) in coalition \( C \) chosen by \( i \).

\(^{53}\) Details of the derivation of (15) are presented in the proof of Proposition 9 in the appendix.
As Proposition 2, Proposition 10 can be seen as an institutionally based extension of the Nash bargaining solution, specifically the weighted Nash bargaining solution in which the weights are given by the recognition probabilities in the bargaining protocol.

Given Proposition 10, it is straightforward to extend the analysis of Section 4 with endogenous reservation values. The analysis of Section 4 remains completely unchanged if we assume that all parties have the same recognition probabilities, as generally assumed in the analysis of the Baron and Ferejohn’s [1989] model. If we allow for heterogeneous recognition probabilities, however, the thresholds for the existence of the different types of equilibria become dependent on the weights \( q(C) \), thus providing an additional channel through which the details of the environment may affect the allocation of resources.

7.4 Externalities

In the previous analysis we considered an abstract environment in which the coalition forming the government, say \( C \), generates a surplus \( V(C) \) that is shared among its members, leaving the others at their reservation utilities (normalized at zero). This is a straightforward extension of the environment in Baron and Ferejohn [1989], where the winning coalition shares a pie of size one among its members, leaving the others at zero. If we think that the surplus generated by \( C \) depends on some policy \( \times \), it is natural to allow it to have externalities on the other parties as well. In this section we first show that, in our environment with transferable utilities, this more complex scenario is in line with the model presented above. In the online appendix we show that the bargaining model easily extends to the case with externalities even if we assume imperfectly transferable utilities (or not transferable at all).

Consider an environment in which party \( i \in N \) has utility \( U_i(\eta, t_i) = u_i(\eta) + t_i \), where \( \eta \) is a policy from some space \( \times \), \( t_i \) is a transfer and \( u_i(\cdot) \) is a concave function. For example, the policy space \( \times \) could be a subspace of \( R^m \) for some integer \( m \) (the dimensionality of the policy) and \( u_i(\eta) \) could be the usual quadratic distance \( u_i(\eta) = \beta + \gamma \sum_i (\eta_i - \eta_i')^2 \) with \( \beta > 0 \) and \( \gamma < 0 \), \( \eta_i' = (\eta_i')_{i=1}^m \) is \( i \)'s ideal point and \( \eta = (\eta_i')_{i=1}^m \) is a policy in \( \times \).\(^{54}\) To each party \( i \), we associate a subset \( P_i \subseteq X \) of policies that are acceptable to its constituency (for example, abortion is not a policy feasible for Republicans in the U.S.; and a flat tax is not a policy feasible to Democrats). Let \( P_C = \cap_{j \in C} P_j \). This is the set of policies feasible to a coalition \( C \).

A coalition \( C \) can select any policy in \( P_C \) and a vector of transfers/taxes \( t_j \) for \( j = 1, \ldots, n \). A policy \( \eta \) now does not only affect the members of \( C \), but all parties in \( N \). Note, however, that a winning coalition, i.e. a legitimate government, can tax or subsidize all parties, including

\(^{54}\) For a model with preferences like this see, for example, Baron and Diermeier [2001].
those outside the coalition.\textsuperscript{55} We assume that no party can be left with less than its reservation utility that we set at zero. This level reflects the fact that there are checks on governmental power. Formally, we assume that 

\[ t_j \geq -u_j(\eta) \quad \text{and} \quad \sum t_j \leq 0, \]

the latter inequality being a budget balance condition.

Given this, we have that any coalition \( C \) sets \( t_j = -u_j(\eta) \) for all \( j \notin C \) and allocates a surplus \( V(C) = \max_{\sigma \in \mathcal{P}_C} \sum_{j \in \mathcal{N}} u_j(\eta) \) to all members of \( C \). As in the model described in Section 2, all parties outside the coalition are left with zero. The allocation in the coalition will be a vector of utilities \( x_j \) such that \( x_j \geq 0, \sum_j x_j \leq V(C) \), exactly as the set \( X(C) \) defined in Section 2. In this context, when the outside options \( u_\tau \) are exogenous simply corresponds to a policy \( \eta^o \) and feasible vector or transfers that would be taken by a caretaker: \( u_j = u_\tau(\eta^o) + t_\tau \). When the outside options are endogenous, they are endogenously defined in the game.

8 Conclusions

In this paper we have proposed a new model of multilateral bargaining to study how majorities are formed in legislatures when coalitions are heterogeneous in terms of the surplus they are expected to generate. In our model, a formateur picks a coalition and negotiates for the allocation of the surplus. The formateur is free to change coalition to seek better deals with other coalitions, but s/he may lose her status if bargaining breaks down, in which case a new formateur is chosen. In this context, a formateur needs to reconcile the need to form the most productive coalition with the desire to maximize the share of output that s/he captures. This seems an important feature that has characterized most legislative negotiations in parliamentary democracies in the post World War II period.

The model provides a new perspective on legislative bargaining and helps explain a number of well established empirical facts at odds with existing noncooperative models of multilateral bargaining. From a theoretical point of view, we have shown that, as the delay between offers goes to zero, the equilibrium allocation converges to a generalized version of the Nash bargaining solution in which each coalition member receives its outside option plus a share of surplus net of reservation utilities. The difference with respect to the Nash’s solution is that in the \( n \)-person Nash bargaining solution the coalition is assumed to be comprised by all players (or chosen exogenously), while in our model it is endogenously determined. A form of the hold-up problem specific to these bargaining games may lead to significant inefficiencies in the selection of the equilibrium coalition. When reservation utilities are endogenized in a fully recursive model in which a bargaining breakdown is followed by the appointment of a new formateur, moreover, we may have

\textsuperscript{55} The parties in our game represent different social classes, they are not individuals. It is therefore legitimate to allow the government to target them differentially with tax/subsidies.
multiple stationary equilibria with different welfare implications. The equilibrium characterization is however sufficiently tight for positive and normative analysis.

In terms of positive analysis, the model helps explaining three well known empirical facts that have been hard to reconcile with non-cooperative models of multilateral bargaining: the absence of significant (or even positive) premia in ministerial allocations for formateurs and their parties; the occurrence of supermajorities; and delays in reaching agreements. While a number of important previous works have attempted to explain these facts individually, our theory has the advantage of providing a unified and intuitive explanation for all them. Finally, in terms of normative analysis, the model provides a framework to study the role of the head of state in legislative bargaining processes, helping to understand the limits of its prerogatives in selecting the formateurs.
Appendix

9.1 Proof of Lemma 1

Let \( x_{f,f}^*(C, C_f) \) be the formateur’s payoff when \( C \) is proposed, but the equilibrium coalition is \( C_f \). We must have that \( x_{f,f}^*(C, C_f) = V(C) - \sum_{i \in C \setminus f} a_{f,i}(C, C_f) \) where, as we did in Section 3, we are using the notation \( a_{j,i}(C, C_f) \) to indicate the acceptance threshold of \( i \) when \( j \) proposes in coalition \( C \) and the expected equilibrium coalition is \( C_f \) to emphasize that the threshold depends on \( C_f \). It follows that:

\[
x_{f,f}^*(C, C_f) = V(C) - p \sum_{i \in C \setminus f} u_i - (1-p) \left[ \sum_{i \in C \setminus f \setminus \{i=2\}} a_{i(2),f}(C, C_f) + V(C) - \sum_{k \in C \setminus (2)} a_{i(2),k}(C, C_f) \right].
\]

Substituting this expression in (18), we conclude that in equilibrium we must have:

\[
fi
\]

Implying that indeed \( \phi^* \) solves the problem in (20) if it does not solve (3), a contradiction.

Recalling that \( \phi^* \) be the formateur’s payo

\[
to indicate the acceptance threshold of \( i \) when \( j \) proposes in coalition \( C \) and the expected equilibrium coalition is \( C_f \) to emphasize that the threshold depends on \( C_f \). It follows that:

\[
x_{f,f}^*(C, C_f) = V(C) - p \sum_{k=0}^{n(C)-2} (1-p)^k u_f + (1-p)^{n(C)-1} x_{f,f}^*(C, C_f).
\]

Substituting this expression in (18), we conclude that in equilibrium we must have:

\[
x_{f,f}^*(C, C_f) = \max_{C \in C_f} \left\{ p \left[ V(C) - \sum_{i \in C \setminus f} u_i \right] + p \left[ 1 + \sum_{k=1}^{n(C)-1} (1-p)^k \right] u_f \right\}.
\]

Recalling that \( C_f \) is a coalition that solves (20), from (20) we immediately have that:

\[
x_{f,f}^*(C, C_f) = u_f + \frac{p \left[ V(C) - \sum_{i \in C \setminus f} u_i \right]}{1 - (1-p)^{n(C)}}.
\]

Assume now that we have an equilibrium in which a \( C_f \neq C_f^* \), as defined in (4). Then can write:

\[
x_{f,f}^*(C, C_f) = p \left[ V(C_f^*) - \sum_{i \in C_f^*} u_i \right] + p \left[ \sum_{k=0}^{n(C_f^*)-1} (1-p)^k \right] u_f + (1-p)^{n(C_f^*)} \cdot x_{f,f}^*(C, C_f)
\]

\[
\geq x_{f,f}^*(C_f, C_f).
\]

Implying that indeed \( C_f \) does not solve the problem in (20) if it does not solve (3), a contradiction. Similarly we have that \( x_{f,f}^*(C_f, C_f^*) \leq x_{f,f}^*(C_f^*, C_f^*) \) for any \( C_f \in C^f \) we conclude that the unique fixed-point of (3) is \( C_f^* \).
9.2 Proof of Proposition 1

From Lemma 1 we know that one and only one coalition is chosen by the formateur, $C^*_f$ that is the unique fixed-point of (3). We now show that there is a unique distribution of surplus and we characterize it. Let $a_i(\tau + j, C^*_f)(C^*_f)$ be the acceptance threshold of the party who proposes at stage $\tau$ when the proposer is the party proposing at stage $\tau + j$. Moreover, $x_i(\tau + j, C^*_f)(C^*_f)$ is the payoff of $\tau$ when $\tau + j$ is the proposer. Following the same steps as in the derivation of (19) we have:

$$x^*_i(\tau, C^*_f) = u_i(\tau, C^*_f) + \frac{p \left[ V(C^*_f) - \sum_{l \in C^*_f} u_l \right]}{1 - (1 - p)^{n(C^*_f)}}. \quad (22)$$

Moreover, we must have:

$$a^*_i(\tau + j, C^*_f) = pu_i(\tau, C^*_f) + (1 - p)a_i(\tau + j + 1, C^*_f)(C^*_f). \quad (23)$$

Iterating over (23), we can then write:

$$a^*_i(\tau + j, C^*_f) = p \sum_{k=0}^{n(C^*_f) - j - 1} (1 - p)^k u_i(\tau, C^*_f) + (1 - p)^{n(C^*_f) - j} x^*_i(\tau, C^*_f) \quad (24)$$

for all $j = 1, ..., n(C^*_f) - \tau$. Similarly we have:

$$a^*_i(\tau - j, C^*_f) = p \sum_{k=0}^{\tau - 1} (1 - p)^k u_i(\tau, C^*_f) + (1 - p)^j x^*_i(\tau, C^*_f) \quad (25)$$

for all $j = 1, ..., \tau - 1$. The system of equations (22), (24) and (25) gives a complete characterization of the optimal strategy for the agent proposing at stage $\tau$ in $C^*_f$ (that is party $i(\tau, C^*_f)$).

Clearly, we must have $x^*_i(\tau + j, C^*_f)(C^*_f) = a^*_i(\tau + j, C^*_f)(C^*_f)$. The strategies and equilibrium payoffs are fully characterized by the system of $n(C^*_f) \times n(C^*_f)$ equations:

\[
\begin{align*}
    x^*_i(\tau, C^*_f) &= u_i(\tau, C^*_f) + \frac{p \left[ V(C^*_f) - \sum_{l \in C^*_f} u_l \right]}{1 - (1 - p)^{n(C^*_f)}} \\
    x^*_i(\tau + j, C^*_f) &= \left[ p \sum_{k=0}^{n(C^*_f) - j - 1} (1 - p)^k u_i(\tau, C^*_f) \right] + (1 - p)^{n(C^*_f) - j} x^*_i(\tau, C^*_f)(C^*_f) \quad \text{for } j = 1, ..., n(C^*_f) - \tau \quad (26) \\
    x^*_i(\tau - j, C^*_f) &= p \sum_{k=0}^{\tau - 1} (1 - p)^k u_i(\tau, C^*_f) + (1 - p)^j x^*_i(\tau, C^*_f) \quad \text{for } j = 1, ..., \tau - 1
\end{align*}
\]

for all $\tau \in \{1, ..., n(C^*_f)\}$. It is immediate to verify that $C^*_f$ and the strategies described in (26)
are an equilibrium. To characterize the equilibrium payoffs for the players note that:

\[
x^*_{f,i}(\tau, C_f^\tau) = a^*_{f,i}(\tau, C_f^\tau) = p \sum_{k=0}^{\tau-2} (1-p)^k u_i(\tau, C_f^\tau) + (1-p)^{\tau-1} x_{i}(\tau, C_f^\tau), i(\tau, C_f^\tau)(C_f^\tau) \tag{27}
\]

\[
= [1 - (1-p^{\tau-1})] u_i(\tau, C_f^\tau) + (1-p)^{\tau-1} x_{i}(\tau, C_f^\tau), i(\tau, C_f^\tau)(C_f^\tau)
\]

\[
= u_i(\tau, C_f^\tau) + \frac{p(1-p)^{\tau-1}}{1 - (1-p)^{n(C_f^\tau)}} \left[ V(C_f^\tau) - \sum_{i \in C_f^\tau} u_i \right]
\]

for all \( \tau \geq 2. \)

\[\text{9.3 Proof of Proposition 2}\]

From Proposition 1, the limit of the formateur’s payoff as \( \Delta \to 0 \) can be written as:

\[
\lim_{\Delta \to 0} x^*_{f,f} = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \left[ u_f + \frac{p \left( V(C_f^\tau) - \sum_{i \in C_f^\tau} u_i \right)}{1 - (1-p)^{n(C_f^\tau)}} \right].
\]

Applying l’Hospital rule, we obtain:

\[
\lim_{\Delta \to 0} x^*_{f,f} = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \left[ u_f + \frac{1 - e^{-r\Delta}}{1 - e^{-r n(C_f^\tau)\Delta}} \left( V(C_f^\tau) - \sum_{i \in C_f^\tau} u_i \right) \right]
\]

\[
= u_f + \frac{1}{n(C_f^\tau)} \left[ V(C_f^\tau) - \sum_{i \in C_f^\tau} u_i \right].
\]

It follows immediately from (26) and (27) that:

\[
\lim_{\Delta \to 0} \left( \frac{x^*_{f}(\Delta) - u_i}{x^*_{f}(\Delta) - u_f} \right) = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \left[ (1-p)^{\tau-1(i, C_f^\tau)} \right] = 1.
\]

It follows that \( \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \left( x^*_{f}(C_f^\tau) - u_f \right) = \lim_{\Delta \to 0} \left( x^*_{i}(C_f^\tau) - u_i \right) \), proving the result.  

\[\text{9.4 Proof of Proposition 3}\]

Since \( x^* = (x_1^*, ..., x_n^*) \) is in the core, there must be some \( C^* \in \arg \max_C V(C) \) such that \( \sum_{i \in C^*} x_i^* = V(C^*) \) and \( x_j^* = 0 \) for all \( j \in N \setminus C^* \). Consider the following strategies. With respect to the proposal strategies, we have: if party \( i \) is the proposer in \( C^* \), then \( i \) offers \( x_i^* \) to all members of \( C^* \) and zero to the remaining parties; if \( i \) is the proposer in \( C \neq C^* \), then \( i \) offers \( V(C) \) to itself and zero to all parties in \( N \setminus \{i\} \); if party \( k \) is the formateur, then \( k \) selects \( C^* \) if \( C^* \in C \) and \( C' = \arg \max_{C \in C} V(C) \) otherwise. With respect to the acceptance thresholds, we require that any party \( i \) accepts an offer \( x_i \) if and only if \( x_i \geq x_i^* \).
To verify that this is an equilibrium, consider first a formateur $i \in N \setminus C^*$. In equilibrium the formateur’s offer is rejected and $i$ obtains $x^*_i = 0$ as soon as a member of $C^*$ is recognized as formateur (an event that for any $\Delta$, even if arbitrarily small, occurs with probability one since $T$ is regular). This formateur can strictly improve his/her payoff only if there is a coalition $C \in \mathcal{C}_i$ that would accept his/her offer. In this case, $i$ can not secure more than $x^*_i$, where

$$x^*_i = \min \{ \kappa(C'), \sum_{\ell \in C \setminus i} x^*_\ell - \sum_{\ell \in C \setminus i} x^*_i \},$$

where the second equality is used the fact that $\sum_{\ell \in C \setminus i} x^*_\ell \geq V(C')$ since $x^* \in K(N, V)$. There is therefore no deviation by $i$ that is strictly profitable. Consider now a formateur $i \in C^*$. By Proposition 1 and 2, the formateur finds it strictly optimal to deviate to a different coalition if there is a coalition $C^0$ such that $V(C^0) - \sum_{\ell \in C \setminus i} x^*_\ell > 0$, but then $x^* \notin K(N, V)$, a contradiction. Again, there is no deviation by $i$ that is strictly profitable. Regarding the acceptance strategies, it is immediate to verify that a party finds it optimal to accept any offer $x_i \geq x^*_i$.

9.5 Proof of Corollary 1

Proposition 3 and the argument in the text shows that there is an equilibrium in which the payoff $x^*$ is efficient. The property that the equilibrium is strongly efficient follows from the fact that, in the equilibrium constructed in the proof of Proposition 3, $x^*$ and the associated efficient coalition $C^*$ form for any initial formateur.

9.6 Proof of Proposition 4

The proofs is presented in the online appendix.

9.7 Proof of Proposition 5

We now characterize the set of equilibria. We start from the efficient equilibrium. Lemma A.5.1. deals with the case in which $d$ and $e$ are nonnegative.

**Lemma A.5.1.** Assume $d, e > 0$. If $d < a - e$, then 2 forms a coalition with 1 or 3, when given proposal power. If $d \geq a - e$ then there is an efficient equilibrium in which 2 is excluded from any coalition; and 1 and 3 receive a share $x_1, x_3$ for any $x_1, x_3$ such that $x_1 \geq a - d, x_3 \geq a, x_1 + x_3 \leq a + e$.

**Proof.** We have two cases to consider:

**Case 1.** We first consider the case $d < a - e$. Assume that when given proposal power, 2 fails to form a government. Then we must have: $a - d - x_2^3 - x_3^3 \leq 0$ and $a - x_2^3 - x_3^3 \leq 0$, else two would be able and find it profitable to form a government with either 1 or 3. By Lemma A.4.1 in Proposition 4 if 2 is unable to form a coalition, then no other party chooses to forms a government
with 2, so \( x_2^1 = 0, x_2^3 = 0 \). It follows from the inequalities above that \( x_1^3 \geq a - d \) and \( x_3^3 \geq a \). Note that \( x_1^1 + x_3^1 \leq a + \epsilon \). We conclude that an equilibrium in which 2 is never in a coalition can occur only if \( d \geq a - \epsilon \).

**Case 2.** Consider now the case \( d \geq a - \epsilon \). Let \( X^* = \{ x_1, x_3 | x_1 \geq a - d, x_3 \geq a, x_1 + x_3 \leq a + \epsilon \} \). It is easy to verify that there is an equilibrium in which 2 is unable to form a coalition and never included in any coalition by others; 1 proposes to 3 and 3 proposes to 1; \( x_1^1 = x_3^1 = x_i \) for \( i = 1, 3 \) and \( x_1, x_3 \in X^* \); and \( x_2^j = 0 \) for \( j = 1, 3 \).

**Lemma A.5.2.** deals with the case in which \( d \) and \( \epsilon \) are nonpositive.

**Lemma A.5.2.** Assume \( d \) and \( \epsilon \) are nonpositive. If \( d > -(a + \epsilon) \), then 3 forms a coalition with 1 or 2, when given proposal power. If \( d \leq -(a + \epsilon) \) then there is an efficient equilibrium in which 3 is excluded from any coalition; and 1 and 2 receive a share \( x_1, x_2 \) for any \( x_1, x_2 \) such that \( x_1 \geq a + \epsilon, x_2 \geq a, x_1 + x_2 \leq a - d \).

**Proof.** The proof of this result is analogous to the proof of Lemma A.5.1. It is presented for completeness in the online appendix.

We now turn to the inefficient equilibria.

**Lemma A.5.3** An equilibrium in which 1 forms a coalition with 3, 3 with 2 and 2 with 1 (clockwise equilibrium) exists if and only if: \( d \leq \min \{ 3a - 2e, \frac{3a}{4} + \frac{a}{4} \epsilon \} \) if \( d, e > 0 \); and \( d \geq -\frac{3a}{2} - 2e \) if \( d, e < 0 \).

**Proof.** We proceed in three steps. We first characterize the value functions assuming a clockwise equilibrium exists; we then prove that the strategies are optimal responses of the players first assuming \( d, e \geq 0 \), and finally \( d, e < 0 \).

**Step 1.** Let \( x_i^j \) be the equilibrium surplus captured by \( j \) if \( i \) is the formateur. Starting with formateur 1, we must have:

\[
x_1^1 = x_2^1 = \frac{a + \epsilon - x_1^3 - x_3^3}{2}, \quad x_2^1 = 0, \quad x_1^3 = x_2^3 = \frac{a - x_1^3 - x_3^3}{2}.
\]

(28)

These formula follows from (8) using as outside options the equilibrium values received if the attempt of 1 fails, so formateur 2 is selected (or analogously (6) and (7) as \( \Delta \to 0 \)). Similarly as in (28) we have:

\[
x_2^2 = x_1^3 + \frac{a - d - x_1^3 - x_2^3}{2}, \quad x_2^2 = x_2^3, \quad x_2^3 = 0
\]

\[
x_1^3 = 0, \quad x_2^3 = x_2^1 + \frac{x_1^3 - x_1^1}{2}, \quad x_3^3 = x_3^1 + \frac{x_1^3 - x_1^3}{2}.
\]

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Equations (28) and (29) give us a system of 3 equations in 3 unknowns with solutions:

\[
\begin{align*}
x_1^1 &= \frac{6a + 5e - 2d}{9}, \quad x_2^1 = 0, \quad x_3^1 = \frac{3a + 4e + 2d}{9} \\
x_1^2 &= \frac{3a + e - 4d}{9}, \quad x_2^2 = \frac{6a - e - 5d}{9}, \quad x_3^2 = 0 \\
x_1^3 &= 0, \quad x_2^3 = \frac{3a - 2e - d}{9}, \quad x_3^3 = \frac{6a + 2e + d}{9}.
\end{align*}
\]

**Step 2.** We now verify that they constitute an equilibrium if \(d, e > 0\). When 1 is the formateur, by Proposition 2, we have that \(\{1,3\}\) is formed if it maximizes the average surplus of the coalition when 1 is the formateur. Let \(S_1(C)\) be the average surplus in coalition \(C\) when 1 is the formateur. We have that: \(S_1(\{1,3\}) = (a + e - x_1^2) / 2 = (6a + 4d + 8e) / 18 > 0\) and \(S_1(\{1,2\}) = S_1(\{1,3\}) - (e + d + x_2^2) / 2 \leq S_1(\{1,3\})\). Thus we have \(S_1(\{1,3\}) > S_1(\{1,2\})\) and \(S_1(\{1,3\}) > 0\), implying that \(\{1,3\}\) is formed in equilibrium. When 2 is the formateur, \(\{1,2\}\) is formed if \(S_2(\{1,2\}) \geq S_2(\{2,3\})\). Since have: \(S_2(\{2,3\}) = \frac{1}{2} (a - \sum_{j=2,3} x_j^3) = 0\) and \(S_2(\{1,2\}) = \frac{1}{2} (a - \sum_{j=1,2} x_j^3) = \frac{6a - 8d + 2e}{18}\). We therefore have \(S_2(\{1,2\}) > S_2(\{2,3\})\) if and only if \(d \leq \frac{3}{4} a + \frac{1}{4} e\). When 3 is the formateur, \(\{2,3\}\) is formed if \(S_3(\{2,3\}) \geq S_3(\{1,3\})\). Since have: \(S_3(\{2,3\}) = a - \sum_{j=2,3} x_j^3 = \frac{6a - 4e - 2d}{9}\) and \(S_3(\{1,3\}) = a - \sum_{j=1,3} x_j^1 = 0\). It follows that the condition is satisfied if and only if \(d \leq 3a - 2e\). We conclude that a clockwise equilibrium exists when \(d, e \geq 0\) if and only if \(d \leq \min\{3a - 2e, \frac{3}{4} a + \frac{1}{4} e\}\).

**Step 3.** We now check when the payoffs in (29) describe an equilibrium if \(d, e < 0\). Consider first the case in which 1 is the formateur. We have: \(S_1(\{1,3\}) = (a + e - x_1^2) / 2 = (6a + 8e + 4d) / 18\) and \(S_1(\{1,2\}) = 0\). It follows that \(S_1(\{1,3\}) \geq S_1(\{1,2\})\) if and only if \(d \geq -\frac{3}{2} a - 2e\). Consider now Formateur 2. We have \(S_2(\{1,2\}) = \frac{1}{2} (a - d - x_2^3) = (6a - 8d + 2e) / 18\) and \(S_2(\{2,3\}) = 0\), so \(S_2(\{1,2\}) > S_2(\{2,3\})\) if \(6a - 8d + 2e \geq 0\). Note that if the condition for formateur 1 is verified, i.e. \(d \geq -\frac{3}{2} a - 2e\), then \(2e \geq -\frac{3}{2} a - d\), so \(6a - 8d + 2e \geq \frac{9}{2} a - 9d > 0\), implying that formateur 2 always finds it optimal to follow the strategies of the clockwise equilibrium. Finally consider formateur 3. We have: \(S_3(\{2,3\}) = (a - x_3^2 - x_1^3) / 2 = (6a - 4e - 2d) / 18 > 0\) and \(S_3(\{1,3\}) = 0\), so \(S_3(\{2,3\}) > S_3(\{1,3\})\) is always true. We conclude that a clockwise equilibrium exists when \(d, e < 0\) if and only if \(d \geq -\frac{3}{2} a - 2e\).

We now prove the existence of a counterclockwise equilibrium.

**Lemma A.5.4.** An equilibrium in which 1 forms a coalition with 2, 2 with 3 and 3 with 1 (counterclockwise equilibrium) exists if and only if: \(d \leq \frac{3}{4} a - \frac{1}{2} e\) if \(d, e > 0\); and \(d \geq -\frac{3}{4} a - \frac{1}{2} e\) and \(d \leq 3a + 7e\) if \(d, e < 0\).

**Proof.** The proof of this result is presented in the online appendix.

Lemmata A.5.1-A.5.4 define the thresholds presented in Proposition 5.
9.8 Proof of Proposition 6-9

The proofs of these results are presented in the online appendix. ■

9.9 Proof of Proposition 10

We must have that \( x_f^*(C,C_f) = V(C) - \sum_{i \in C \backslash f} a_i(C,f) \) where, as in Section 7.1.2, we use the notation \( x_f^*(C,C_f) \) to indicate the formateur’s payoff when \( C \) is selected and the equilibrium coalition is \( C_f \), to emphasize how it depends on \( C_f \). Note that

\[
x_f^*(C,C_f) = \sum_{i \in C \backslash f} u_i - (1-p) \sum_{i \in C \backslash f} \left[ q_i(C) \begin{bmatrix} V(C) \\ - \sum_{k \in C} a_k(C,C_f) \end{bmatrix} + a_i(C,C_f) \right]
\]

So we have:

\[
x_f^*(C,C_f) = V(C) - p \sum_{i \in C \backslash f} u_i - (1-p) \left[ (1 - q_f(C)) \left[ V(C) - \sum_{k \in C} a_k(C,C_f) \right] + V(C) - x_f^*(C,C_f) \right]
\]

where the first equality follows from the fact that \( \sum_{i \in C \backslash f} q_i(C) = q_f(C) \) (with the expression \( V(C) - \sum_{k \in C \backslash f} a_k(C,C_f) \) independent of \( i \)), and \( x_f^*(C,C_f) = V(C) - \sum_{i \in C \backslash f} a_i(C,C_f) \). Note that by definition, we must have \( a_f(C,f) = pu_f + (1-p) \left[ q_f(C)x_f^*(C,C_f) + (1-q_f(C))a_f(C,C_f) \right] \).

Thus,

\[
a_f(C,f) = \frac{pu_f + (1-p)q_f(C)x_f^*(C,C_f)}{1 - (1-p)(1-q_f(C))}.
\]

It follows that:

\[
x_f^*(C,C_f) = p \left[ V(C) - \sum_{i \in C \backslash f} u_i \right] + (1-p) \left[ \frac{q_f(C)x_f^*(C,C_f) + (1-q_f(C))u_f \cdot p}{1 - (1-p)(1-q_f(C))} \right].
\]

(30)

After some algebra, we have: \( x_f^*(C,C_f) = u_f + (1 - (1-p)(1-q_f(C))) \left[ V(C) - \sum_{i \in C \backslash f} u_i \right] \) or \( x_f^*(C,C_f) = u_f + \Omega(C) \) where we define \( \Omega \) to shorten the notation. As \( p \to 0 \), we obtain: \( x_f^*(C,C_f) = u_f + q_f(C) \left[ V(C) - \sum_{i \in C \backslash f} u_i \right] \). We now show that the equilibrium coalition is \( C_q^* \) as defined in (16). Assume by contradiction that we have an equilibrium in which a \( C_q \neq C_q^* \). From (30), we have: \( x_f^*(C_q^*,C_q) = x_f^*(C_q,C_q) + \left[ \Omega(C_q^*) - \Omega(C_q) \right] > x_f^*(C_q,C_q) \). Implied by this is not optimal for \( f \), a contradiction. Similarly we have that \( x_f^*(C_q,C_q^*) \leq x_f^*(C_q^*,C_q^*) \) for any \( C_q \in C_f \). We conclude that in equilibrium \( C_q^* \) is chosen. ■
References


